Tin — material dossier

Structural facts + context. Tin is the canonical "electronics solder" metal — every PCB on Earth depends on it. Concentration is severe but more diversified than tungsten or graphite.

What it is

Soft, malleable, low-melting-point metal (atomic number 50; melting point 232°C). Does not corrode in air or water at room temperature, alloys readily with lead, copper, silver, and bismuth. The combination of low melting point + good wetting on copper + ductile joints + (with the post-2006 lead-free shift) high-tin SAC alloy chemistry makes tin the irreplaceable joining material in electronics assembly.

Traded primarily as:

• Refined tin metal: LME 3-month contract is the global

reference price. Min 99.85% purity. Standard cast-ingot form for solder-paste manufacturers.

• Tin concentrate (60-72% Sn content): ore-stage product;

smelted to refined metal; trades at LME-discount.

• Solder alloys: SAC305 (Sn-Ag-Cu, lead-free electronics

solder, dominant since RoHS 2006), Sn-Pb 63/37 (legacy, permitted in defence + aerospace + medical), Sn-Bi (low- temperature specialty).

Where it comes from

Mine production (~290 kt Sn content / year, 2024)

Top producing countries (USGS MCS 2025, 2024 data):

• China: ~30% — Yunnan + Guangxi mines. Gejiu (Yunnan)

is the legacy capital.

• Indonesia: ~18% — Bangka-Belitung islands. PT Timah

(state) + private smelters. Highly variable year-on-year because of the 2023 export-permit freeze that paused shipments for ~Q1-Q2 2023.

• Myanmar: ~13% — Wa State, opaque reporting because the

region operates outside central Myanmar government control. August 2023 Wa State authorities imposed a mining ban citing depletion + environmental concerns; the ban removed ~20kt/yr of feedstock from the system. Enforcement is partial and 2024 production has slowly recovered.

• Peru: ~8% — Minsur San Rafael (Apurímac).
• DRC: ~6% — artisanal cassiterite mining in

Maniema/South Kivu, exported via ITSCI traceability scheme.

• Bolivia: ~5% — Huanuni + Colquiri (state-owned

COMIBOL).

• Brazil: ~4% — Mineração Taboca + Minsur subsidiary

in Pará/Amazonas.

• Australia: ~2% — Renison-Bell (Tasmania).

Reserves (USGS MCS 2025, contained Sn)

• China ~1.1 Mt
• Indonesia ~0.8 Mt
• Brazil ~0.4 Mt
• Australia ~0.4 Mt
• Bolivia ~0.4 Mt
• Russia ~0.3 Mt

Refining (~390 kt refined Sn / year)

• China: ~49% — Yunnan Tin (Gejiu, world's largest

smelter at ~80kt/yr capacity), China Tin Group, plus smaller Hunan and Guangxi smelters.

• Indonesia: ~20% — PT Timah dominates with ~70% of

Indonesian smelted output; private smelters account for the rest, mostly on Bangka-Belitung.

• Malaysia: ~7% — Malaysia Smelting Corp (MSC) at

Penang. The historical centre of South-East Asian tin smelting; processes Indonesian + DRC + Myanmar concentrate alongside domestic.

• Peru: ~6% — Minsur Pisco smelter.
• Bolivia: ~5% — Vinto smelter (state).
• Brazil: ~3% — Taboca + private smelters.
• Belgium: ~3% — Hindustan Zinc / Metallo Belgium

recycling-oriented operation; one of the few non-Asian refiners of consequence.

• Thailand: ~2% — Thaisarco (Phuket).

China refining share has been remarkably stable at ~46-49% across 2014-2024 — tin is one of the few critical-material refining surfaces where Chinese share has NOT crept upward over the decade.

