Industrial Policy & Trade Monitor· 2666 actions· ✨ 90 recent

On June 8, 2026, the US Department of Defense published its annual update to the Section 1260H Chinese Military Companies (CMIC) list, adding 65 entities (17 new parent companies and 48 subsidiaries), bringing the total to approximately 188–200 designated entities. Major additions span EV and battery manufacturing (BYD, NIO, CATL), consumer internet (Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent), semiconductors (SMIC, YMTC, CXMT), solar (JA Solar, Trina Solar), biotech (BGI Genomics, WuXi AppTec), drones/robotics (DJI, Unitree, RoboSense), and telecoms (TP-Link). Effective June 30, 2026, DoD is prohibited from procuring goods, services, or technology directly from listed entities; effective June 30, 2027, the ban extends to indirect supply-chain procurement through prime contractors and all sub-tiers.

On 13 May 2026, Entreprise Générale du Cobalt (EGC — the DRC state cobalt monopsony), Trafigura Pte Ltd, and EVelution Energy LLC signed a tripartite MOU in Madrid to establish a long-term supply framework for Congolese cobalt hydroxide to the United States. EGC will originate cobalt hydroxide from artisanal and small-scale mining; Trafigura will provide logistics and marketing services; EVelution will process the material into battery-grade cobalt sulfate and alloy-grade cobalt metal at a new first-of-kind commercial-scale refinery in Yuma County, Arizona (construction 2027, target completion 2029). The arrangement is designed to supply approximately 40% of projected US cobalt demand for aerospace, defence, and EV batteries. The MOU operationalises the December 2025 US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement at the commercial supply-chain level, creating a primary DRC→US cobalt flow that bypasses Chinese refiners.

USTR formally initiated the second statutorily mandated four-year review of its Section 301 investigation into China's acts, policies, and practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation (Federal Register 2026-08806, published May 6, 2026). The review covers tariff actions imposed on approximately $300 billion of Chinese goods across Lists 1–4B (25% on most lists; 7.5% on List 4A) and will determine whether those actions should be continued, modified, or terminated. Interested parties may file continuation requests in two 60-day windows: May 7–July 5, 2026 (for the July 6, 2018 action) and June 24– August 22, 2026 (for the August 23, 2018 action). DISTINCT from the March 2026 Section 301 excess-capacity investigations (which target 16 economies on overcapacity sectors) and from the June 2026 Section 301 forced-labor enforcement action (60 economies); this review is China-specific, IP/TT-focused, and mandated by the original Biden-era statutory clock under Section 304(c) of the Trade Act of 1974.

The Decreto para la Autorización Inmediata de Inversiones, published in Mexico's Diario Oficial de la Federación on 4 May 2026, creates a streamlined investment-authorization mechanism under President Sheinbaum's Plan México strategy. The decree establishes an Investment Committee — composed of the Secretariats of Economía, Hacienda, SEMARNAT, SCT, Energía, and Bienestar — mandated to issue authorization certificates within 30 business days for qualifying projects, replacing the historic 6–18-month multi-agency backlog. Eligibility covers three tiers: projects in designated Polos de Desarrollo Económico para el Bienestar (Welfare Development Poles), investments of MXN 2 billion (≈USD 100M) or more, and projects in strategic sectors (semiconductors, EV batteries, critical minerals, automotive supply chain, medical devices, biotech, aerospace). This is the procedural- acceleration arm of Plan México, structurally distinct from the January 2025 Plan México tax-incentive decree (the fiscal arm), and operationalises the February 2026 Plan México expansion announced by Sheinbaum.

The European Commission and the US announced on 24 April 2026 the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a strategic partnership on critical minerals, accompanied by an EU-US Critical Minerals Action Plan. The framework deepens cooperation on supply-chain security across the strategic raw-materials list shared between the two jurisdictions — joint financing, recycling, mutual recognition of strategic- project status under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (filed: 2024-05-23-eu-crma-entry-into-force) and US IRA §30D / §45X frameworks (filed: 2022-08-16-us-inflation-reduction-act). The agreement is positioned as a joint response to non-market practices in third-country supply chains for the named materials.

