Loading…
Loading…
One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If China refining (85% of global) halts: 3 substitutes cover 100% of non-CN capacity · fastest ramp 6-12mo (MY) · highest policy-risk: MY (score 0, 0 filings).
Stage: Separation + Nd-Pr magnet alloy (didymium) · Year: 2025 · Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (Feb 2026 release; 2025 data).
Post-removal HHI = 4,556 (high). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m praseodymium filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Praseodymium is a LIGHT rare earth co-produced with neodymium as "didymium" (Nd-Pr) — the two are separated together and used together in NdFeB magnets, so Pr's supply structure mirrors Nd's (refining HHI ~7,300, China ~85%). Unlike the heavy pair Dy/Tb, didymium magnets currently remain exportable under China's rare-earth licensing regime (the April 2025 controls targeted the heavy + medium elements Sm/Gd/Tb/Dy/Lu/Sc/Y, not Nd/Pr). The watch item is that the same licensing lever can be extended to light elements at short notice. Scored separately from neodymium (2026-06-01) so a bill-of-materials that names praseodymium explicitly resolves it rather than collapsing it into the Nd line.