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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Company profile →
Slovmag a.s. is a refractories works (formerly also a magnesite mine, now suspended — see below) at Lubeník (Revúca district, Banská Bystrica region, Slovakia), with mining tradition dating to 1897 and the current joint-stock company registered in 1994.
It historically mined magnesite ore (~42% MgO) and processed it on-site into sintered and fused magnesia and shaped/unshaped basic refractory products — used to line steelmaking furnaces, non-ferrous metallurgy vessels, cement rotary kilns and lime kilns, plus some use in electric storage heaters. As of late 2025 the on-site mine has suspended extraction (Ukraine-war export decline to Ukraine/Russia/Belarus plus higher energy and raw-material costs); the company filed a plan in June 2026 to flood and decommission the mine workings. Refractory production continues, now on externally-sourced magnesite; the workforce fell from ~450 (spring 2023) to over 260 (mid-2026). It is a small, loss-making producer: FinStat registry data shows revenue of €30.1M (2024, loss €3.3M) and €36.8M (2025, loss €0.56M).
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Slovmag Lubeník produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Magnesium — Slovmag's entire output (magnesite ore, sintered/fused magnesia, refractory products) sits in the magnesium value chain. Global magnesium *metal* production is ~91% concentrated in China (CRM Alliance), making any EU-based magnesium-chain capacity strategically scarce — but magnesite/magnesia itself is **not currently on the EU Critica…
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
No upcoming policy in our register currently touches magnesium. The pipeline is re-scanned continuously; this line changes the day that changes.
These are not proposals — each links to the register entry with its primary source. They set the baseline the pipeline items above would tighten further.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 1 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of magnesium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the magnesium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.