On 20 March 2026, METI/MOFA (Japan) and the US Departments of State and Energy jointly published the "Japan–United States Critical Minerals Project Cooperation Joint Fact Sheet," identifying five specific upstream critical-mineral projects spanning four continents (Australia, Tanzania, Brazil, UAE, Namibia) to receive structured joint financing through JOGMEC equity and offtake instruments and US DFC/Ex-Im Bank facilities. The document operationalises the October 2025 US-Japan Critical Minerals Framework and the same-day Action Plan, converting policy-framework language into named project commitments covering nickel, lithium, battery-anode graphite, and heavy rare earths. It was released the day following the Takaichi–Trump summit on 19 March 2026 and follows the Critical Minerals Investment Ministerial convened in Tokyo on 14 March 2026.

On 19 March 2026, USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, METI, and Ministry of Finance jointly released the "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" — the operational follow-on to the 27 October 2025 US-Japan Framework. The Action Plan formally commits both governments to develop a plurilateral trade initiative in critical minerals "supported by price floors or other measures", to consult on embedding "border-adjusted price floors" in a binding plurilateral agreement, and to identify specific mining/processing/manufacturing projects in the US, Japan, or third countries for prioritised joint financing. It is the first formal US/Japan trade-policy commitment to administered floor-pricing as an instrument of critical-minerals trade governance, and explicitly invites third countries to join the contemplated plurilateral.

On 10 March 2026, Chile's Ministry of Mining submitted to the Contraloría General de la República the supreme decree establishing the requirements and conditions for a Special Lithium Operating Contract (CEOL) at the Laguna Verde salt flat in the Atacama Region. The CEOL is the third contract under the 2023 National Lithium Strategy and covers a 153 km² concession area across all project phases — exploration, evaluation, construction, production and closure — for a 40-year term. The operator is a consortium led by UK-listed CleanTech Lithium plc (CTL.L), which holds a JORC- compliant resource of 1.9 million tonnes LCE and targets 20,000 t LCE per year at plateau production. Contraloría toma de razón (formal legal ratification) was expected by Q2 2026.

Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) confirmed it has officially cut the 2026 nickel-ore Work Plan and Budget (RKAB) production ceiling to 260–270 million wet metric tonnes (wmt), down from the ~379 million wmt approved for 2025 — a reduction of roughly one-third. Actual 2026 production is targeted at approximately 209–210 million tonnes. Minister Bahlil Lahadalia framed the cut as a supply-demand balancing measure to stabilise nickel prices and conserve reserves; the government first signalled the production control on 23 December 2025, after which world nickel prices rose from roughly US$14,800/t under oversupply to above US$17,000–18,800/t. This is the operative 2026 application of the annual RKAB cycle established by Permen ESDM 17/2025.

On 12 February 2026, Chile's Ministry of Mining and Codelco (via subsidiary Salar de Maricunga SpA) signed the definitive Contrato Especial de Operación de Litio (CEOL) for the Salar de Maricunga, formalising Rio Tinto as strategic partner with a capital commitment of up to US$900 million. The instrument constitutes the second tranche of Chile's 2023 National Lithium Strategy, distinct from the NovaAndino Litio (Codelco–SQM) JV that governs the Salar de Atacama tranche. Rio Tinto was selected as partner in May 2025 following a competitive process; the definitive CEOL modifies the original 2018 exploration contract, expands the concession area (incorporating pre-1979 concessions acquired from Lithium Power International in 2024), and extends the exploration phase by four years. Remaining conditions precedent — including foreign competition-authority approvals — were projected for completion during 2026.

