OFAC International Criminal Court-Related Sanctions Regulations — codifying EO 13928 into 31 CFR Part 520

Mechanism

President Trump's Executive Order 13928 ("Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court," 11 June 2020, 85 FR 36139) declared a national emergency under IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act with respect to the ICC's assertion of jurisdiction over U.S. personnel (principally arising from the ICC's Afghanistan investigation, opened in 2016 and authorised to proceed in March 2020 after an appeals chamber reversed the pre-trial chamber's initial refusal). EO 13928 blocked property and suspended entry for persons who "directly engaged in" or "materially assisted" ICC efforts targeting U.S. or allied (i.e., non-ICC-state-party) personnel.

OFAC published the implementing regulations (31 CFR Part 520) on 1 October 2020 in abbreviated form to provide immediate guidance, with the intention to supplement the part with additional interpretive guidance, general licences, and statements of licensing policy. The interim rule established the standard IEEPA blocking framework:

• All property and interests in property of designated persons within

U.S. jurisdiction are blocked.

• U.S. persons are generally prohibited from transactions with

designated persons.

• The regulations applied to persons designated pursuant to EO 13928

and to any person whose property was otherwise blocked pursuant to the order.

Parallel to the Part 520 publication, OFAC also published amended regulations under two other programmes on the same date (FR doc 2020-21734 — WMD Proliferators / Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations).

Downstream implications

• No economic weight in practice: no designations were ever made under

31 CFR Part 520. The ICC-related blocking framework existed as a legal structure without activation.

• The principal compliance risk during the programme's life was for

U.S. law firms, NGOs, or professional-services providers that worked with or for the ICC — they faced potential SDN exposure absent licences.

• EU blocking-statute exposure (Regulation 2271/96) would have applied

had designations been made, creating potential jurisdictional bifurcation for EU-based entities.

• The regulatory architecture was short-lived: Biden EO 14022 (1 April

2021) terminated the national emergency; OFAC removal rule (FR doc 2021-14337, effective 6 July 2021) struck 31 CFR Part 520 entirely. See 2021-07-06-us-ofac-icc-sanctions-removal.

• The 2025 Trump administration re-created a functionally equivalent

programme under EO 14203 and 31 CFR Part 528, this time with active SDN designations against ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan and multiple judges. See 2025-02-06-us-eo-14203-icc-sanctions-program.

Open questions

• OFAC indicated intent to issue comprehensive regulations supplementing

Part 520, but the programme was terminated before any supplement was published — no final comprehensive rule ever appeared.

• The legal validity of IEEPA-based sanctions against an international

institution (rather than a sovereign state or its nationals) was challenged in litigation; the question was mooted when Biden terminated the programme in 2021 and has not been resolved on the merits.