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One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If China refining (36% of global) halts: 6 substitutes cover 100% of non-CN capacity · fastest ramp 0-6mo (ID) · highest policy-risk: ID (score 12.6, 10 filings) · 1 of these (RU) sit under comprehensive Western sanctions and aren't a real option for a Western buyer regardless of the risk score.
Stage: Refining (Class 1 + Class 2 nickel) · Year: 2025 · Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (Feb 2026 release; 2025 data).
Post-removal HHI = 3,258 (high). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m nickel filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Indonesia mining + processing is the structural shift; China-Indonesia interlock via Tsingshan / GEM / Huayou JVs. 2020 Indonesia ore-export ban + 2024 copper-concentrate ban part of the same hilirisasi doctrine. Indonesia mining share 17%→67% over 2014-2025 is the largest single-country share gain in the register.