US–Bolivia Critical Minerals Memorandum of Understanding

Mechanism

The MoU is a non-binding framework agreement creating a US–Bolivia intergovernmental channel for critical-minerals investment facilitation. It establishes a bilateral cooperation pathway — analogous to the six Critical Minerals Ministerial MoUs signed on 4 February 2026 with Guinea, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Uzbekistan, and the DFC Joint Investment Framework — but with Bolivia as the first signing from the Lithium Triangle since the US–Argentina reciprocal trade agreement (February 2026) and Chile's ongoing Chile–US cooperation (via NovaAndino/CODELCO-SQM structures).

The signing was conducted in Washington DC by Asst Sec Caleb Orr (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs) and Bolivian Mining Minister Marco Antonio Calderón de la Barca. The US commitment per the official announcement: to "work with Bolivia under the leadership of President [Paz] to bring investment that drives prosperity in both the US and Bolivia and secures critical mineral supply chains."

Bolivia's strategic context: Bolivia hosts the world's largest identified lithium resource at the Salar de Uyuni (~21 Mt LCE per USGS), historically inaccessible to Western capital under the Morales-Arce-MAS resource-nationalism cycle (2006–2025). The November 2025 election of President Paz marked the first post-MAS government in nearly two decades, creating an opening for Western-aligned private investment. The MoU is the first tangible bilateral economic deliverable from that political transition.

Competitive restructuring of Bolivia lithium offtake: Existing YLB development partnerships are Russian (Uranium One Group, USD 970 M DLE plant — court-suspended May 2025 per 2024-09-01-bolivia-ylb-uranium-one-dle-contract) and Chinese (Hong Kong CBC, USD 1 bn DLE 35 kt/yr — per 2024-11-26-bolivia-ylb-hong-kong-cbc-lithium-contract). The MoU explicitly seeks to attract Western developers (Albemarle, Lithium Americas, Standard Lithium, KoBold Metals) as a counterweight, creating the first genuine competitive bidding environment for YLB partnership since the DLE technology round began.

Domestic enabling legislation: The MoU's investment-facilitation objective depends in part on the Proyecto de Ley del Litio clearing the Bolivian legislature. That bill would allow YLB to form private-sector partnerships at the extraction stage, introduce a progressive royalty scale (3%–7% linked to lithium carbonate price), and mandate Bolivian personnel training. Until it passes, the MoU's operative scope is limited to non-extraction cooperation (technology transfer, feasibility studies, DFC debt financing).

Downstream implications

• Closes the Lithium Triangle bilateral-instrument gap: US–Chile and US–Argentina

cooperation tracks were already operational; Bolivia was the last major holdout

• Raises probability weighting on Bolivian supply contribution to the 2030+ lithium

supply gap (Wood Mackenzie / BMI base case: 100–300 kt LCE by 2030, conditional on regime + financing certainty)

• Albemarle (ALB) and Lithium Americas (LAC) are the most plausible US-aligned anchor

investors for Salar de Uyuni; any DFC debt facility would likely require an ALB or LAC JV structure as counterparty

• The MoU's success depends on the Paz government surviving politically long enough to

push the Proyecto de Ley del Litio through a Congress where MAS still holds significant representation

Open questions

• Whether a binding follow-on agreement (DFC facility, JV framework, technology-transfer

protocol) is in negotiation and on what timeline

• Legislative prospects for the Proyecto de Ley del Litio under the new administration
• Whether the YLB–Uranium One court suspension will be formally terminated or left

dormant under the Paz government's Western-realignment posture