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The original DL 175/2025 ("Transizione 5.0", GU n. 271 of 21 November 2025) is a sectoral measure on tax credits for industrial-energy transition and renewables-permitting. The Golden Power expansion is not in the original text — it was inserted during parliamentary conversion as Article 2-bis. This is a typical Italian legislative pattern (the conversion law as omnibus vehicle) and is the same mechanism used by Decreto Asset / Legge 136/2023 in the prior 2023 expansion of the Golden Power perimeter to intra-group transactions and IP-rights operations (see 2023-08-10-italy-decreto-asset-golden-power-expansion).
Three substantive changes in Article 2-bis:
1. Statutory extension to banking, credit, and insurance. Qualifying-holding acquisitions (and certain other transactions) in Italian credit institutions, insurers, and other supervised financial intermediaries are now expressly within the Golden Power scope. The 2023 Decreto Asset had created an "exceptional situation" residual veto over financial-sector transactions; the 2026 amendment converts that residual power into an explicit sectoral perimeter.
2. New public-order criterion: "national economic and financial security." Added alongside the pre-existing security / public-order profiles. This is the legislative mirror of the policy doctrine the Meloni government has been articulating since the 2023-2025 banking-consolidation episodes (UniCredit/BPM, UniCredit/Commerzbank, BPER offer for Banca Popolare di Sondrio, MPS/Mediobanca takeover).
3. Coordination clause with European authorities. Italy cannot exercise Golden Power special powers in the financial sector before the conclusion of pending procedures before competent EU authorities (ECB Single Supervisory Mechanism on prudential profiles; EIOPA on insurance; EU Commission on competition and foreign-subsidies). This is an explicit response to the EU Commission Article 258 TFEU infringement procedure opened on 21 November 2025 against Italy over the Golden Power exercise on UniCredit's BPM bid and around the MPS/Mediobanca transaction.
The conversion law was approved by Parliament on 14-15 January 2026 and published in Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 15 of 20 January 2026; under Italian constitutional rules the law entered into force on 21 January 2026 (the day after publication).
screening into financial-sector M&A in the EU since the 2017 EU FDI Screening Regulation, on a G7 economy that hosts UniCredit (one of the EU's two systemic cross-border banks) and Generali (one of Europe's largest insurance groups).
EU coordination clause meaningfully constrains unilateral exercise — Italy must wait for ECB SSM / EIOPA / DG COMP proceedings to conclude before vetoing or conditioning a transaction; (b) the amendment formalises rather than invents the financial-sector veto power (the 2023 "exceptional situation" residual already covered finance); (c) prior Italian Golden Power practice in the banking space has been heavy-conditions / prescriptions rather than outright prohibition.
perimeter to block (rather than condition) a major cross-border EU-banking transaction — the UniCredit/Commerzbank track is the most-watched test.
the European Commission have been arguing that cross-border consolidation is a precondition for completing banking union; Italy's statutory extension of Golden Power to qualifying holdings in supervised banks creates a national-security veto layer on top of ECB qualifying-holdings clearance. The coordination clause defers but does not eliminate the friction.
2025 procedure was opened over the original prescription pattern on UniCredit/BPM; the 2026 statutory codification gives the Commission a stronger statutory target but also gives Italy the argument that the new EU-coordination clause cures the proportionality concern.
contemplating Italian banking targets must now plan for a dual track (ECB SSM clearance + Italian Golden Power notification with potential conditional clearance), with longer end-to-end timing. This raises the implementation-risk premium on Italian bank acquisition deals.
already been examining banking-sector FDI screen reforms; Italy's explicit statutory perimeter sets a precedent peer member states may copy, fragmenting the FDI-screening landscape further.
for the Article 258 procedure, or escalate to a reasoned opinion / referral to the Court of Justice?
Phase II reviews where DG COMP timelines extend the "pending procedure" window — does the Italian veto effectively stay until Brussels closes, and what are the deadlines?
Italian-bank-as-target deal) be the first test case under the new Article 2-bis perimeter?
procedural rules implementation that was still in consultation through mid-2025?