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On December 16, 2022, BIS published a final rule (87 Fed. Reg. 76924, FR Doc 2022-27149) transferring nine Russian entities from the Unverified List to the Entity List under 15 C.F.R. Part 744. This was the first rule applied under BIS's October 2022 policy codifying that a host government's sustained non-cooperation with end-use checks (beyond 60 days of UVL listing) automatically triggers Entity List escalation — formalising a tougher "comply or escalate" framework distinct from the pre-2022 practice of indefinite UVL residence.
All nine entities receive identical restrictions:
| Entity | Location | Sector |
|---|---|---|
| Alliance EG Ltd. | St. Petersburg | Electronics/technology trading |
| FSUE Rosmorport Far Eastern Basin Branch | Far Eastern Russia | State maritime port infrastructure (Ministry of Transport) |
| Intercom Ltd. | St. Petersburg | IT/communications |
| Nasosy Ampika | Moscow | Industrial pump manufacturing (dual-use equipment) |
| Nuclin LLC | Moscow | Possible nuclear/energy-adjacent technology |
| SDB IRE RAS (Special Design Bureau of IRE RAS) | Fryazino, Moscow Oblast | Defense R&D — microwave devices, radar, radio engineering (Russian Academy of Sciences entity; dissolved March 2023) |
| Security 2 Business Academy (aka S2BA) | Moscow | Security consulting/training |
| Tavrida Microelectronics | Dolgoprudny, Moscow Oblast | Defense microelectronics (System-in-Package technology for Russia's defense/security sector) |
| VIP Technology Ltd. | St. Petersburg | Technology trading |
The two most significant designees from a defense perspective are SDB IRE RAS (a federal research institute focused on radar, microwave, and radio-electronics — applied to weapons guidance and EW) and Tavrida Microelectronics (System-in-Package defense MCMs with domestic-component sourcing). The inclusion of FSUE Rosmorport's Far Eastern branch likely reflects procurements of controlled maritime navigation and vessel-traffic technology.
a policy statement — subsequent BIS rules in 2023-25 use the same mechanism routinely.
ambiguity that UVL-listed Russian entities could remain in a softer enforcement category indefinitely.
unwinding of at least one state defense-R&D structure.
procurements (e.g., vessel traffic systems, icebreaking tech) or as a broader deterrent.
supply chain activity not yet publicly detailed.