EU Council Regulation 2024/2897 expands Iran UAV/missile export ban and bans transactions with Amirabad and Anzali ports

Mechanism

Two changes to the EU's dedicated Iran-Russia military-support regime (Regulation (EU) 2023/1529):

• Export ban widened. Annex II is replaced (extended, not newly created)

with a list of UAV/missile-relevant goods and technology in ten categories, including special materials, materials processing, electronics, computers, telecommunications, sensors/lasers, navigation/avionics, aerospace and propulsion.

• Port transaction ban. New Article 2a prohibits any transaction,

directly or indirectly, with ports and locks listed in Annex IV — those owned, operated or controlled by listed entities, or used to transfer Iranian UAVs, missiles or related components to Russia. Annex IV names Amirabad Port and Anzali Port.

GTA's sector tags on the source record (starches, textile yarn) are its product-code mapping for the Annex II expansion, not a statement about the measure's intent; the primary text ties the goods to UAV/missile production.

Downstream implications

• EU exporters of dual-use electronics, navigation and propulsion inputs

face a wider prohibited-goods list to Iran; the Annex II list is the screening reference.

• Shipping, port-services and insurance counterparties must screen for

Caspian-route calls at Amirabad and Anzali, which are the named transfer points for Iran-to-Russia UAV/missile flows.

• Follows the 2024-10-14 listing tranche under the same regime; see the

western-russia-sanctions theme.

Open questions

• No trade value or product-line count is disclosed in the regulation text,

so severity is a qualitative rating.

• Whether the Caspian-route port ban measurably shifted routing of the

flows it targets.