On 4 February 2026 USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer and Mexican Secretary of Economy Marcelo Ebrard announced a U.S.-Mexico Action Plan on Critical Minerals — a first-of-its-kind 60-day bilateral work programme to develop coordinated trade policies and supply-chain mechanisms for critical minerals. The Action Plan tasks both governments with identifying a priority mineral list, exploring border-adjusted price floors as a candidate trade instrument, and consulting on how price floors could be incorporated into a binding plurilateral agreement on trade in critical minerals. It is framed as a confidence- building measure ahead of the USMCA Joint Review (statutory deadline 1 July 2026) and as the Mexico-side template that parallels concurrent USTR engagements with the EU and Japan.

On 27 January 2026 President Gabriel Boric presented Chile's National Critical Minerals Strategy (Estrategia Nacional de Minerales Críticos, NCMS) — the country's first horizontal critical-minerals governance framework, identifying 14 minerals as priorities for development and establishing five strategic pillars: production and diversification of critical minerals; responsible mining; development opportunities based on critical minerals; enabling capacities; and strategic international positioning. The strategy was developed through a multi-year participatory process coordinated through Cochilco and Sernageomin, involving a 16-member high-level advisory committee, 120 specialists from 56 institutions, regional workshops and a public consultation. It materially broadens Chile's mineral policy beyond the 2023 lithium-specific National Lithium Strategy to a cross-cutting framework that underpins future bilateral critical-minerals MOUs and positions Chile as a strategic raw-materials partner for the US, EU and Japan under their respective IRA/CRMA/GX supply-chain frameworks.

On 27 December 2025, Codelco and SQM formally closed NovaAndino Litio SpA, the 50:50 joint venture (with a golden share for state-owned Codelco) mandated by the 2023 National Lithium Strategy to bring the Salar de Atacama under state operational control. The vehicle is formed by merging Codelco's subsidiary Minera Tarar SpA with SQM's SQM Salar SpA, governed by a six-director board (three Codelco, three SQM), and runs until 2060 under a CORFO contract amendment that extends operations beyond SQM's previous 2030 lease expiry. SQM manages operations 2025-2030, Codelco from 2031 onward; the Chilean state captures up to ~70% of operating margins through 2030 and ~85% from 2031. As part of the closing, SQM transferred all of its mining concessions in the Salar de Maricunga to Codelco. President Boric and the Cabinet Económico formally endorsed the venture on 29 December 2025, when the first board meeting was held in Santiago.

On 16 December 2025 the European Commission adopted the Communication on a Battery Booster Strategy (later published in the Official Journal as C/2026/682), part of the EU Automotive Package presented alongside the CO2 emission-standards review, the Automotive Omnibus simplification, and the Corporate Vehicle Decarbonisation initiative. The Battery Booster envelopes EUR 1.8bn of EU-budget support for the European battery value chain: EUR 1.5bn from the Innovation Fund as interest-free loans for European battery cell producers ramping to giga-scale output (delivered through a dedicated Battery Booster Facility, with the implementing Commission Decision in stakeholder consultation through 15 March 2026), plus EUR 300m for critical raw materials projects in Europe. The strategy is the first standalone EU industrial-finance instrument targeted exclusively at battery cell manufacturing, and is paired with RESourceEU (3 Dec 2025) and the Industrial Accelerator Act proposal (4 Mar 2026) to stitch together upstream CRM, midstream cell production and downstream automotive demand.

Morocco's Loi de Finances n° 50-25 for fiscal year 2026, promulgated by Dahir n° 1-25-67 of 10 December 2025 and published in Bulletin Officiel n° 7465 bis of 16 December 2025, sets the FY2026 customs-tariff schedule (continuing the EU Common External Tariff alignment process at 2.5%/17.5%/40% tiers with sector-specific input reductions), amends the fiscal regimes for Zones d'Accélération Industrielle and Casablanca Finance City, and delivers the 2026 tranche of the multi-year IS (corporate-tax) rate-convergence schedule under Framework Law n° 69-19. The law also extends green-investment fiscal accelerators aligned with the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the EU-Morocco Strategic Partnership on Sustainable Raw Materials Value Chains, and contains phosphate-sector fiscal provisions affecting OCP Group's DAP/MAP/TSP export treatment. Entry into force: 1 January 2026.

Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Bahlil Lahadalia signed Peraturan Menteri ESDM Nomor 18 Tahun 2025 ("Permen ESDM 18/2025") on 14 November 2025, Indonesia's first comprehensive ministerial-level framework for the exploration, designation, allocation, and utilisation of rare-earth resources. The regulation operationalises Government Regulation PP 39/2025 (signed 11 September 2025), which inserted a dedicated rare-earths article (Article 18A) into PP 96/2021 on the implementation of mineral and coal mining business activities. It empowers the Minister to designate BUMN (state-owned enterprises) as preferred operators of rare-earth mining and processing, mandates that REE output prioritise domestic strategic industries (defence, electric vehicle batteries, advanced technology, permanent magnets), and routes inventarisation through the geological agency before WIUP (mining business permit areas) are awarded.

On 27 October 2025, during the Trump-Takaichi Tokyo summit, the United States and Japan announced the "Framework for Securing the Supply of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths through Mining and Processing", signed by President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on 28 October 2025. The non-binding framework establishes a US-Japan Critical Minerals Supply Security Rapid Response Group co-led by the US Secretary of Energy and the Japanese METI Minister; commits both governments to provide financial support to selected mining and processing projects within six months via grants, guarantees, loans, equity, offtake arrangements, and insurance — mobilising DFC + EXIM (US side) with JOGMEC + JBIC (Japan side); develops a "mutually complementary stockpiling arrangement" leveraging existing national systems; and schedules a Mining, Minerals and Metals Investment Ministerial within 180 days. The framework was subsequently operationalised through the 19 March 2026 "United States-Japan Action Plan for Critical Minerals Supply Chain Resilience" jointly issued by USTR and METI.

Indonesia's Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources issued Permen ESDM No. 17 of 2025 on procedures for preparing, submitting and approving Work Plans and Budgets (RKAB) and reporting of mineral and coal mining activities. Signed by Minister Bahlil Lahadalia on 30 September 2025 and in force from 3 October 2025, the regulation reverses the 2023 three-year RKAB cycle back to an annual cycle, requires all IUP/IUPK holders to resubmit through the new MinerbaOne digital portal between 1 October and 15 November each year, annuls previously-issued 2026/2027 quotas, and introduces a 5-working-day auto-approval rule. Operationalised by a 2026 nickel-ore RKAB target band of 250–270 million wmt — roughly one third below the 2025 approved quota of ~379 million wmt — explicitly framed as a price-management and conservation instrument. First clear use of the RKAB framework as an explicit market-management lever rather than a domestic-licensing tool.

On 5 September 2025, President Gabriel Boric led the signing of the inaugural Contrato Especial de Operación de Litio (CEOL) between the Chilean government and state mining company ENAMI (Empresa Nacional de Minería) for the Salares Altoandinos basins in the Atacama region — the first CEOL ever issued under Chile's 2023 National Lithium Strategy. The contract runs until 31 December 2060 and covers exploration, evaluation, construction, and extraction phases; Rio Tinto holds a 51% operating stake with up to $425 million in cash and Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) technology contributions, while ENAMI retains 49% with full corporate- governance rights over material decisions. Projected peak output is 75,000 tonnes per year of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE), with production expected to commence between 2032 and 2034.

On 18 July 2025 Kazakhstan's Parliament adopted Law No. 215-VIII ZRK "On Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Taxation Matters," which abolishes the legacy priority-investment-project and special-investment-contract regimes under the Entrepreneurial Code and replaces them with three new contractual instruments — the Investment Agreement, the Investment Obligations Agreement, and the Simplified Investment Contract — effective 1 January 2026. The law is the binding legal operationalisation of the October 2024 Concept of Investment Policy until 2029 (filed), the US-Kazakhstan Critical Minerals MOU of November 2025 (filed), and the EU-Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership Roadmap 2025-2026 (filed), providing a contractual-certainty architecture for the USD 150 billion FDI-attraction target that previous "priority investment project" frameworks lacked. A statutory effectiveness-evaluation obligation (first of its kind in Central Asia) for assessing the socio-economic impact of granted investment preferences enters force separately on 1 July 2026.

