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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
Masan High-Tech Materials Corporation (MSR, a Masan Group company) owns and operates, through 100 %-owned subsidiaries in Thai Nguyen province, Vietnam, the Nui Phao polymetallic mine — described as the largest tungsten mine outside China — and a tungsten processing plant producing APT and tungsten oxide. The mine yields tungsten, fluorspar, bismuth and copper concentrates. In 2025 MSR reported net revenue of VND 7.
44 trn (~US$286 M), with tungsten the leading segment at ~US$171.5 M. It sold its downstream business H.C. Starck to Mitsubishi Materials in December 2024 (see `h-c-starck-tungsten`) and, under the 30 May 2024 definitive agreements, entered a long-term APT and tungsten-oxide offtake with the Mitsubishi Materials group.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Masan High-Tech Materials produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tungsten (producer; *bulk output* — the core product, concentrate refined on-site to APT/oxide). China dominates mined and refined supply and has tightened mining quotas and export controls, which makes Nui Phao one of the few scaled non-China sources; MSR's exposure is as a beneficiary of that concentration and as a supplier on a VN→JP offtake c…
Copper (producer; *by-product* concentrate). Small relative to tungsten; copper exposure is price rather than supply-chokepoint driven for MSR.
Bismuth (producer; *minor by-product* concentrate). Refined bismuth supply is heavily China-concentrated; MSR is a small non-China source.
Fluorspar (producer; *bulk co-product* — acid-grade concentrate). Supply is China-concentrated; MSR reports rising fluorspar recovery at Nui Phao.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Copper (producer; *by-product* concentrate). Small relative to tungsten; copper exposure is price rather than supply-chokepoint driven for MSR.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CN · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 25 Jul 2026, 72d pending
Effective 1 May 2026 China suspended exports of all ordinary industrial sulfuric acid — including the acid co-produced from copper/zinc smelting — with only electronic-grade high-purity acid still exportable under special approval; reporting attributes the measure to a joint Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) + General Administration of Customs (GACC) notice, expected to run through end-2026. Sulfuric acid is the indispensable leach/process input for copper hydrometallurgy (SX-EW), phosphate-fertilizer production, and battery-metal (nickel HPAL, lithium) processing, so a China export halt tightens a systemic upstream chokepoint hitting seaborne-acid buyers (Chile/Peru copper, Morocco/India phosphate, Indonesia nickel). This is a DISTINCT instrument from the already-filed 2025-12-12-china-ndrc-phosphate-fertilizer-export-suspension (finished-fertilizer export control) and 2026-03-31-russia-decree-350-sulphur-export-ban-extension (elemental sulphur, different country/product) — it controls the acid itself.
source ↗Copper (producer; *by-product* concentrate). Small relative to tungsten; copper exposure is price rather than supply-chokepoint driven for MSR.
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
ZM · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 31 Jul 2026, 66d pending
Minister of Finance, acting under s. 89 of the Customs and Excise Act, cut the copper-concentrate export duty to ZERO for tariff headings 2603. 00. 21 / 2603. 00. 22 / 2603. 00. 23 / 2603. 00. 29, capped at 271,742 t, effective 1 June 2026 with automatic lapse 30 September 2026, with per-entity tonnage caps and (per one secondary) a requirement that exempt shipments channel through Industrial Resources Limited. This is a SUPPLY-RELIEF (liberalising) action — a net EASING of a copper/cobalt chokepoint for ~4 months, explicitly to clear stockpiled unprocessed concentrate while Zambia's major smelters are down for extended maintenance. It is the "(No. 2)" successor instrument to the already-filed 2026-03-05-zambia-si-15-2026-copper-concentrates-export-duty-suspension (a distinct SI with its own number, tonnage cap and validity window). Severity ~2 expected.
source ↗Copper (producer; *by-product* concentrate). Small relative to tungsten; copper exposure is price rather than supply-chokepoint driven for MSR.
This changes the form of what ZM exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your ZM-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a ZM processing partner, not a supplier switch.
