Niger Council of Ministers awards large-scale uranium mining permits at In Azaoua (to state-owned TSUMCO, ex-SOMAÏR perimeter) and Madaouela I (re-attributed to MAMICO, Niger state stake raised to 40%)

Mechanism

The 21 August 2026 Council of Ministers session formalises the next step in Niger's post-2023 uranium resource-nationalism arc on two separate assets. In Azaoua is the operating continuation of the SOMAÏR perimeter: after the June 2025 nationalisation of SOMAÏR and the May 2026 creation of TSUMCO as its wholly state-owned successor operator (see responds_to amendment history on the SOMAÏR action), this permit formally hands TSUMCO the exploitation title. Madaouela I follows a different path — GoviEx Uranium's permit lapsed to the public domain in July 2024 after the company failed to bring the deposit into production; the August 2026 re-attribution to MAMICO reflects a renegotiated structure in which GoviEx's Australian successor Atomic Eagle holds 60% and operational control, while the Nigerien State raises its stake to 40% (from a prior minority position) in exchange for the permit grant and a $10M upfront redevance forfaitaire.

Downstream implications

• Completes state operational control over the former Orano/SOMAÏR

production base at Arlit via TSUMCO, closing the loop opened by the June 2024 Imouraren revocation and June 2025 SOMAÏR nationalisation.

• Madaouela I is a new production asset entering Niger's uranium

pipeline under a majority-foreign (Australian), minority-state ownership structure — a different template than the full nationalisation applied to SOMAÏR, suggesting Niger is willing to retain foreign operational partners where the state's equity position is increased rather than eliminated.

• Both permits sit in the Arlit uranium belt that has historically

supplied a significant share of EU natural-uranium imports; renewed permitting activity signals Niger intends to keep production capacity online despite the ongoing Orano-Niger ICSID dispute over SOMAÏR stock and title.

Open questions

• Whether TSUMCO's In Azaoua output is folded into the same

contested uranium stockpile / ICSID provisional-measures dispute as SOMAÏR production, or marketed separately.

• Madaouela I production timeline and investment commitments beyond

the $10M redevance forfaitaire — not disclosed in primary reporting.

• Whether Atomic Eagle's 60% stake carries offtake rights that route

Madaouela production toward Western utilities, or toward the Russia/China counterparties Niger has favoured for re-marketed SOMAÏR stock.