The UK's state-owned National Wealth Fund (NWF) and UK Export Finance (UKEF), both wholly government-owned, jointly provided financial guarantees covering £272 million each (80% coverage of a £340 million loan facility) to unlock £680 million in commercial-bank financing for AESC's second battery gigafactory ("Plant 2") in Sunderland. The UK's Automotive Transformation Fund separately contributed £150 million in grants. Total investment mobilised exceeds £1 billion. The plant will add 15.8GWh of annual battery-cell capacity, supporting production of up to 100,000 electric vehicles per year and creating over 1,000 direct jobs in North East England.

Government Regulation No. 19 of 2025 on Types and Rates of Non-Tax State Revenue (PNBP) applicable to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, signed by President Prabowo Subianto on 11 Apr 2025 and effective 26 Apr 2025 (15 working days after promulgation), revokes PP 26/2022 and replaces fixed mining royalty rates with a progressive tiered system anchored to international benchmark prices (HMA for nickel, HBA for coal). Headline shifts: nickel ore from fixed 10% to 14–19% by HMA tier; ferronickel 2% → 4–6%; nickel matte 2% → 3.5–5.5%; NPI 5% → 5–7%; copper cathode 2% → 4–7%; tin 3% → 3–10%; gold 3.75–10% → 7–16%; coal up to 13.5% at HBA >USD 90 for >5,200 kcal/kg grades. The regulation is the cornerstone fiscal lever of the Prabowo nickel-downstreaming/hilirisasi 2.0 strategy alongside RKAB-quota tightening that cut national nickel quotas from 272m to 150m tonnes for 2025.

On 26 February 2025 the European Commission adopted the "Clean Industrial Deal" (CID), Communication COM(2025) 85 final, framed as a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation. The CID bundles state-aid simplification, energy-cost relief, lead-market creation, capital mobilisation and circular-economy mandates into a single industrial strategy targeting both energy-intensive industries (steel, metals, chemicals, cement) and clean-tech manufacturing (batteries, solar, wind, heat pumps, electrolyzers). The Commission claims the package will mobilise more than €100 billion of public-and-private financing for EU-made clean manufacturing through a strengthened Innovation Fund, amendments to the InvestEU Regulation (up to €50bn additional guarantee capacity) and a proposed Industrial Decarbonisation Bank. CID directly precedes the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF, adopted 25 June 2025) and seeds legislative work on an Industrial Accelerator Act, a Circular Economy Act, and a strengthened CBAM. Severity 4 on mixed basis: explicit €100bn+ quant headline plus qualitative breadth across the EU industrial perimeter, formally re-anchoring the von der Leyen II mandate around competitiveness rather than pure decarbonisation.

On 24 February 2025 President Prabowo Subianto launched Badan Pengelola Investasi Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara), Indonesia's new state investment-management agency, consolidating around USD 900bn–1tn of Indonesian state-owned-enterprise assets — including Pertamina, PLN, Bank Mandiri, BRI, BNI, Telkom, MIND ID, Antam and Inalum — into a single super-holding modelled on Singapore's Temasek. Danantara was created by the Third Amendment to the BUMN Law (Law No. 1 of 2025, enacted 24 February 2025) and Government Regulation No. 10 of 2025 on its organisation and governance, with board appointments formalised by Presidential Regulation No. 30 of 2025. The agency reports directly to the President, bypassing the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises, and is mandated to deploy SOE balance-sheet capacity into Prabowo's 8% growth target via co-investment in mineral downstreaming, refinery and EV-battery build-out, food security, and semiconductor / data-centre infrastructure.

