Loading…
Loading…
Base rate computed from analyst-asserted responds_to: edges in the reverse direction (target-country → issuer-country) for prior issuer-actions on the same target. Modal type + lag percentiles only — not a model output. Treat as a historical anchor for sizing counter-response scenarios, not a forecast in itself.
BIS amended two CFR parts simultaneously:
column for China (CN) and Macau (MO). Before this rule, neither country had NP2 entries, meaning exporters could ship items controlled only for NP2 reasons to China or Macau without a BIS licence.
expanded NP2 country scope and updated the corresponding licensing policy provisions.
The eight ECCN families now subject to NP2 licensing requirements for China and Macau:
| ECCN | Category |
|---|---|
| 1A290 | Nuclear reactors and major components |
| 1C298 | Other nuclear-related materials (depleted uranium, heavy graphite, deuterium) |
| 2A290 | Nuclear-related machine tools |
| 2A291 | General nuclear-plant equipment (generators, pumps, heat exchangers) |
| 2D290 | Nuclear-related software |
| 2E001 | Technology for development of nuclear equipment |
| 2E002 | Technology for production of nuclear equipment |
| 2E290 | Technology for use of nuclear equipment |
Licence review policy: Per § 742.3(b)(3)–(4), BIS applies a case-by-case review standard for China and Macau. Exports supporting clearly peaceful end uses (commercial power generation, medical isotope production) are reviewed favourably; items with plausible military-nuclear application face a presumption of denial.
Erratum chain: The Country Chart table was mis-printed in the original Federal Register publication. Two subsequent corrections were issued:
table entry; the corrected text itself contained a secondary rendering error.
authoritative version of the NP2 entries for China and Macau in the Country Chart.
The substantive policy was established by this August 14 rule and was unaffected by the erratum chain.
The preamble cites China's accelerating nuclear force expansion (estimated by US DoD at ≥1,000 warheads by 2030), military-civil fusion obligations that could divert civilian nuclear technology to weapons programs, and China's failure to conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. Prior to 2023, NP2 controls had been applied to a limited set of countries known to have unsafeguarded nuclear programs; this rule significantly expands the country scope to include a P5 state, which is unusual in the nonproliferation control architecture.
must now obtain a BIS export licence where no NP2 licence was previously required.
utilities are directly affected; licence applications are reviewed case-by-case rather than under a licence exception.
industrial processes) now require licence review, raising compliance burden for non-nuclear commercial exporters.
aggregate approval/denial breakdown for this rule class.