US BIS: Additional EAR Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus — Quantum Computing, CBW Items, and EAR99 Industrial Expansion (Sep 2022)

Mechanism

This interim final rule (IFR) amends 15 CFR Parts 744 and 746 with five structural expansions to the Russia/Belarus EAR sanctions perimeter, effective 15 September 2022 (published 16 September 2022, 87 FR 57068, FR Doc 2022-19910, RIN 0694-AJ04):

1. Quantum computing controls — new licensing requirements

All quantum computing items — hardware, software, components, and related technical services — exported or re-exported to Russia or Belarus are now subject to BIS licensing requirements with a policy of denial. This applies regardless of whether the items were otherwise EAR99 or controlled on the CCL. Russia had been identified as a quantum research nation with state-backed institutes (several simultaneously designated by the State Department in this rulemaking), raising concerns about dual-use applications in cryptography, sensing, and communications-intelligence systems. The new controls align with the broader US strategy of denying Russia access to foundational emerging and enabling technologies (EETs).

2. Supplement No. 6 — Chemical and biological items

A new Supplement No. 6 to Part 746 was created, covering:

• Discrete chemicals and biologics identified by Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) numbers
• Fentanyl and fentanyl precursor chemicals (targeting Russia's reported use and domestic production

capability for chemical-weapons-adjacent synthetic opioids)

• Equipment for fentanyl and precursor production
• Biological equipment including bioreactors and related production apparatus

These items target Russia's CBW-adjacent procurement pathways. The addition of fentanyl precursors reflects US intelligence assessments of Russia's CBW-capable industrial infrastructure.

3. Supplement No. 4 — Industrial sector expansion (+57 EAR99 items)

Fifty-seven EAR99 items were added to the Russia/Belarus industry-sector sanctions list, including:

• Fork-lift trucks and materials-handling equipment
• Sawing and cutting machines
• Heating radiators and boilers
• Locomotives and rolling stock
• Contact lens solutions and consumer communications devices (tablets, microphones, headphones)
• Clothing and footwear above the $1,000 wholesale threshold

These items were previously uncontrolled to Russia/Belarus under the EAR. Adding them to Supplement No. 4 brings them under licensing requirements with a policy of denial, closing a procurement gap through which they were still reaching Russian industry via third-country diversion.

4. Military End User (MEU) designations and worldwide extension

Six entities were designated as Russian Military End Users, located across Russia, China, Lithuania, UK, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam — reflecting the diversion-network geography. Concurrently, the MEU/MIEU licensing requirement was extended to apply worldwide (previously it had been limited to six specified countries), substantially broadening the reach of the military end-user controls.

5. Foreign Direct Product Rule extension

The FDP Rule was extended to additional categories of foreign-produced items that are the direct product of certain US-origin software or technology subject to the EAR. Allied-nation exemptions apply: exports from EU member states, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the UK remain outside the expanded FDP Rule restrictions.

Downstream implications

• Quantum computing controls represent the first explicit EAR restriction on this technology class for

Russia, setting a precedent extended by subsequent BIS Russia/Belarus rules in 2023 and 2024.

• The worldwide extension of MEU licensing requirements significantly expanded BIS jurisdiction beyond

prior geographic limits, enabling action against diversion nodes in neutral or partner countries (notably: UK, UAE, Turkey, Central Asia) without a separate country-based framework.

• Fentanyl precursor controls in an export-control rule (rather than a OFAC sanctions instrument)

reflect cross-agency coordination between BIS and DEA, and signal a broadening of the Russia sanctions architecture beyond traditional dual-use categories.

• Supplement No. 6 became the template for subsequent CBW-adjacent additions in the February 2023

and November 2024 Russia/Belarus IFRs (2023-02-24-us-bis-ear-russia-belarus-additional-sanctions-industrial-luxury-bio, 2024-11-01-us-bis-russia-belarus-chemical-precursors-export-controls).

Open questions

• Whether the quantum computing controls were observed to slow Russian state research programs, or

whether domestic development and China supply chains provided adequate substitution paths.

• Whether fentanyl precursor controls had measurable interdiction effect given the scale of Russian

domestic chemical synthesis capacity.