Niger TNUC – Uranium One Group (Rosatom) Memorandum of Cooperation on Uranium Mining

Mechanism

This MoU is the third and completing step of Niger's structural uranium supply-chain realignment following the July 2023 coup:

1. June 2024 (2024-06-21-niger-imouraren-uranium-licence-revocation): Niger revoked Orano's Imouraren uranium mining licence — the world's largest undeveloped uranium deposit (~200 kt U₃O₈) — expelling France's nuclear fuel company from Niger's largest untapped asset. 2. June 2025 (2025-06-19-niger-somair-uranium-mine-nationalisation): Niger nationalised SOMAÏR (the Arlit mine operating since 1971, ~52% of Niger's production), transferring it to TNUC; Orano's ~63.4% operational stake was extinguished. 3. December 2025 (this action): TNUC formalises the replacement partner — Uranium One Group JSC (Rosatom subsidiary), covering geological exploration, new-deposit permitting, and mine construction at prospective sites. Uranium One Group also operates the world's largest single uranium mine (Kazakh ISL operations), bringing ISL and conventional mine development competencies.

Issoufou Tsalhatou, TNUC Secretary General, confirmed Niger has "large-scale plans for developing its uranium mineral resource base" and is attracted by Rosatom's "reference experience and competencies in managing mining projects." Pavel Larionov, Uranium One Group President, framed the deal as combining Niger's geological potential with Rosatom technology.

A companion Rosatom–Niger MoU on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation (NPP feasibility studies, reactor construction) was signed in the same period, indicating ambitions beyond the mining supply chain toward domestic nuclear power generation.

EU uranium supply-chain implications

Prior to the coup, Niger supplied ~12–15% of EU uranium enrichment via the Orano/EURENCO pipeline (Arlit → France → enrichment). SOMAÏR's nationalisation severed that route. This MoU signals future NE yellowcake production will route through the Rosatom enrichment network (Tenex/TVEL), not Western utilities' supply chains. EU nuclear operators with Niger-origin uranium in their fuel cycle will need to find replacement supply or accept a Rosatom-chain dependency — directly relevant to EU's nuclear fuel supply diversification effort (Euratom Supply Agency 2024 annual report).

Downstream implications

• Niger uranium now structurally linked to Rosatom global enrichment network; EU utilities

depending on Niger-origin yellowcake face supply-source re-qualification costs.

• TNUC–Uranium One partnership could unlock Imouraren development (world's largest undeveloped

deposit, French-designed open-pit); if Rosatom funds and constructs it, Niger's output could double from ~2,000 to potentially ~5,000 t U/year on a 15-year horizon.

• Puts pressure on EU's Euratom Supply Agency to identify compensating volumes (Kazakhstan,

Canada, Namibia, Uzbekistan) given both the SOMAÏR and Imouraren channels now blocked.

• Kazakhstan–Rosatom Balkhash NPP deal (May 2026, separately queued) suggests Rosatom is

assembling a vertically integrated NE→KZ→enrichment→NPP supply chain across Francophone Africa and Central Asia simultaneously.

Open questions

• Will TNUC–Uranium One progress to a formal mining convention (Convención Minière) for

specific deposit licences? Watch for Niger Ministry of Mines permit decrees.

• Companion nuclear energy MoU scope: is a state-to-state IGA for NPP construction

contemplated? (VVER-1200 siting in Niger would be unusual given grid capacity ~200 MW.)

• Does the Imouraren deposit (reclassified after Orano exit) feature in the prospection

programme, or is TNUC offering Rosatom a fresh greenfield portfolio?