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Base rate computed from analyst-asserted responds_to: edges in the reverse direction (target-country → issuer-country) for prior issuer-actions on the same target. Modal type + lag percentiles only — not a model output. Treat as a historical anchor for sizing counter-response scenarios, not a forecast in itself.
Substantive expansions vs the April 2025 baseline (Announcement No. 18, which controlled samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium):
europium (Eu), ytterbium (Yb) — all medium / heavy REEs where China holds dominant refined share. Total = 12 of the 17 rare-earth elements now under MOFCOM licensing.
≥0.1% by value of PRC-origin controlled REEs require a MOFCOM licence to export to any third country. This is a direct textual mirror of the US BIS de-minimis architecture under EAR §734.4.
items produced using PRC-origin REE mining, smelting, separation, metal-smelting, magnet-manufacturing or recycling technology require a MOFCOM licence even when no PRC-origin material is physically present in the finished item. Direct parallel to BIS FDP rules used against Huawei / SMIC.
affiliates ≥50% owned by entities on China's Unreliable Entity List or Export Control List are subject to presumptive denial. Military end-users are effectively denied across the board.
export-control framework (action 2024-10-19) — exporters bear diligence obligation on suspected unlawful end-use.
For the first time the technology side of the rare-earth supply chain is controlled as an export class in its own right:
manufacturing (NdFeB, SmCo), secondary-resource recycling.
upgrade** services — closing the obvious work-around of shipping the equipment without the operating know-how.
investors, and provision to foreign persons whether inside or outside China — a deemed-export concept analogous to BIS §734.13.
foreign REE activities without authorisation — extraterritorial reach over PRC nationals abroad.
| Provision | Effective |
|---|---|
| Direct PRC exports of the 5 new REEs (No. 61 §一(三)) | 2025-10-09 |
| Tech / know-how controls (No. 62) | 2025-10-09 |
| Extraterritorial de minimis (No. 61 §一(一)) | 2025-12-01 |
| FDP for foreign items made with PRC REE tech (No. 61 §一(二)) | 2025-12-01 |
The split commencement was deliberate: the immediately-effective provisions hit the existing PRC-direct supply chain while the extraterritorial provisions gave foreign firms (and foreign governments) a 53-day window to either pre-build inventory or negotiate carve-outs. As noted in the suspension amendment, the extraterritorial provisions never actually entered into force.
control to apply extraterritorially via de-minimis + FDP + 50%-rule. All previous PRC controls (2023 Ga/Ge, 2023 graphite, 2024 Ga/Ge/Sb-to-US ban, 2025 heavy-REE licensing) reached only PRC-origin direct shipments. The October package shifts the entire global REE-derivative product universe under potential Chinese jurisdiction.
global refined heavy-REE output and ~60% of light-REE refining; for the magnet-manufacturing technology covered by No. 62, China is effectively monopolist (>90% of global NdFeB capacity, >95% of sintering / coating IP).
platforms — F-35 (~417 kg REE per airframe), Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk, Predator UAVs, JDAM. The sole US REE-magnet manufacturer (Noveon Magnetics) and the Mountain Pass / MP Materials separation facility (DoD $400M equity + $150M loan, 2025) are years from displacing Chinese capacity at any meaningful scale.
language are textually homologous to EAR §734.4 / §734.9 — a deliberate signal that China can and will deploy the same reach the US deploys against Huawei and SMIC. This is the single most consequential change in PRC export-control doctrine since the 2020 Export Control Law.
MOFCOM Announcement No. 70 (7 November 2025) suspended No. 61 and No. 62 — alongside several other October 2025 measures — for one year, until 10 November 2026. The suspension is part of the post-APEC (October 30 Busan summit) tariff de-escalation between Presidents Trump and Xi: the US side paused planned incremental tariff escalation; the PRC side paused the rare-earth extraterritorial regime and several Q4 retaliations.
Important features of the suspension:
remain on the books and reinstate automatically on 2026-11-10 absent further action.
heavy-REE licensing regime (Announcement No. 18), which continues to operate. Western importers still face per-shipment licensing on the original 7 REEs.
due to enter force on 2025-12-01 never actually commenced — there is no operational track record to assess their stringency.
rare-earth controls are calibrated as negotiating instruments in the broader US-China economic-security dialogue rather than pure structural decoupling tools — the architecture is retained for deterrent value, deployment is conditional.
triggered a near-immediate DoD response in Oct-Nov 2025 including additional MP Materials offtake commitments and acceleration of the Lynas USA Texas separation facility. Watch for FY26 NDAA appropriations targeting REE refining / magnet-manufacturing capacity.
Announcement No. 61 are all on the EU CRMA Strategic Raw Materials list (action 2024-05-23). Strategic Project status for European REE separation projects (Norra Kärr, Solvay La Rochelle expansion) was actively re-prioritised post-October.
controls are the more durable threat. Foreign attempts to build NdFeB capacity outside China (USA Rare Earth, Less Common Metals, Neo Performance Materials Estonia) have historically depended on Chinese-trained personnel and Chinese-supplied equipment — both now subject to PRC export licence even after the suspension lifts.
docs/minerals/materials/neodymium.md covers the broader REE chain; the 5 newly-listed elements (Ho, Er, Tm, Eu, Yb) are not yet covered with their own dossiers — the europium and ytterbium chokepoints in particular merit follow-up given their phosphor / laser / nuclear-control-rod uses.
on 2026-11-10 without a follow-on agreement, the severity reverts to 5 and the extraterritorial provisions enter force with a fresh 53-day commencement clock — model accordingly.
defining the de-minimis valuation methodology, the FDP presumption-of-knowledge standard, or the 50%-rule aggregation rules. As of the suspension date no such guidance had been published — leaving a deliberate ambiguity that maximises chilling effect.
cerium, lanthanum, promethium) will ever be added — neodymium and praseodymium remain China's largest reserve escalation lever, deliberately held back through both the April and October 2025 packages.
underlying April 2025 regime (Announcement No. 18) through the suspension window is the operational tell — if approval rates remain depressed for US-bound shipments, the suspension is cosmetic; if they normalise, the de-escalation is real.