US Executive Order 14154 — Unleashing American Energy

Mechanism

EO 14154 is the foundational deregulatory instrument of Trump's second-term energy agenda, enacted on Day 1 alongside a declaration of "national energy emergency" under the National Emergencies Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The order operates across three main channels:

1. LNG export licence resumption. The Biden DOE pause of 26 January 2024 had placed on hold all pending applications to export LNG to non-FTA countries under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. At the time of Trump's inauguration, at least 17 applications were in the queue representing ~40 Bcf/day of additional export capacity if approved. EO 14154 directed the DOE Secretary to process these applications "as expeditiously as possible" and mandated that the "public interest" criterion be interpreted to include economic and employment impacts as well as the energy security of US allies and partners — a geopolitical weighting that had been absent from Biden-era reviews.

2. Upstream re-opening. The EO directed reopening of offshore petroleum and gas leasing (reversing Biden's Gulf Coast and Atlantic moratoria), federal-lands coal leasing, and exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) — all previously restricted under the Biden administration's climate commitments. Agencies were instructed to identify all energy-related permits and regulations for expedited processing.

3. Biden EO rescissions. The order explicitly revoked: EO 14082 (Advancing the Inclusion of Women and Girls in US International Development and Diplomacy — energy elements), EO 14037 (Strengthening the Buy American Provisions), EO 14072, EO 14151, and directed a comprehensive review of all Biden-era energy regulations for reversal.

Downstream implications

• The LNG licence resumption is the single most consequential US energy-export-deregulation

decision of 2025 — it directly affects global LNG spot and contract markets, particularly for European utilities (still reducing Russian pipeline dependence) and Asian buyers (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) seeking long-term supply agreements.

• The "allies security" weighting in the public-interest test institutionalises geopolitical

considerations in DOE licensing, previously handled informally. This has precedential value for future LNG and gas-infrastructure export reviews.

• The Biden DOE pause had been commercially damaging for US LNG project developers

(Venture Global, New Fortress Energy, Sempra, NextDecade) awaiting licence determinations; the resumption removed a regulatory overhang on FID decisions for next-generation export terminals.

• Federal coal-leasing resumption primarily affects Powder River Basin producers; near-term

export impact is modest given Asian metallurgical-coal market dynamics.

Open questions

• DOE pace of actual licence determinations: the EO directs expeditious processing but does

not set timelines; the administrative backlog (17+ applications) may take 12–24 months to clear even with the pause lifted.

• FERC and environmental-review requirements remain unchanged; downstream pipeline and

terminal permitting still subject to NGA Section 7 and NEPA review.

• Whether the "allies security" weighting survives judicial challenge under the APA or

the Natural Gas Act's statutory public-interest standard.