South Korea's National Assembly passed the Special Act on the Expansion of the National Electricity Network (Law No. 20844) on 19 February 2025 as part of the bipartisan "Energy Trifecta Bill," with promulgation on 25 March 2025 and entry into force on 26 September 2025. The act creates an expedited siting, permitting, and compensation framework for trunk transmission-grid construction, consolidating 35 previously separate regulatory approvals into a single streamlined procedure and targeting a >30% reduction in grid-build timelines. It directly addresses the electricity-infrastructure bottleneck constraining semiconductor fab clusters (Yongin, Pyeongtaek, SK Hynix HBM), sovereign AI datacenter build-out, and EV/battery gigafactory load growth — structurally distinct from the K-Chips Act (fiscal incentives) and the Semiconductor Special Act (regulatory framework), as it unblocks the physical power-delivery constraint those programmes depend on.

The European Commission published Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2754 on 29 October 2024 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of new battery electric vehicles (BEVs) originating in China, effective the day after publication. Following a 13-month investigation initiated by Commissioner Dombrovskis in October 2023, the rates layered on top of the existing 10% MFN duty are: BYD 17.0%, Geely 18.8%, SAIC 35.3%, Tesla 7.8% (individually-investigated), 17.0% for sampled cooperating producers, 20.7% for non-sampled cooperating producers, 35.3% for non-cooperating producers. Duties are payable for five years from entry into force unless reviewed earlier. The measure followed a member-state vote with Germany voting against and France/Italy in favour.

The Biden administration announced on 14 May 2024 a package of Section 301 tariff increases on Chinese imports following the four-year statutory review of the original 2018-2019 tariffs. The hikes target sectors central to the US-China industrial-policy contest: BEVs went from 25% to 100%, lithium- ion EV batteries 7.5% → 25% (with non-EV battery cells rising in 2026), battery parts 7.5% → 25%, natural graphite + magnets 0% → 25% (phased to 2026), semiconductors 25% → 50% (phased to 2025), solar cells 25% → 50%, steel + aluminum products in selected categories 0-7.5% → 25%, ship-to-shore cranes 0% → 25%, certain medical products 0-7.5% → 50%. USTR issued the final determination on 13 September 2024 with most items effective 27 September 2024.

The EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1252) entered into force on 23 May 2024 after publication in the EU Official Journal on 3 May 2024. The Act sets binding 2030 benchmarks for the Union: ≥10% of annual consumption from domestic extraction, ≥40% from domestic processing, ≥25% from domestic recycling, and a strict ≤65% concentration limit from any single third country for each strategic raw material. It establishes a list of 17 strategic raw materials and 34 critical raw materials, creates a "Strategic Project" fast-track permitting regime (≤27 months for extraction, ≤15 months for recycling), and mandates joint purchasing and supply-risk stress tests for large EU manufacturers.

Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 establishes a comprehensive EU statutory framework for all battery categories (portable, SLI, LMT, EV, industrial), imposing supply-chain due-diligence obligations for cobalt, lithium, nickel, and natural graphite; mandatory recycled-content thresholds; carbon-footprint declarations; a digital battery passport; and ambitious collection and recycling-efficiency targets, with rolling application dates running from February 2024 through August 2036. It repeals Battery Directive 2006/66/EC and applies to every economic operator placing batteries on the EU market, binding every EV, consumer-electronics, and stationary-storage supply chain that relies on DRC cobalt, Australian/Chilean lithium, Indonesian/Philippine nickel, and Chinese/Mozambican graphite.

Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market — the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) — entered into force on 12 July 2023, with notification obligations becoming applicable from 12 October 2023. The FSR gives the European Commission powers to investigate financial contributions granted by non-EU governments to companies active in the EU, and to impose remedies (commitments, redressive measures, prohibitions) where such subsidies are found to distort competition. Three review tools: (i) notifiable concentrations (M&A above €500m EU turnover + €50m foreign financial contributions); (ii) notifiable public procurement bids (€250m+ contract value + €4m foreign contributions); (iii) ex-officio investigations of any other market situation. Although neutral on its face, the regime has been used predominantly against Chinese-state-backed bidders + investors.

