Presidential Decree No. 693 of 30 September 2025 ("On certain particularities of the sale of property held in federal ownership"), signed by Vladimir Putin and entered into force on the day of its official publication, creates an accelerated pathway for disposing of federally-owned property in cases determined by a separate decision of the President, where the goal is to ensure the Russian Federation's defence capability and security. Market valuation and the appraisal report must be completed within 10 business days of signing the appraisal contract; PSB Bank JSC (formerly Promsvyazbank, the state-controlled defence-procurement bank) is designated as the sale-organising agent and seller-on-behalf-of-the-state. The Decree also authorises the President to set special features of how Russian legislation on privatisation, joint-stock companies, limited-liability companies, the securities market, banks and competition protection applies to such sales. Expressly framed as a counter-measure to "unfriendly" actions by the United States and its allies; structurally the disposal-mechanism complement to the foreign-asset external- administration and seizure decrees (95/322/520/442) — the fast-track liquidation channel that converts seized or nationalised assets into state-budget cash for defence purposes.

Analyst notesShow

Mechanism

Decree 693 is short — three substantive paragraphs — but structurally important. It does not itself nationalise or seize any specific asset. What it does is build a pre-authorised fast-track liquidation conveyor that the President can activate by separate decision for any federally- owned asset, with three core simplifications:

1. 10-business-day market-valuation cap: where standard Russian privatisation procedure under Federal Law 178-FZ requires a full independent appraisal that can take weeks, Decree 693 caps the valuation contract → final report cycle at 10 business days. 2. PSB Bank as sole sale-organising agent: PSB (Promsvyazbank, taken into state hands in 2018 and converted into Russia's defence- procurement and sanctioned-counterparty bank) replaces the standard range of authorised sale-organisers. PSB acts as seller on behalf of the Russian Federation and runs the auction. 3. Bespoke disapplication of competing legislation: the President can by separate decision set special features of how privatisation law, joint-stock-companies law, LLC law, the securities-market law, banking law and competition-protection law apply to a particular sale — effectively a per-deal carve-out from any procedural rule that would otherwise block or delay it.

The decree's "in cases determined by a decision of the President" gating language is the operative discretion: the asset-by-asset trigger remains with Putin, and the published Decree 693 text does not enumerate qualifying assets. Subsequent presidential ukases will identify specific properties and route them through PSB.

Downstream implications

Conveyor for the seizure decrees. The 2022-2025 Russian counter-

sanctions decree stack (95 / 322 / 520 / 442 / 25-04-2023 external- administration framework) creates a pipeline of foreign-controlled assets that have been moved into temporary state administration or subjected to forced exit. Decree 693 is the back-end of that pipeline — the fast-track that monetises seized / nationalised assets into budget cash earmarked for defence-capability and security purposes.

PSB monopoly on defence-related asset disposal. Centralising

sale-organisation in PSB consolidates the Russian defence-finance perimeter: PSB already holds the lion's share of state-defence-order contracts and ESCROW accounts; adding asset-sale agent mandate thickens its role as the singular intermediary between sanctioned counterparties and the Russian state.

Signal to European corporates still in Russia. Coverage in RFE/RL

and Western financial press read the Decree as a near-term threat vector for Western-headquartered businesses still operating in Russia — particularly those whose Russian subsidiaries have already been placed under temporary external administration. The 10-day valuation cap precludes meaningful pre-sale negotiation between current beneficial owners and state authorities.

**Counter-measure positioning vs EU REPO 2.0 / frozen-asset

reparations debate.** The Decree's signing date (30 Sept 2025) sits in the window when (a) EU member states were debating the use of frozen Russian sovereign assets as reparations to Ukraine and (b) US senators introduced bipartisan REPO 2.0 legislation. Decree 693 functions as a public-facing demonstration of Russia's parallel disposal capability — i.e. signalling that any Western move to monetise frozen Russian assets can be answered by accelerated disposal of foreign- owned assets in Russia.

Open questions

Does any subsequent presidential decision under Decree 693 publicly

name specific assets, or are the activations made via classified presidential ukases?

How does PSB's sale-organising mandate interact with the Government

Commission on Foreign Investment Control — which retains authority over forced-exit transactions involving "unfriendly-state" beneficial owners under Decrees 81, 254, 618 and the May 2024 Decree 442?