EU Commission opens in-depth FSR ex officio investigation into Goldwind's activities in the EU wind sector

Mechanism

The European Commission's DG Competition opened an ex officio preliminary review into Goldwind in April 2024, sending requests for information to companies active in the EU wind sector. After gathering evidence across the preliminary phase, the Commission found sufficient indications that Goldwind received foreign subsidies from Chinese public authorities of a scale and selectivity likely to distort the EU internal market.

The Phase II in-depth investigation (FS.100143) formally opened 3 February 2026. It examines three subsidy categories preliminarily identified:

1. Grants — including insurance-premium subsidies and R&D grants from Chinese public authorities 2. Preferential tax measures — reduction of corporate income tax and VAT refunds 3. Preferential financing — loans from banks likely attributable to the Chinese state (policy banks: CDB, EXIM, etc.)

The distortion theory is that these measures unduly improved Goldwind's competitive position in EU wind-project tenders — both turbine supply and associated services — to the detriment of EU-domiciled OEMs (Vestas, Siemens Gamesa, Nordex, Enercon).

At conclusion of the 18-month Phase II window the Commission may issue: (a) a non-objection decision, (b) a decision with commitments, or (c) a decision imposing redressive measures.

Structural significance

This is the second FSR ex officio Phase II investigation ever opened (the first being Nuctech, FS.100068, opened 10 December 2025) and the first targeting the renewable-energy / wind-OEM sector. The pair — Nuctech (security scanners) and Goldwind (wind turbines) — together define the Commission's ex officio enforcement-priority architecture: Chinese SOE / state-linked incumbents deeply embedded in EU critical-infrastructure supply chains.

The FSR Guidelines adopted 9 January 2026 (C(2026) 43 final, filed 2026-01-09) provide the analytical framework DG COMP is applying to Goldwind: the distortion assessment, public-procurement distortion test, and balancing test codified there govern the Phase II investigation methodology.

Goldwind's EU activities are estimated at approximately EUR 7bn of turbine-related revenue. Its EU presence spans onshore and offshore wind-turbine manufacturing, R&D, sales, and servicing through EU subsidiaries.

Downstream implications

• EU wind-OEM competitive landscape: Vestas, Siemens Gamesa, Nordex, and Enercon are direct

incumbents with competitive interest in the outcome. A redressive-measures decision could significantly limit Goldwind's ability to bid on EU wind-project tenders.

• Chinese wind-OEM pipeline: Mingyang Smart Energy, Envision Energy, Sany Renewable Energy,

and Shanghai Electric Wind Power are identified as next-in-queue candidates for comparable ex officio scrutiny. The Goldwind opening signals that the Commission intends to apply FSR enforcement systematically across Chinese wind-OEM EU market entrants.

• EU green-transition supply-chain tension: The investigation sits at the intersection of the

EU's wind-deployment targets (offshore wind: 300 GW by 2050, under the European Green Deal and REPowerEU) and its foreign-subsidy surveillance architecture. A Goldwind supply restriction could tighten EU wind-turbine supply, adding to component-cost and lead-time pressures.

• FSR precedent: This is the first application of the FSR enforcement tools to the clean-energy

equipment sector, extending the regime's scope beyond M&A review (ADNOC/Covestro Phase II), public-procurement notifications, and security equipment (Nuctech).

Open questions

• Will the Commission use interim measures under FSR Art. 31 to freeze any ongoing EU wind tenders

pending the Phase II conclusion?

• Which EU wind-procurement tenders have Goldwind bids under active evaluation?
• Will the MOFCOM TIB Final Determination (filed 2025-01-09) — China's blocking-statute

countermeasure — be invoked by Goldwind during the Phase II investigation?

• How will the investigation interact with the EU Wind Power Package and the Net-Zero Industry Act

criteria for strategic-project certification of EU-domiciled OEM manufacturing?