UK Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA, c.13)

Mechanism

SAMLA was enacted as the foundational Brexit-preparedness measure to repatriate the UK's sanctions capacity from EU Council Regulation machinery. Before SAMLA, UK participation in international sanctions regimes depended on EU retained law; SAMLA created the autonomous sovereign toolbox effective from exit day.

Part 1 — Sanctions Powers. Ministers (FCDO for geographic/thematic foreign-policy sanctions; HM Treasury for financial sanctions enforcement via OFSI) may make regulations by statutory instrument establishing:

• Financial sanctions: asset freezes, account restrictions, payments prohibitions, capital-market

restrictions (bond/equity issuance bans)

• Trade sanctions: import/export prohibitions on goods, technology, and services, with licensing

powers delegated to HMRC and DBT

• Immigration sanctions: travel bans (direction to Home Secretary)
• Aircraft/shipping sanctions: landing/port-access prohibitions
• Transport sanctions (added by post-SAMLA instruments)

Each SI must specify a "purpose" drawn from the statutory list: UN obligations, other international obligations, prevention of terrorism, national security, international peace and security, foreign policy objectives, promotion of resolution of armed conflicts, and promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

Part 2 — AML/CTF Powers. Replaces EU Anti-Money-Laundering Directive transposition mechanism with domestic SI-making powers, enabling HM Treasury to update AML/CTF regulations without primary legislation. The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/692) remain the primary AML instrument; SAMLA authorises future amendments.

Part 3 — Overseas Territories. Obliges UK Overseas Territories to implement public registers of beneficial ownership, with the power to introduce these registers by Order in Council if territories fail to do so by the target date (later extended to 2023 by the Economic Crime Act 2022, then again revised by the British Overseas Territories Act 2022).

OFSI enforcement architecture. Under SAMLA read with the Policing and Crime Act 2017 (which pre-established OFSI's civil penalty powers), HM Treasury/OFSI may:

• Impose monetary penalties up to £1 million or 50% of the value of the breach (whichever is

higher) for civil violations

• Make criminal referrals for wilful violations (maximum 7 years' imprisonment)
• Issue licenses for otherwise-prohibited transactions (humanitarian, legal-services, winding-down

general licenses)

Key statutory instruments made under SAMLA

SAMLA has underpinned more than 30 regulations since commencement. Major examples:

Relationship to filed IPTM actions

The following IPTM actions operate under SAMLA's enabling powers and are linked via responds_to / enforcement lineage:

• 2025-01-13-uk-ofsi-russia-shadow-fleet-sanctions — designations under Russia SI 2019/855
• 2025-03-20-uk-ofsi-hsf-russia-sanctions-penalty — OFSI civil penalty under Russia SI 2019/855
• 2026-02-09-uk-ofsi-enforcement-monetary-penalties-guidance-update — OFSI penalty-framework update
• 2026-03-19-uk-ofsi-apple-distribution-russia-sanctions-penalty — OFSI civil penalty, Russia SI
• 2026-03-12-uk-nsi-act-nars-reform — sibling statute (NSI Act 2021); different enabling instrument

Downstream implications

• Every UK OFSI enforcement action, designation listing, and thematic sanctions package derives

its legal authority from SAMLA; analysis of UK sanctions exposure must trace back to this statute.

• Post-Brexit, the UK can act faster than the EU (SI process vs. EU Council unanimity) but has

a smaller economic weight; SAMLA gives Parliament override powers by resolution if a Minister fails to revoke an expired sanctions designation.

• The AML Part 2 powers mean UK AML regulatory updates (FATF greylisting responses, crypto-AML

extensions) are made by SI without primary legislation — lower political friction than US Bank Secrecy Act amendments.

• Part 3 Overseas Territories beneficial-ownership obligation has been a sustained flashpoint

with British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands; enforcement timelines have slipped repeatedly.

Open questions

• Whether SAMLA's "foreign policy objectives" purpose clause is broad enough to authorise climate

or supply-chain-resilience sanctions (untested in litigation as of 2024)

• Pace of statutory-instrument making post-2025 general election under new FCDO/HMT leadership
• Court challenges to SAMLA-derived designation decisions (UK courts do not have IEEPA-equivalent

national-security deference — judicial review of designations is more robust than in the US)