Türkiye Presidential Decision No. 11068 — Military and Dual-Use Goods Transit Control Framework

Mechanism

Presidential Decision No. 11068 creates the first explicit Turkish legal instrument requiring pre-clearance for the transit trade of controlled military-related goods. The legal basis is Law No. 5201 on the Control of War Materials and Their Technologies ("Harp Araç ve Gereçleri ile Silah, Mühimmat ve Patlayıcı Maddeler Kanunu"), which had long governed the domestic control of such items but had been selectively enforced in practice, particularly with respect to goods destined for or transiting toward Iran.

The compliance letter ("uygunluk yazısı") requirement is the operative mechanism: exporters or transit operators must apply to the Ministry of Trade before moving covered goods through Turkish customs territory. The Ministry conducts a multi-agency review — effectively embedding intelligence and security clearance checks into a trade-compliance process. This shifts the burden of proof from the regulator (to prove a violation occurred) to the applicant (to prove the transit is legitimate before clearance is granted).

Context: US sanctions-diversion pressure

The decision did not emerge from domestic initiative. A sustained 2023-2025 US enforcement campaign progressively named Türkiye-based companies in BIS Entity List additions and OFAC actions targeting Iran-sanctions evasion networks. The October 2025 BIS Entity List batch (2025-10-09-us-bis-entity-list-iran-diversion-china-turkey-uae) specifically cited Türkiye-based diversion conduits alongside Chinese and UAE actors — placing Türkiye on notice that secondary-consequences risk was escalating.

Nordic Monitor reporting (April 2026) confirms the decision is explicitly framed within the Turkish government as a response to US pressure, following diplomatic demarches and bilateral discussions about Iran-sanctions compliance. Critics — including Nordic Monitor — note that structural enforcement capacity remains weak: Turkish Customs has limited post-clearance verification resources, and the uygunluk yazısı mechanism depends on the Ministry of Trade acting on intelligence it may not independently possess.

Scope assessment

Covered categories broadly align with Turkish Law 5201 schedules and encompass:

• Military vehicles, armoured fighting vehicles, and defence systems
• All small arms, crew-served weapons, artillery, and their ammunition
• Spare parts and support equipment for military systems
• Military-grade explosives and propellants
• Dual-use technologies "associated with" the above (a broad catch-all clause)

The decision applies to transit passage (goods moving through Turkish ports/airports/borders without entering free circulation) and re-export under transit trade arrangements — specifically targeting the intermediary-trade structures commonly used in diversion networks.

Downstream implications

• Türkiye-based trading companies operating as intermediaries in Iran-bound supply chains

face immediate compliance costs and legal exposure; the measure gives Turkish prosecutors a domestic legal hook to act where US pressure alone was insufficient.

• For the US and EU, the measure is a necessary but insufficient step: enforcement quality

will determine whether actual diversion volumes decline or simply route through alternative jurisdictions (UAE, Iraq, Georgia remain key alternative transit hubs).

• The Erdoğan government's willingness to promulgate the decree signals a tactical

accommodation with US Iran-policy priorities — notable given the concurrent Türkiye-Russia relationship and Türkiye's historical ambiguity on Iran sanctions.

• Watch: whether Turkish Customs publishes implementing regulations specifying the uygunluk

yazısı application procedure, timelines, and appeal rights — without these, the measure remains largely declaratory.

Open questions

• Do dual-use goods not covered by Law 5201 (e.g., civilian electronics with military

applications, chemical precursors) require separate measures under Turkey's Dual-Use Control Regulation (based on EU Regulation 428/2009)?

• Will OFAC/BIS publicly acknowledge the Turkish measure as reducing secondary-sanctions

risk for Turkish financial institutions currently operating under heightened scrutiny?

• Is enforcement being delegated to a specific Ministry of Trade directorate, or handled

ad hoc by the Import Regime General Directorate?