Bolivia Proyecto de Ley del Litio — national lithium statutory framework

Mechanism

Bolivia holds ~23 million tonnes of identified lithium reserves — the largest globally by most estimates — concentrated in the Salar de Uyuni (Potosí Department) and the smaller Salar de Coipasa and Salar de Pastos Grandes. The 1992 Ley 928 created YLB (then GNRE, reconstituted under Ley 928 in 2017) as the 100%-state monopoly on evaporitic-resource extraction, leaving no legal pathway for independent private-capital participation. The result was a decade of failed state-only DLE pilots and two major foreign contracts (Uranium One USD 970M; Hong Kong CBC USD 1.0bn) blocked in Congress for lack of a clear statutory framework.

The Proyecto de Ley del Litio addresses this by splitting the Salar de Uyuni into two regulatory zones:

1. Tourism-reserve sub-zone — a delimited area designated as patrimonio turístico to preserve the salt-flat tourism industry and local community livelihoods. No industrial lithium extraction in this zone.

2. Industrial production zone — the remaining salar area, to be tendered under an international bidding process. Concessions may be awarded to (i) private capital acting independently, or (ii) YLB + private capital in mixed-JV alliances. This is a structural departure from the Ley 928 state-monopoly model and the first explicit private-sector pathway since Bolivia nationalised its lithium resources.

The bill's 121 articles also provide the Congressional mandate required for ratification of the two pending YLB foreign contracts — the Uranium One DLE extraction agreement (2024) and the Hong Kong CBC lithium-carbonate services contract (2024) — both of which were legally blocked without a statutory framework authorising YLB to enter mixed-capital arrangements at that scale.

President Paz's framing emphasised "reglas claras" (clear rules) and investor-legal certainty, a pointed contrast to the Arce-era contracts which critics argued lacked statutory grounding. Tax stability provisions for 20 years and elimination of an additional levy on company profits were announced as incentive features to be embedded in the bill, positioning Bolivia competitively against Argentina's RIGI and Chile's lithium tender architecture.

Downstream implications

• YLB-Uranium One and YLB-Hong Kong CBC contract ratification contingent on bill passage;

both remain in legislative limbo until a plenary vote occurs. The Salar de Uyuni DLE plant (capacity target ~25,000 t/y LCE) was under court suspension as of mid-2025 following the prior administration's contract disputes — the new statutory framework is the precondition for reopening construction.

• International bidding process — if enacted, opens Bolivia's ~23Mt reserve to competitive

tender for the first time; directly competes with Argentina's RIGI lithium pipeline (~USD 30bn committed as of May 2026) and Chile's Codelco-SQM JV structure for global DLE capex flows.

• LatAm lithium triangle realignment — peers structurally to Chile's 2023 National Lithium

Strategy (state-majority + Codelco lead); a second major lithium-triangle jurisdiction pivoting from state-monopoly to mixed/private-capital model under sovereign-control framing.

• DLE supply-chain signalling — explicit private-capital pathway + 20-year tax stability

makes Bolivia viable for DLE technology licensors (EnergyX, Lilac Solutions, International Battery Metals) seeking Salar de Uyuni project access blocked under the prior framework.

• Social-consensus risk — indigenous communities in Potosí and Oruro departments have

historically opposed large-scale salar industrialisation; the tourism-reserve delimitation is designed to address this, but a national consensus summit was still needed as of May 2026, signalling ongoing legitimacy-building before plenary passage.

Open questions

• Exact article count — the 121-article figure is widely cited in secondary coverage; the

canonical Cámara de Diputados bill text (PL filing) should be checked against the MHE December 2025 framework once the enacted gazette version is published.

• Tourism-reserve boundary — the exact geographic delimitation of the heritage tourism

sub-zone within the Salar de Uyuni has not been publicly gazetted; the precise area carved out will determine the viable industrial-zone footprint for the international tender.

• Contract ratification sequence — unclear whether the Paz administration will pursue

ratification of the Uranium One and Hong Kong CBC contracts under the new statute or renegotiate terms given Paz's public criticism of the Arce-era contracts.

• Enactment timeline — as of May 2026, the bill was still in the socialisation / consensus

phase, with a national mining summit (May 18-20 2026) and a planned legislative submission by end of July 2026.