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Volume data pending.
The chokepoint sits downstream: 38% mining share (AU) concentrates to 55% at refining, with China's share rising from 11% to 55%.
Iron ore is the basic industrial bedrock — the largest non-fuel mineral commodity by volume + trade value globally; ~98% of mine output goes to steel.
Import-dependency chokepoints: 🇨🇳 CN 83%, 🇪🇺 EU 100%, 🇯🇵 JP 100%, 🇰🇷 KR 100%, 🇩🇪 DE 100%, 🇹🇷 TR 85%.
Iron ore is **not** on the EU CRMA / US DOI / JP JOGMEC / AU Critical Minerals lists — geological supply is abundant and geographically diversified across friendly Australia + Brazil + Canada + India.
Per-country net position. Emerald = supply > consumption (net exporter); red = consumption > supply (net importer). 1 country appears on only one side of the two source tables and is left grey — a missing row means not itemised, which is not the same as zero, so no gap is computed for it.
| Direction | GACC commodity line | Quantity YTD | Value YTD |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import | Iron ores and concentrates ore/concentrate basis | 845.27 Mt | $85.36bn |
National totals — there is no partner dimension in these tables. This is what China imported or exported in total on each line, never to or from whom, so these figures cannot be combined with the bilateral flows above.
Policy pressure on Iron Ore is accelerating — 10 restrictive actions on record, peak severity 5, 4 in the last 12 months (vs 2 the year before). Most-active issuer: 🇿🇦 ZA (2).
Signals are read directly from the policy register's recorded cadence, pending effective dates, and responds_to cycles for Iron Ore. They describe the trajectory already on the record — not a forecast.
Tickers and corporate names parsed from the company_refs field of every action whose target_materials includes iron-ore — the specific operators a policymaker identified by name. Click a company to see the filings.
Worked causal-chain narratives whose recorded actions overlap this material's policy register — the evidence behind the exposure thesis.