Price state (structural, not verified this wake)

Historical reference ranges (LME 3-month):

• Pre-2020: $15-22k/t typical range
• March 2022: $50k/t spike on combined Indonesia export

pause + Russian-flagged tin concerns

• 2023: ~$25-30k/t with Wa State mining ban shock
• 2024-2025: ~$32-36k/t structural range

Trend direction: tin prices have been gradually rising 2023-2025 as:

1. Myanmar Wa State mining ban (Aug 2023) removed ~17% of global mine supply 2. Indonesia 2023 export-permit freeze briefly paused PT Timah shipments 3. Chinese mine grades declining (Gejiu deposit maturity) 4. Electronics-demand recovery from 2023 slump 5. New supply struggling to come online (greenfield projects are 5-7 year minimum)

A WebFetch verification in a future wake would replace these ranges with current LME quotes.

Demand structure

• Electronics solder: ~50% — printed-circuit-board

assembly, semiconductor packaging, surface-mount technology. Lead-free SAC305 (96.5% Sn / 3.0% Ag / 0.5% Cu) is the dominant alloy.

• Chemicals: ~17% — PVC heat stabilisers (organotin

compounds), PVC catalysts, glass-coatings, biocides.

• Tinplate: ~14% — electrolytically tin-coated steel

for food + beverage cans. Largest substitutable end-use (aluminium beverage cans + plastic compete).

• Brass + bronze alloys: ~6% — copper-tin alloys for

marine + architectural + bearings applications.

• Lead-acid batteries: ~4% — tin alloying additive in

positive grid alloys for cycle-life improvement.

• **Float-glass production, pewter, ammunition,

superconductors: ~9%**

Demand drivers forward:

• Electronics output (~1.5% CAGR baseline)
• Semiconductor packaging volume (with AI / advanced

packaging substrates moving to higher solder counts)

• Tinplate growing in emerging-market food packaging,

flat in developed markets

• PVC chemicals modestly growing with construction

Substitution risk (downward demand pressure): conductive adhesives, epoxies, sintered-silver bonding, and laser- welding could in theory replace solder — but currently cover <2% of the joining-material market and are unlikely to displace tin meaningfully without a manufacturing-process redesign across millions of assembly lines.

Policy / geopolitical context

Tin sits in an interesting policy space — it is not yet on the active Chinese export-control radar (unlike Ga/Ge, graphite, heavy REEs, or rumoured tungsten). Reasoning:

• Concentration is severe (CN+ID+MM = 61% of mining,

CN+ID+MY = 76% of refining) but no single-country chokepoint comparable to tungsten (CN ~83%) or graphite (CN ~85% refining)

• Chinese tin smelters are net importers of concentrate —

raising export controls on refined Sn would be self-harming to the mid-stream industry that consumes Myanmar + DRC ore

• Indonesian and Myanmar policy actions have been the

primary supply-shock drivers, not Chinese export policy

Tin IS on multiple critical-minerals lists:

• US Geological Survey 2022 Critical Minerals List: yes
• EU CRMA Annex II (Critical Raw Materials List): yes
• Japan METI critical-minerals (5 + 11 framework): yes
• Australia Critical Minerals List 2023: yes

The supply-side stories most likely to move price:

1. Indonesia export-policy regime — periodic export- permit freezes / IMEX licensing tighteningss / palm-oil- style domestic-market obligations. PT Timah governance reforms have followed several recent corruption cases. 2. Myanmar Wa State mining ban evolution — fully- enforced version would remove another 5-10kt/yr. 3. DRC artisanal supply — ITSCI traceability + conflict- minerals reporting affects what reaches Western buyers even when production volume is unchanged.

Non-Chinese capacity in the pipeline

• Alphamin Resources Bisie mine (DRC, Mpama North +

Mpama South phase 2): ramping; ~15kt/yr at full output; largest single non-Chinese mine project of the 2020s.

• Aurelia Metals (Australia): legacy Renison-Bell

expansion potential.

• Cornish Metals South Crofty (UK): historic Cornwall

district revival; small but symbolic.

• Peruvian + Bolivian incremental brownfield expansions:

ongoing but limited.

All combined non-Chinese new capacity = perhaps 20-30kt/yr addition over 5-7 years vs current global mine total of 290kt — meaningful but not transformative.