On 20 April 2023, President Gabriel Boric announced Chile's National Lithium Strategy ("Estrategia Nacional del Litio") in a national broadcast from La Moneda. The strategy mandates state majority participation in projects deemed strategic for the country and creates a state-owned National Lithium Company ("Empresa Nacional del Litio", subject to Congressional approval) covering the full productive cycle from exploration through battery cell assembly and recycling. In the interim, the existing state-owned firms Codelco (copper) and ENAMI take the lead — Codelco for the Atacama salar (where SQM and Albemarle operate under existing leases) and ENAMI for the Maricunga salar. The strategy also commits to a network of protected salt flats targeting 30% protection by 2030 and promotes new lower-impact extraction technologies (notably direct lithium extraction, DLE). The full policy document "Estrategia Nacional del Litio — Por Chile y su Gente" was published by the Ministry of Economy on 15 June 2023.

Framework Law n° 03-22 forming Morocco's Investment Charter, promulgated by Dahir n° 1-22-76 of 14 joumada I 1444 (9 December 2022) and published in Bulletin Officiel n° 7152 (12 December 2022), replaces the 1995 Investment Charter (Law 18-95) — the first major overhaul of Morocco's horizontal investment-incentive regime in nearly 30 years. Operationalised by Decree n° 2.23.1 (Government Council 26 January 2023, BO publication February 2023), the regime layers a "main" support mechanism (CAPEX subsidies up to 30% combining sector-priority, regional/territorial, gender, sustainable and value-chain bonuses) and a "specific" mechanism for strategic projects ≥ MAD 2bn (~USD 200m) covering EV/batteries, semiconductors, green hydrogen, defence and pharmaceuticals — providing the legal foundation for Morocco's emergence as Africa's leading EV-battery and automotive industrial hub.

The Inflation Reduction Act (Public Law 117-169), signed by President Biden on 16 August 2022, contains the largest single package of clean-energy and clean-manufacturing subsidies in US history — Congressional Budget Office scored the energy and climate provisions at $369B over 10 years, with subsequent Treasury / academic estimates reaching $800B-$1.2T as uptake exceeded baseline. Core mechanisms include the Section 30D Clean Vehicle credit ($7,500 per qualifying EV), the Section 45X Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit (per-unit credits for domestically-produced battery cells, modules, electrodes, and critical-mineral processing), the Section 48E Clean Electricity Investment Credit, and the Section 45V Clean Hydrogen Production Credit. Critically, the law contains Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) provisions barring credit eligibility for vehicles or components linked to entities controlled by China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea.

On 20 April 2022 Mexico's Diario Oficial de la Federación published a reform to the Ley Minera (Mining Law) declaring lithium "patrimonio de la Nación" (national patrimony) and of public utility, adding Article 5 Bis to state that no further concessions, licenses, contracts, permits or authorizations for lithium exploration, exploitation, benefit or use will be granted to private parties — reserving the entire value chain exclusively to the State (Articles 1, 9 and 10 also amended). On 23 August 2022 a follow-on decree created "Litio para México" (LitioMx), a decentralized public agency governed by a board of five cabinet secretaries (Energy as chair, plus Finance, Economy, Interior and Environment) and technically supported by the Mexican Geological Service, holding exclusive rights to explore, exploit and commercialize Mexico's lithium deposits. The law was subsequently upheld as constitutional by Mexico's Supreme Court in March 2026 (Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 78/2022, filed separately).

Indonesia accelerated the implementation of its raw nickel ore export ban, originally scheduled for 2022, to take effect on 1 January 2020. Announced 30 August 2019 by Minister Ignasius Jonan via ESDM Regulation No. 11/2019, the ban prohibits the export of nickel ore with grades below 1.7% Ni (effectively all Indonesian saprolite and limonite ore that previously flowed to Chinese stainless-steel and ferronickel mills) and forces ore to be processed domestically into intermediate products (nickel pig iron, ferronickel, mixed hydroxide precipitate, nickel sulfate). The policy is part of the long-running "hilirisasi" (downstream-isation) strategy and was the trigger for the >$30B wave of Chinese-led nickel- processing investment in Sulawesi (Morowali, Weda Bay) that has since made Indonesia the dominant global nickel producer.