Loading…
Loading…
Base rate computed from analyst-asserted responds_to: edges in the reverse direction (target-country → issuer-country) for prior issuer-actions on the same target. Modal type + lag percentiles only — not a model output. Treat as a historical anchor for sizing counter-response scenarios, not a forecast in itself.
The MOT measure is China's named-target mirror response to USTR's 17 April 2025 Section 301 Notice of Action (which imposed U.S.-port-entry fees on Chinese-owned/-operated/-built vessels effective 14 October 2025). The Chinese instrument was announced on 10 October 2025 — four days before the U.S. fees took effect — and entered into force on the same date as the U.S. action.
The fee is levied on a first-port-of-call-per-voyage basis (not every Chinese port the vessel visits during a single voyage) and is calculated per net ton on the stepped schedule:
| From | Fee (per NT) |
|---|---|
| 14 Oct 2025 | ¥400 |
| 17 Apr 2026 | ¥640 |
| 17 Apr 2027 | ¥880 |
| 17 Apr 2028 | ¥1,120 |
The five-voyage-per-vessel-per-year cap deliberately mirrors the five-call cap in USTR's Annex III, giving the two regimes proportional structural symmetry. Statutory authority is the PRC International Maritime Transport Regulations (中华人民共和国国际海运条例), which authorises differential port charges as a reciprocal counter-measure when foreign port-state action discriminates against PRC vessels.
Coverage definition is broader than the U.S. mirror in one direction (captures ≥25% U.S.-equity vessels — a 'beneficial ownership' test) and narrower in another (the 13 Oct 2025 MOT FAQ exempts Chinese-built vessels even if U.S.-operated or U.S.-flagged, preserving China's shipbuilding- industry primacy).
measure has been filed; this establishes a precedent for using maritime service fees as a Section-301-equivalent retaliation tool — a new lever outside the MOFCOM export-control / unreliable-entity-list playbook.
containership = ¥40m (~USD 5.5m) per first-port call, capped at five calls → ~USD 27.5m/vessel/year at the 2025 rate, rising to USD 77m/vessel by 2028. U.S. container lines (Matson, APL/CMA-CGM U.S.-flag subsidiaries, ROSS-flagged carriers) have limited China-direct exposure but U.S. parent-owned chartered-in tonnage is the binding constraint.
schedule precisely tracks the USD 50/80/110/140 Annex III schedule by ratio, signalling that PRC retaliation is being calibrated as a permanent feature of the toolkit rather than ad-hoc tit-for-tat.
reactivation risk. If the Busan trade-deal track stalls (e.g., on fentanyl precursors, agricultural purchases, semiconductor controls), both sides revert to the fee regimes automatically — no new MOT notice required.
trade-reset cycle now includes calibrated port-state retaliation; expect the same template if USTR opens new Section 301 service-trade investigations (e.g., logistics platforms, cloud, financial services).
re-shuffling — non-Chinese-built tonnage to U.S. lanes, Chinese-built tonnage to non-U.S. trades — which would have reversed the pricing pattern for trans-Pacific and Asia-Europe routes. Suspension freezes the re-shuffle; reactivation would un-freeze it.
US→CN action in the IPTM register (announcement date, effective date, fee structure, exemption logic, and suspension all mirror their U.S. counterpart) — a useful template for downstream symmetric-escalation analytics.
U.S.-side commitments (extending the Sec 301 maritime suspension was presumably the bargaining chip).
narrowed if reactivated — this is the largest single-decision lever the MOT retains.
China retaliation — and against what sector (logistics platforms vs. cloud vs. payments would each shape the bilateral trade-services perimeter very differently).