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Last amendment: First commercial shipment from Forécariah port; President Doumbouya attends with WCS, Baowu, Chinalco, Rio Tinto leadership. Marks transition from project-construction phase to operational ramp under the conventions. on 2025-11-11.
The Simandou conventions are not a tariff or export-control instrument; they are the constitutional-level legal scaffolding for Guinea's largest-ever single foreign-investment package. The CNT (Guinea's transitional parliament under the post-2021-coup Doumbouya government) ratified three agreements in a single sitting on 3 February 2024:
1. Trans-Guinéen co-development convention — establishes the CTG joint venture (Republic of Guinea ~15% / WCS / Rio Tinto Simfer) to build, own and operate the 670km dedicated heavy-haul iron-ore railway from the Simandou range (south-east Guinea) to a new deepwater port at Morebaya/Forécariah. CTG is structured as multi-user infrastructure so future Guinean bauxite or iron-ore projects can also tariff-pay for access — a non-trivial revenue lever for the state. 2. WCS exploitation convention (blocks 1–2) — sets the fiscal, royalty and local-content regime for the northern half of the deposit, operated by Winning Consortium Simandou (Singapore-Guinea consortium, ultimate beneficial owner Weiqiao/Hongqiao 51%, Baowu 49%). These are the blocks that have moved fastest into ramp. 3. Simfer base-convention adjustments (blocks 3–4) — bilateral amendments updating Rio Tinto Simfer's pre-coup convention to align fiscal terms, force-majeure language and infrastructure sharing with the new CTG architecture. Chalco Iron Ore Holdings (Chinalco vehicle) holds a minority economic stake.
Capex is reported at USD 15–20bn integrated (mine + rail + port), financed through a mix of partner equity, China Development Bank syndicated facilities, and Guinea-side state participations.
at 65% Fe — adds ~5–6% to global high-grade seaborne supply. Most consensus models (CRU, Wood Mackenzie, BHP/Rio in disclosures) had treated Simandou as effectively zero-supply through the 2010s; the 2024 ratification + 2025 first shipment removes that option value.
ore displaces blended Pilbara low-grade fines at Chinese steel mills. BHP and FMG have the most-exposed marginal tonnes; Rio Tinto is partly internally hedged through its own Simfer stake.
reduces blast-furnace coke rates and slag volumes — modestly bullish for Chinese mill margins, modestly bearish for thermal coal demand at the margin.
(Simfer minority) explicitly position Simandou as a non-Australian high-grade source — directly relevant to the post-2020 Beijing push to reduce dependency on Pilbara producers (which historically supplied ~60% of Chinese iron-ore imports).
on the West African coast (vs Pilbara/Brazil) lengthens average haul-distance tonne-miles for China-bound flows; structurally bullish for Capesize utilisation but bearish for FOB-Pilbara benchmark (62% Fe).
steady-state at 120 Mt/yr is widely modelled for 2027–2028. Slip risk is the rail-port commissioning, not the mine.
2025 referendum on a new constitution) leave open whether a future civilian Guinean government re-opens the conventions for higher state stake or royalty — this is the principal political-risk vector for partner economics.
domestic processing and local-employment quotas; enforcement and dispute-resolution mechanism not yet tested at scale.
(other Guinean miners) is set in subsidiary regulation, not the convention itself — watch for the Ministry of Mines implementing decree.