BIS EAR: Military-Intelligence End-Use Controls Extended to Burma; Technical Corrections

Mechanism

This interim final rule operates on three tracks simultaneously:

Track 1 — Burma military-intelligence end-use controls (new scope). BIS added Burma to the list of countries covered by the military-intelligence end-use and end-user controls in 15 CFR § 744.22. Two Burmese government entities are specifically named as military-intelligence end users: the Office of Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA) and the Directorate of Signal — both organs of the State Administration Council (SAC) military that seized power on February 1, 2021. Exporters, reexporters, and transferors of items on the Commerce Control List (especially ECCN series ending in "A018" or in the "600 series") must now apply end-use and end-user due diligence before supplying Burma's military-intelligence apparatus.

Track 2 — U.S.-person activity restrictions for Burma. Under 15 CFR § 744.6, U.S. persons (wherever located) are prohibited from supporting military-intelligence end uses and end users in Burma. This extends beyond exports to encompass services, facilitation, shipping, and transmitting of items — a structural feature borrowed from the Russia/China mil-intel perimeter established in January 2021. U.S. nationals working for Burmese defence-technology integrators or telecom infrastructure companies serving the SAC face potential liability under this provision.

Track 3 — Technical corrections to the January 15, 2021 rule. The parent rule (FR Doc 2021-01879) inadvertently introduced formatting and cross-reference errors into 15 CFR Parts 732, 736, and 744. This April 2021 rule corrects those errors without substantively altering the scope of the original seven-country framework. The January 2021 rule itself was not separately filed in the IPTM register — this action captures both the Burma extension and serves as the primary register entry for the mil-intel end-use/end-user control architecture.

Downstream implications

• Burma now sits within a multilateral surveillance-technology restriction perimeter

alongside China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela under § 744.22.

• Any exports of CCL items with a "AT" (anti-terrorism) or "NS" (national security) control

for Burma that could plausibly benefit OCMSA or the Directorate of Signal require a BIS licence with a presumption of denial.

• U.S. telecom and networking companies with Burmese operations (e.g., services to

military-linked mobile infrastructure) must assess U.S.-person activity restrictions under § 744.6.

• The rule anchors BIS's role in the post-coup Burma response — OFAC's EO 14014 asset-

blocking and BIS's end-use controls are complementary but distinct legal perimeters.

• Subsequent BIS Entity List additions targeting Burma-based entities (July 2021, March 2023)

build on this foundation: entity-list entries impose item-level controls, whereas § 744.22 imposes end-use-level controls regardless of whether the end user is listed.

Open questions

• Whether the Directorate of Signal's acquisition of Chinese- or Israeli-sourced

surveillance platforms is being monitored under diversion-risk frameworks (third-country transshipment through Singapore or Thailand).

• No public record of a BIS enforcement action under the Burma § 744.22 controls as of

the filing date — enforcement visibility remains low relative to the Russia and China perimeters.