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Loi n°1/19 of 4 August 2023 is a structural amendment to Burundi's foundational mining legislation (Loi n°1/21 of 15 October 2013). It does not repeal the 2013 Code but recasts its investment terms across four dimensions:
1. Mandatory state equity (16% + ratchet) The State, as owner of the subsoil, acquires at least 16% of the capital of any large-mine joint venture at no cost to the government (carried interest). This stake increases by an additional 5% at each permit renewal, creating a compounding state-ownership ladder over the project lifecycle. The mechanism mirrors the DRC SAEMAPE/state-carry architecture and Indonesia's 51% divestment programme, though at a lower entry threshold.
2. Permit cap: 2 permits per substance per operator No single operator may hold more than two exploitation permits per mineral substance nationally. This is an anti-monopoly provision targeting incumbent Chinese and Western mining concession holders; it prevents accumulation of dormant exploration permits as strategic inventory.
3. Municipal development levy: 0.5% of turnover Large-scale operators must pay 0.5% of annual turnover to municipal development funds in the zones where they operate. This supplements (not replaces) the national royalty regime codified in the 2013 Code.
4. Separate licensing tracks codified by implementing instruments
the ASM licensing framework — distinct categories for artisanal (nationals only) and small-scale (industrial ASM) operations with defined permit areas and conditions.
by DLA Piper Africa) establishes the large-mine licensing track procedures in full detail.
applicable royalty rates, tax treatment, and transfer-pricing rules for the new Code.
Burundi holds the second-largest coltan (columbite-tantalite) reserves in East Africa after the DRC, and significant deposits of cassiterite (tin ore), gold, wolframite (tungsten), REE, nickel, and phosphate. The country is a significant artisanal 3TG (tin, tantalum, tungsten, gold) producer, with minerals flowing primarily through informal trans-border channels to Rwanda and then into the global supply chain. The 2023 Code reform signals a shift from tolerance of informal extraction toward formal state-capture of rents.
At least one ICSID arbitration has been triggered — Ntega Holding Burundi v. Republic of Burundi — arising from the government's 2021 mining-contract renegotiation drive that preceded the 2023 Code. This indicates the 16% carry mechanism and related provisions are being enforced, not treated as aspirational. The arbitration also signals investment-treaty risk for holders of pre-2023 concessions whose stabilisation clauses conflict with the new state-carry requirement.
materially less attractive for Western developers (Rio Tinto, Barrick, junior miners) unless offset by high grades or project scale.
a precedent they have navigated elsewhere (DRC, Zimbabwe); the near-term risk is more to Western or international capital entering for the first time.
it may prompt some operators to divest lower-priority permits before the law's enforcement is tightened.
status for ASM but also creates a liability surface (permit revocation, taxation) that may push informal miners further underground.
Ntega case resolves or a government–investor framework agreement is reached.
The DLA Piper Africa 2025 mining alert confirms its existence but the full text has not been independently verified via a primary government URL.
cap the state's total stake; this could theoretically approach majority control over time.
The DLA Piper analysis suggests renewals trigger the new terms, not existing permit periods.