Indonesia ESDM Minister Announces Study to Terminate Tin Exports Under Hilirisasi Programme

Mechanism

Minister Bahlil's statement at the Indonesia Economic Outlook 2026 forum on 13 February 2026 explicitly cited the hilirisasi template: Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in 2020, resulting in total nickel export value growing from USD 3.3bn in 2018 to USD 34bn by 2024. The 2023 bauxite export ban followed the same logic. Tin is the stated next target.

The critical distinction from the nickel and bauxite precedents is structural: Indonesia already exports tin in refined form (not raw ore), through the Bangka Belitung smelter network (dominated by PT Timah). A ban at this stage would block refined tin metal exports, not ore — requiring domestic production of downstream tin alloys, solder, and semiconductor packaging materials before an export ban could be economically viable. This is a materially harder industrial-policy ask than banning raw ore.

As of June 2026, no formal instrument has been issued. The policy trajectory follows the same telegraph-then-gazette pattern observed for nickel (~12 months from first signal to formal ban) and bauxite (~10 months). The Ministry of Trade (Kemendag) would issue the export prohibition via Permendag; the ESDM ministry provides the sectoral rationale and drafts supporting regulations on downstream-facility requirements.

Downstream implications

• Global tin supply risk: Indonesia supplied approximately 25–30% of global refined tin in 2025. A formal export ban on refined tin would be a more acute supply shock than the nickel ore ban, because the nickel ban merely pushed intermediate processing to Indonesia — a ban on refined tin would block a finished commodity with no near-term substitute source at scale.
• PT Timah (TINS.JK): The state-controlled smelter would be the primary implementing vehicle and a beneficiary of downstream-investment incentives accompanying any formal ban.
• Solder and electronics supply chains: Tin solder is the dominant joining material in PCB manufacturing. Semiconductor assembly, EMS, and EV battery pack manufacturers sourcing tin from Indonesian channels face upstream concentration risk if a formal ban advances.
• Hilirisasi 2.0 signal: The announcement is the clearest public indicator that the Prabowo administration intends to extend hilirisasi beyond the nickel-bauxite pair to tin, copper, and potentially other Tier 1 refined metals.

Watch triggers

• Formal Permendag or Kepmen ESDM designating tin as a restricted-export commodity — this is the gazette event that moves severity to 4.
• ESDM publication of a downstream-readiness study (kajian) with specific timelines.
• Announcement of smelter/refinery investment commitments from foreign tin consumers (South Korean, Japanese, Taiwanese) as pre-condition for ban — similar to the HPAL nickel investment conditionality model.
• Presidential Regulation (PP) amending the Minerba framework to formally include tin under the downstream mandate.

Open questions

• Will the government require domestic production of tin-based solder and tin chemicals (not just refined tin metal) before banning exports, or will the ban apply to refined tin immediately?
• Does the study cover only raw tin ore / tin concentrate, or does it extend to refined tin (tin ingots, tin alloys)?
• How does this interact with the US-Indonesia reciprocal trade agreement (filed 2026-02-19) and any US pressure to maintain tin supply chains?