BIS Entity List: Five Xinjiang Solar and Polysilicon Producers Designated for Uyghur Forced Labor

Mechanism

BIS amended Part 744, Supplement No. 4 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add five entities under the destination of China (PRC). The action triggers an EAR license requirement (Case-by-Case Review for ECCNs 1A004.c/d, 1A995, 1A999.a, 1D003, 2A983, 2D983, 2E983, and items for infectious-disease detection/treatment; Presumption of Denial for all other items). This effectively bars US exporters from supplying technology, software, and most goods to the listed entities absent a BIS-approved license.

The legal basis is Executive Order 13959 (CMIC), the National Emergency declared under IEEPA, and BIS's foreign policy authority under EAR § 744.11. The stated finding: the five entities "have been implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of China's campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor and high-technology surveillance against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups."

The Five Entities

Context

This action was part of a coordinated 24-hour Xinjiang policy package on June 23–24, 2021. CBP issued a Withhold Release Order (WRO) on silica-based products from Hoshine on June 23, and the Department of Labor simultaneously updated its List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor to include polysilicon from China. The BIS Entity List designations followed on June 24. Taken together, the package targeted the full input chain for solar-grade silicon — from raw silica/MG-Si (Hoshine) through high-purity polysilicon (Daqo, GCL, East Hope).

The four polysilicon companies collectively accounted for a substantial share of global polysilicon supply at the time of designation. The solar industry's supply-chain exposure to Xinjiang polysilicon (estimated at ~35–45% of global supply) made this a high-profile trade-policy intervention with direct implications for the energy transition.

Downstream Implications

• These designations were a direct precursor to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA, Pub. L. 117-78, signed December 2021, enforcement from June 2022), which codified a rebuttable-presumption regime for all goods with Xinjiang nexus — a far broader instrument than entity-specific export controls.
• US solar project developers faced module supply disruptions and scrambled to source panels from non-Xinjiang polysilicon supply chains.
• Daqo New Energy (DQ) subsequently shifted production documentation efforts; its NYSE-listed parent has been separately subject to CBP enforcement under UFLPA.
• The XPCC designation complemented earlier OFAC sanctions (EO 13818, July 2020) which blocked US persons' property dealings with XPCC — the BIS layer added export-licensing requirements on top of the financial-prohibition layer.

Open Questions

• Whether the parent entities (GCL Technology, Daqo New Energy Corp) will face direct US capital-markets restrictions given their NYSE/HK listings and significant Xinjiang production footprint.
• Whether post-UFLPA enforcement actions against these same companies will supersede or add to the EAR-based Entity List restrictions.