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One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If China refining (90% of global) halts: 4 substitutes cover 100% of non-CN capacity · fastest ramp 6-12mo (AT) · highest policy-risk: US (score 12.4, 8 filings).
Stage: APT + tungsten powder + carbide · Year: 2025 · Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (Feb 2026 release; 2025 data).
Post-removal HHI = 3,086 (high). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m tungsten filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Most extreme single-country dependency in the register. Tooling, defence, lighting all rely on Chinese tungsten — and China MOFCOM Feb 2025 export controls on selected tungsten items tightened the chokepoint further. German Mittelstand tooling makers are a canonical exposure. China refining share has crept up: 85% (2014) → 88% (2019) → 90% (2025).
Non-CN refining capacity ~16,000 tpy vs global demand 90,000 tpy → 30–36 months runway before structural shortage. This is a global single number; substitutes below show who specifically provides it.