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
MN · stage draft-published → moderate likelihood · touches tungstencopperfluorspar · flagged 27 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising holding fees (to curb speculative licence-trading/flipping); (ii) introduces a STATUTORY definition of "critical minerals" (aligned to Mongolia's 11-mineral list: molybdenum, manganese, nickel, copper, fluorspar, graphite, REEs, cobalt, lithium, PGMs, tungsten) and a SEPARATE licensing regime for downstream beneficiation plants; (iii) mandates mine-closure plans + financial bonding once a mine reaches 75% of its life; aims to accelerate licence issuance and expand the resource base. Mongolia is a structural China/Russia-flanked chokepoint pursuing Western REE/copper partnerships (US FORGE, JP, KR), so a domestic critical-minerals statutory regime + downstream-processing licensing reprices the entry terms for any foreign developer of Mongolian copper/REE/fluorspar (Oyu Tolgoi-adjacent, Erdenes critical-minerals SOE pipeline).
source ↗Tungsten (producer; *bulk output* — the core product, concentrate refined on-site to APT/oxide). China dominates mined and refined supply and has tightened mining quotas and export controls, which makes Nui Phao one of the few scaled non-China sources; MSR's exposure is as a beneficiary of that concentration and as a supplier on a VN→JP offtake c…
Copper (producer; *by-product* concentrate). Small relative to tungsten; copper exposure is price rather than supply-chokepoint driven for MSR.
Fluorspar (producer; *bulk co-product* — acid-grade concentrate). Supply is China-concentrated; MSR reports rising fluorspar recovery at Nui Phao.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
tungsten — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
MW · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches copper · flagged 13 Aug 2026, 53d pending
President Peter Mutharika signed an executive order (dated 23 Oct 2025, effective 21 Oct 2025, announced at Sanjika Palace during a cabinet swearing-in) prohibiting the export of raw/unprocessed minerals extracted in Malawi — uranium, rare earth elements, niobium, graphite, tantalum, bauxite, coal, limestone, gemstones, heavy mineral sands, vermiculite, phosphate, rutile, gold, diamonds, copper and others — with an exemption for minerals processed/refined/value-added domestically per Malawian mining law. Announced alongside a suspension of new mining-licence issuance and a review of mining laws (2026/27 State of the Nation Address), plus a planned sovereign wealth fund. Stated rationale: local beneficiation, targeting up to USD 500m/yr once the Kasiya rutile/graphite deposit (Lilongwe) and Kangankunde rare-earth project (Balaka, Mkango Resources — Africa's prospective first new REE mine since 2017, targeting late-2026 production) are fully developed. Violators face fines/penalties under Malawian law. MW is currently the THINNEST country in the register (1 prior action) despite this breadth of minerals covered. Export-ban/beneficiation-mandate, same instrument class as Zimbabwe's SI 213/2022 raw-mineral bans and Guinea's 2026 gold-export ban already in the register.
source ↗Copper (producer; *by-product* concentrate). Small relative to tungsten; copper exposure is price rather than supply-chokepoint driven for MSR.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Malawi stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Malawi processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
copper — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No.
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax…
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators…
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0.
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mini…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — cover…
State-owned QMSD (Qatar Mining Company subsidiary), paused since Sudan's 2023 civil war, confirmed at a 13 May 2026 Port Sudan meeting between Sudan's Minister of Minerals Nour al-Daim Taha and Qatar…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Saudi state mining-investment vehicle Manara Minerals (the PIF/Ma'aden JV) is negotiating to buy a 10–20% stake in the Reko Diq copper-gold project (Balochistan, Pakistan) for ~$500M–$1bn, acquiring…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in negotiation to buy a 10-20% stake (deal value ~USD 500m-1bn) in the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Balochistan, Pakistan — one…
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
2 of 51 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 4 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of tungsten. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tungsten chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of copper. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the copper chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of bismuth. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the bismuth chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of fluorspar. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the fluorspar chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.