Nickel · Monthly — April 2026

Bottom line: nickel at $18,732/tonne (LME), up +8.0% MoM and +20.9% YoY. Up materially from the post-2024 bottom but well below the 2022 Tsingshan squeeze peak. The central story: Indonesia is imposing supply discipline — tightened ore pricing formulas and production quotas — after the 2020-2024 flood of Chinese-built HPAL capacity tanked prices. This is the reverse of the polysilicon over-investment story.

Price state (verified 2026-04-24)

Cleaner reference range: $12,000-$22,000/t over the last 18 months. Current price is in the upper half of that normalised range.

What changed / what matters (per TE commentary)

• Indonesia tightened supply: revised ore pricing formulas +

production quotas. 2026 approvals indicating ~190-200 Mt production (ore, Class 2 equivalent). Continued discipline signalled.

• Sulphur price surge above $800/tonne is pressuring HPAL

nickel-intermediate processing economics. Some processors reducing battery-intermediate output. Supportive of Class 1 / battery-grade pricing by making the Class 2 → Class 1 conversion more expensive.

• Steady battery + stainless demand absorbing most supply

concerns. Global inventory elevated but not climbing fast.

• 2026 market surplus still projected but smaller than

feared a year ago.

Concentration map (pre-wake shares; Indonesia dominance

verified via TE commentary)

Mining (2024, approximate)

• Indonesia: ~50%+ (and rising — the central fact)
• Philippines: ~10-12%
• Russia: ~8% (sanctioned from West)
• New Caledonia: ~5%
• Canada: ~5%
• Australia: ~5%
• China: ~3-4% (mining; much larger refining)

Refining

• China dominates battery-grade (Class 1) refining, importing

Indonesian NPI + MHP as feedstock

• Non-Chinese refining: Vale, Glencore, Sumitomo, (sanctioned)

Norilsk, Sumitomo Coral Bay Philippines

The Indonesia-China-battery structural story

This is the key frame for understanding nickel 2020-2030:

Phase 1 (2020-2022): Indonesia bans raw ore export, Chinese companies (Tsingshan, CATL, Huayou, Lygend) build massive HPAL + NPI capacity in Indonesia. Supply surge starts.

Phase 2 (2022-2024): New capacity floods market. Prices crash from 2022 squeeze peak to $15k floor. Marginal producers everywhere outside Indonesia-HPAL curtail.

Phase 3 (2024-2026): Indonesia recognises over-supply is damaging its own returns. Imposes quota discipline. Prices recover to $18-20k range. Current state.

Phase 4 (2027+?): Either Indonesia maintains OPEC-style discipline (price supportive, structural winner) OR Chinese capacity builders force through non-quota production (price pressure returns). The key question for 2026-2028.

Why this matters for the broader strategic materials picture

Nickel is the mirror image of polysilicon. Same pattern: concentrated supply (Indonesia+China for Ni, China for polysilicon), Chinese-backed producers racing to build capacity. Different outcome:

• Polysilicon: no discipline, over-investment, prices

crashed, stayed crashed

• Nickel: Indonesia-imposed discipline (via quotas), supply

constrained, prices recovered

The variable is who holds the discipline lever. In polysilicon it's Chinese producers (who don't discipline each other). In nickel it's the Indonesian state (which does).

Scenarios

• Further rally to $22-28k/tonne: if Indonesia tightens

quotas further AND/OR sulphur prices persist high AND/OR Russia sanctions escalate AND/OR Philippines follows Indonesia's playbook. Higher-probability upside than base case if quota discipline holds.

• Hold $17-20k range: base case. Market balance continues

with Indonesia as marginal swing producer.

• Pullback to $12-16k: if Chinese capacity builders push

past Indonesian quotas, OR China stainless/EV demand weakens materially, OR Indonesian political cycle reverses the quota regime

Policy watchlist

• Indonesian Mining Ministry (ESDM) monthly/quarterly

quota announcements — the key data point

• Philippines mining export policy — any shift toward

Indonesian-style restrictions would be price-positive

• US IRA FEOC enforcement re: Indonesian nickel refined by

Chinese-linked entities — affects IRA-eligible EV supply chain

• Sulphur market — tightness is indirectly nickel-

supportive through HPAL processing cost

• Russia sanctions regime — any escalation/de-escalation

affects 8% of mine supply

• Tsingshan + Huayou + Lygend capacity announcements

Questions this report helps answer

• "Should I expect nickel to stay near $20k?" — Likely yes

through 2026 if Indonesia maintains quota discipline. Downside risk if discipline breaks; limited upside unless major shock.

• "How exposed is my battery supply chain to Indonesia?" —

Very, if you source nickel sulphate / MHP through Chinese refiners. All non-Russia, non-Canada non-Australia battery-grade supply goes through the Indonesia → China → battery-grade pipeline.

• "What's the FEOC impact?" — Indonesian nickel refined in

Chinese-linked facilities is partly FEOC-tainted under US IRA. Creates premium for Canadian/Australian/Brazilian origin battery-grade. Small price differential today, structural long-term.

Cross-references

• docs/minerals/materials/nickel.md (dossier)
• docs/minerals/materials/cobalt.md — cobalt is the

direct byproduct of Indonesian HPAL nickel; nickel price supports cobalt economics

• docs/minerals/reports/2026-04-silicon.md — nickel is

the opposite pattern of polysilicon (supply discipline vs over-investment); worth calling out in next overview

• docs/thinking/2026-04-23-fx-policy-divergence.md —

Indonesian rupiah + EM policy relevance