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One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If China refining (60% of global) halts: 5 substitutes cover 100% of non-CN capacity · fastest ramp 0-6mo (BE) · highest policy-risk: US (score 3.4, 7 filings) · 1 of these (RU) sit under comprehensive Western sanctions and aren't a real option for a Western buyer regardless of the risk score.
Stage: Germanium refining (zinc/lignite byproduct recovery; modelled split) · Year: 2025 · Source: Modelled refining split — USGS MCS 2026 publishes no country shares for germanium ("most producers do not publicly report"); China stated as leading producer. Estimate anchored on USGS narrative + US-import-source shares + IEA/EU-JRC ~60% China refined-Ge..
Post-removal HHI = 2,345 (moderate). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m germanium filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Germanium is gallium's twin in the China counter-strike — paired with Ga at every escalation step (August 2023 export licensing, December 2024 outright ban to the US under MOFCOM Announcement No. 46, November 2025 suspension to 27 November 2026). USGS MCS 2026 explicitly publishes NO country production split ("most producers do not publicly report germanium production"), naming only that China is "the leading global producer and exporter" among the few processors (US, Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Russia); the shares here are a MODELLED estimate (see GERMANIUM_ESTIMATE source note), anchored on the USGS narrative, US import-source data (Belgium 41% / China 23% / Canada 17% / Germany 14% combined), and IEA/EU-JRC ~60%-China refined-Ge figures. Recovered as a byproduct of zinc (lead-zinc-copper sulphide) ores and lignite coal. End uses: fibre-optic glass, infrared optics (defence thermal imaging), space-grade multijunction solar cells, and radiation detectors — silicon/GaAs substitute only partially. The US is >50% net-import-reliant with no primary refinery. The December 2024 US ban cut China's reported Ge-metal exports for Jan–Sep to 7,520 kg (from 18,787 kg a year earlier), and European Ge-metal prices ran from ~$3,150/kg (Jan 2025) to ~$5,380/kg (Oct 2025). The DOE announced ~$1bn in August 2025 toward domestic Ge/critical-material refining.