Presidential Resolution No. PP-319 of 14 July 2022 directed Navoiuran State Enterprise to more than double uranium output from approximately 3,500 tU/year to 7,100 tU/year by 2030, expand the national uranium reserve base to 100,000 tonnes through new exploration, and develop domestic nuclear-fuel-cycle conversion capacity alongside rare-metal co-extraction. The resolution simultaneously reorganised the uranium and rare-earth sector into a vertically integrated state enterprise — Navoiuran — spun out of the former Navoiy MMC JSC, placing the full extraction-to-conversion chain under state control.

Analyst notesShow

Mechanism

Presidential Resolution PP-319 is the operative production-and-state-control mandate governing Uzbekistan's uranium sector. It did two things simultaneously: (i) restructured the uranium and rare-metals business of Navoiy Mining and Metallurgical Combine (Navoiy MMC JSC) into a new, dedicated State Enterprise — Navoiuran — giving the state a fully integrated vehicle from mine to conversion; and (ii) set binding output and reserve targets for 2022–2030 that effectively double the country's uranium extraction capacity.

Production targets (2022–2030):

Uranium output: 3,500 tU/year (2022 baseline) → 7,100 tU/year (2030 target)
Uranium reserve base: Expand to 100,000 tonnes through new geological exploration, prospecting, evaluation, and forecasting
Downstream conversion: Increase ammonium perrhenate production to 3,700 kg/year (a rhenium by-product with aerospace-superalloy applications)
Rare and rare-earth metal co-extraction: Deploy extraction technologies for rare metals produced alongside uranium in Navoiuran's ore bodies

Institutional architecture: Navoiuran was formally established in January 2022 as a spin-out from Navoiy MMC. PP-319 provided the strategic mandate, funding authorisation framework, and performance targets. All in-situ leach (ISL) uranium deposits in Uzbekistan's Navoi and Bukhara regions fell under Navoiuran's 100% state monopoly.

Nuclear fuel cycle ambition: Beyond raw yellowcake, PP-319 directed the development of uranium conversion volumes within Uzbekistan — a value-chain capture ambition structurally analogous to Kazakhstan's parallel efforts to move from raw UF₆ production toward fuel-assembly manufacturing. The resolution establishes Uzbekistan's intent to participate in the nuclear fuel cycle at intermediate processing stages, not merely as a raw material exporter.

Downstream implications

Uzbekistan is the world's 5th–6th largest uranium producer (~3,500–4,000 tU/year), supplying ~5% of global mine output through Navoiuran's state monopoly; the PP-319 2030 target of 7,100 tU/year would make it the 3rd-largest producer globally if achieved, materially shifting the global uranium supply balance
All Navoiuran output is routed through bilateral supply contracts — Uzbekistan has existing agreements with China (CGN, CNNC), France (Orano), Russia (Rosatom's ARMZ), South Korea, and Japan; a doubling of output increases Uzbekistan's leverage in these negotiations and creates new contract volume for non-Russian/Chinese buyers seeking uranium supply diversification
PP-319 is the statutory foundation for all subsequent Uzbekistan uranium and critical-minerals legislative instruments: the Subsoil Law LRU-987/2024 (filed), DP-37 State Programme 2030 (filed), National Critical Minerals Programme 2025 (filed), and the US-Uzbekistan Critical Minerals MOU 2026 (filed) all build on the institutional and production architecture established here
Rare-metal co-extraction provision creates an early precedent for Uzbekistan's subsequent critical-minerals strategy: Navoiuran's ore bodies contain economically relevant concentrations of rhenium, molybdenum, and rare-earth elements alongside uranium, and PP-319 authorises their capture
Kazakhstan's parallel 2025 subsoil code amendment requiring 90% Kazatomprom stakes in expiring uranium JVs (filed 2025-12-26) illustrates the broader Central Asian pattern of which PP-319 is an early example: state reassertion of monopoly control over uranium as a strategic asset rather than a commodity

Open questions

Actual 2030 production trajectory: Navoiuran's 2024 Sustainability Report notes ongoing exploration campaigns; whether the 7,100 tU/year target is on track by mid-decade is not confirmed in public filings
Rare-earth extraction commercialisation: PP-319 authorises rare-metal extraction alongside uranium but public reporting on the scale and offtake arrangements for these co-products is limited
Fuel-cycle progression: Whether Uzbekistan achieves conversion-stage participation (UF₆ or UO₂) within the PP-319 timeframe, or remains a yellowcake exporter, will determine the severity escalation profile of this action

Sources

Primary: lex.uz — Official National Legislation Database of Uzbekistan (Resolution PP-319, 14 July 2022)

Secondary: Navoiyuran State Enterprise — Compliance with Requirements (lists PP-319 as governing resolution) · Daryo.uz — Uzbekistan targets doubling uranium production to 7,100 tons by 2030 · World Nuclear Association — Uranium in Uzbekistan (country profile) · CIS Legislation Portal — Resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan PP-319

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Mechanism

Production targets (2022–2030):

Uranium output: 3,500 tU/year (2022 baseline) → 7,100 tU/year (2030 target)

Uranium reserve base: Expand to 100,000 tonnes through new geological exploration, prospecting, evaluation, and forecasting

Downstream conversion: Increase ammonium perrhenate production to 3,700 kg/year (a rhenium by-product with aerospace-superalloy applications)

Rare and rare-earth metal co-extraction: Deploy extraction technologies for rare metals produced alongside uranium in Navoiuran's ore bodies

Downstream implications

Uzbekistan is the world's 5th–6th largest uranium producer (~3,500–4,000 tU/year), supplying ~5% of global mine output through Navoiuran's state monopoly; the PP-319 2030 target of 7,100 tU/year would make it the 3rd-largest producer globally if achieved, materially shifting the global uranium supply balance

All Navoiuran output is routed through bilateral supply contracts — Uzbekistan has existing agreements with China (CGN, CNNC), France (Orano), Russia (Rosatom's ARMZ), South Korea, and Japan; a doubling of output increases Uzbekistan's leverage in these negotiations and creates new contract volume for non-Russian/Chinese buyers seeking uranium supply diversification

PP-319 is the statutory foundation for all subsequent Uzbekistan uranium and critical-minerals legislative instruments: the Subsoil Law LRU-987/2024 (filed), DP-37 State Programme 2030 (filed), National Critical Minerals Programme 2025 (filed), and the US-Uzbekistan Critical Minerals MOU 2026 (filed) all build on the institutional and production architecture established here

Rare-metal co-extraction provision creates an early precedent for Uzbekistan's subsequent critical-minerals strategy: Navoiuran's ore bodies contain economically relevant concentrations of rhenium, molybdenum, and rare-earth elements alongside uranium, and PP-319 authorises their capture

Kazakhstan's parallel 2025 subsoil code amendment requiring 90% Kazatomprom stakes in expiring uranium JVs (filed 2025-12-26) illustrates the broader Central Asian pattern of which PP-319 is an early example: state reassertion of monopoly control over uranium as a strategic asset rather than a commodity

Open questions

Actual 2030 production trajectory: Navoiuran's 2024 Sustainability Report notes ongoing exploration campaigns; whether the 7,100 tU/year target is on track by mid-decade is not confirmed in public filings

Rare-earth extraction commercialisation: PP-319 authorises rare-metal extraction alongside uranium but public reporting on the scale and offtake arrangements for these co-products is limited

Fuel-cycle progression: Whether Uzbekistan achieves conversion-stage participation (UF₆ or UO₂) within the PP-319 timeframe, or remains a yellowcake exporter, will determine the severity escalation profile of this action