Treasury sanctions Houthi-linked petroleum smuggling and sanctions-evasion network

Mechanism

OFAC designated two individuals and five entities pursuant to E.O. 13224 (as amended, counterterrorism sanctions authority) for materially assisting the Houthis. Muhammad Al-Sunaydar manages a Yemen/UAE petroleum-import network (Arkan Mars Petroleum Company for Oil Products Imports, plus UAE-based Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC and FZE) that holds an agreement with the Houthis to import gas and oil — including Iranian petroleum products — through the Houthi-controlled Hudaydah and Ras Isa ports. The three Arkan Mars entities coordinated the delivery of approximately $12 million of Iranian petroleum products with the Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Company (PGPICC), an entity previously designated by OFAC under E.O. 13382 as owned or controlled by an IRGC-linked petrochemical conglomerate — establishing a direct Iran-Houthi commercial link. Separately, Yahya Mohammed Al Wazir launders and raises funds for the Houthis via Al-Saida Stone for Trading and Agencies (a nominal Sana'a stationery wholesaler that made roughly €6 million in bulk-coal payments across five transactions between November and December 2024) and Amran Cement Factory, a Houthi-controlled producer whose output has been redirected since March 2025 toward fortifying military and weapons-storage sites in the Saada region.

The Houthis generate hundreds of millions of dollars annually by taxing petroleum imports and controlling the resale price of fuel inside Houthi-held Yemen; this action targets the commercial layer — importers, shell trading companies, and a cement producer doubling as a money-laundering vehicle — that sustains that revenue stream. All US-touching property of the designees is blocked, and foreign financial institutions risk secondary sanctions exposure for knowingly facilitating significant transactions with them.

Downstream implications

• Confirms a direct commercial nexus between Iran's IRGC-linked petrochemical

trade apparatus (PGPICC) and Houthi-aligned import networks — reinforcing the Iran-Houthi supply relationship already tracked in adjacent Iran maximum-pressure designations.

• Extends the same mid-2024-onward Houthi-network designation cadence as

[[2025-09-11-us-ofac-houthi-illicit-revenue-procurement-networks]] and [[2026-01-16-us-ofac-houthi-smuggling-illicit-revenue-networks]] — expect continued rolling waves rather than a one-off action.

• UAE-based shell entities (Arkan Mars DMCC/FZE) again feature as the

jurisdiction of choice for structuring Houthi-linked petroleum trade, consistent with recurring Gulf trans-shipment/laundering patterns in this sanctions program.

Open questions

• Whether PGPICC's designation-driven blocking materially disrupted the

Iranian petroleum flow to Ras Isa, or whether replacement intermediaries emerged (as seen in later 2025/2026 actions in this series).

• No specific compliance wind-down deadline was set (standard OFAC immediate-

designation practice); watch for any general license covering pre-existing contracts.