Concentration risks (ranked)

1. Indonesia export-policy shock — single-government action can move 50-70kt/yr in or out of the market within weeks. Demonstrated 2023. 2. Myanmar Wa State mining ban — already partial- enforced, full-enforcement scenario would remove additional 5-10kt/yr. 3. Chinese smelter feedstock disruption — Yunnan Tin + China Tin depend on Myanmar + DRC concentrate; if cross- border flows tighten, Chinese refined output falls and non-Chinese smelters (MSC Malaysia, Vinto Bolivia) gain pricing power. 4. PT Timah governance / corruption episodes — Indonesia has had multiple criminal investigations into PT Timah officials since 2022; institutional disruption translates to operational delays. 5. Inverse risk: substitution by conductive adhesives / epoxies in electronics assembly — currently <2% of solder market, could grow with manufacturing-process redesign.

Players to know

Chinese majors

• Yunnan Tin Co. (Tin Industry Co., Ltd. of Yunnan;

state-owned; Gejiu, Yunnan — world's largest tin smelter + integrated mining)

• China Tin Group (Liuzhou, Guangxi)
• Guangxi Huaxi Group (private; Guangxi)
• Hunan Yuteng (private; Hunan)

Non-Chinese producers

• PT Timah Tbk (Indonesia state; Bangka-Belitung;

TINS.JK on IDX)

• Malaysia Smelting Corp (Malaysia; MSC.KL on KLSE;

Penang smelter; integrated with Australian + DRC mining)

• Minsur (Peru; subsidiary of Grupo Breca; San Rafael

mine + Pisco smelter)

• Alphamin Resources (DRC; AFM.V on TSX-V; Bisie mine —

fastest-growing non-Chinese tin mine)

• Metals X / Renison Bell (Australia; MLX.AX on ASX)
• Mineração Taboca (Brazil; private)
• Bolivian state COMIBOL (Huanuni + Vinto smelter)
• Hindustan Zinc / Metallo Belgium (Belgium; recycling

+ secondary refining)

• Thaisarco (Thailand; private)

Downstream tin-solder users

• MacDermid Alpha (Element Solutions) (US; ESI on NYSE;

electronics solder paste + flux dominant supplier)

• Indium Corporation (US; private; high-end electronics

solder)

• Senju Metal Industry (Japan; 5662.T; Asian solder leader)
• Henkel Loctite electronics (Germany; HEN3.DE; smaller

solder share, larger flux + adhesive position)

• Heraeus Electronics (Germany; private)

Chemicals (organotin) end-users

• Galata Chemicals (US; private)
• Songwon Industrial (Korea; 004060.KS)
• PMC Group (US; private)

What to watch monthly

• LME tin 3-month price + LME stocks (LME website,

free datapoint) — the cleanest market-temperature read.

• Indonesian Ministry of Trade / ESDM announcements on

tin export permits (RKAB approvals, IUP renewals)

• PT Timah quarterly production reports (PT Timah investor

relations site; bahasa-Indonesia + English)

• Wa State mining-ban enforcement reports (CRU /

Fastmarkets — paywalled)

• Alphamin Bisie production updates (TSX-V reports,

monthly)

• MSC Malaysia smelter throughput (MSC investor

relations; Penang fire-incident risk historically)

• DRC ITSCI conflict-minerals quarterly volumes (ITRI

/ ITA traceability reports)

Cross-references

• Reports: docs/minerals/reports/YYYY-MM-tin.md (none yet —

first monthly report should pick up after coverage_started)

• docs/minerals/materials/tungsten.md — same Mittelstand-

electronics exposure family; tungsten is the more- concentrated cousin

• docs/minerals/materials/silver.md — overlaps in

electronics-solder demand (silver is the Ag in SAC305 alloy at ~3% by mass) and PV-cell solder paste

• docs/minerals/FRAMEWORK.md — tin sits in cell (1,2)

of the 2x2: durable structural demand (electronics baseline) + moderately-concentrated supply with policy- shock prone subset (Indonesia + Myanmar). Lower immediate-shock probability than tungsten/graphite, higher than diversified silver.