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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: metals recycling. Ownership re-checked 2026-09-12 — exposure claims not re-checked since fill. Company profile →
Lianyou Metals Co., Ltd. (TWSE: 7610; registered as "LIANYOU METALS CO.
,LTD.") was founded in May 2018 and is based in Pingtung County, Taiwan. It recycles, purifies and refines spent cemented-carbide (hard-metal) alloys and tungsten- and cobalt-bearing scrap and residues into rare-metal raw materials, using its own patented hydrometallurgical process chain — metal recovery, grinding, drying, electrolysis and oxidation. Its principal product is sodium tungstate (Na₂WO₄), the top upstream intermediate in the tungsten value chain, alongside calcium tungstate and a battery-grade cobalt sulfate solution; ammonium paratungstate, tungsten oxide and tungsten powder are also produced, with tungsten carbide powder and several refined cobalt products (cobalt carbonate, tricobalt tetroxide, cobalt metal powder) named as planned lines. The Taiwan Stock Exchange's listing profile records it as ranking second worldwide in tungstate export volume in 2024 and among the world's top three sodium tungstate producers. It listed on Taiwan's Innovation Board in 2025, having traded on the Emerging Stock market since 2022.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Lianyou Metals Co., Ltd. produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Tungsten — *bulk input and principal output*. Recovered from spent cemented-carbide scrap and refined into sodium tungstate, calcium tungstate, APT, tungsten oxide and tungsten powder.
Cobalt — *bulk input and co-product*. Cobalt is the binder phase in tungsten-carbide hard metal, so it arrives in the same scrap stream and is recovered alongside the tungsten rather than sourced separately.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobalt · flagged 11 Aug 2026, 55d pending
On 29 June 2026 DRC's Vice-Prime Minister for the National Economy (Daniel Mukoko Samba), Minister of Mines (Louis Watum Kabamba) and Minister of Foreign Trade (Julien Paluku Kahongya) jointly signed an arrêté interministériel regulating the commercialisation, export and nomenclature of marketable mining products, which for the first time BANS the export of unprocessed copper and cobalt concentrates outright — replacing the entire framework adopted 4 August 2023. Mining-rights holders, processing entities and buying counters (comptoirs) may seek a ministerial derogation to export less-elaborated products for up to one year, assessed against national mining policy and the technical/economic constraints of each mineral. A new tax regime for economically significant mining byproducts is introduced with a 3-month transition period. This is broader and more foundational than the existing filed/queued DRC cobalt-specific instruments — it is a national concentrate EXPORT BAN (not a quota or hydroxide-specific measure) covering BOTH copper and cobalt, issued under joint Economy/Mines/Trade authority rather than ARECOMS sectoral rulemaking. DRC = priority-tier chokepoint (cobalt, copper, tantalum). Severity 4 expected (national ban, dual-metal, replaces a 3-year-old framework).
source ↗Cobalt — *bulk input and co-product*. Cobalt is the binder phase in tungsten-carbide hard metal, so it arrives in the same scrap stream and is recovered alongside the tungsten rather than sourced separately.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in DR Congo stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a DR Congo processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches cobalt · flagged 20 Jul 2026, 77d pending
On ~29 June 2026 the Autorité de Régulation et de Contrôle des Marchés des Substances Minérales Stratégiques (ARECOMS) ordered that all first-half-2026 cobalt export quotas left unused by 30 June 2026 be forfeited and recovered, with a 5 July 2026 cutoff, and reallocated into ARECOMS's discretionary "strategic quota" pool (already ~10% of the 96,600 t/yr authorised volume) earmarked for national-interest local-processing projects. This is an escalation/operationalisation of the filed 2025-02-22 ARECOMS cobalt quota system: it concentrates additional volume under state discretionary control, tightens the effective free-market allocation for producers (Glencore/KCC, CMOC, ERG) on the world's dominant cobalt chokepoint (~76% of mine supply), and — via the linked customs-notification malfunction that blocked quota-linked export declarations after 1 July 2026 — created a real short-run supply interruption. IPTM action would be an AMENDMENT to 2025-02-22-drc-arecoms-cobalt-export-ban-quota-system.
source ↗Cobalt — *bulk input and co-product*. Cobalt is the binder phase in tungsten-carbide hard metal, so it arrives in the same scrap stream and is recovered alongside the tungsten rather than sourced separately.
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
TZ · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches cobalt · flagged 26 Jun 2026, 101d pending
TZ Finance Bill establishes the Mineral Research Fund capitalised at 10% of gross mineral revenue (~TZS 141 billion/yr at 2025 collection levels); amends the Income Tax Act to formally recognise tax exemptions granted under individual mining Framework Agreements and introduces standard operating procedures — reduces discretionary government risk for large mining investors (Panda Hill niobium, graphite juniors, Buzwagi gold); parallel VAT amendments give equivalent statutory certainty for VAT exemptions; taken together, the bill moves Tanzania from discretionary tax administration toward a rule-of-law-based investor regime for all critical-mineral projects; budget targets Tanzania for top-4 niobium producer status (Panda Hill DA already signed March 24, 2026) and 50% geophysical survey coverage by 2030
source ↗Cobalt — *bulk input and co-product*. Cobalt is the binder phase in tungsten-carbide hard metal, so it arrives in the same scrap stream and is recovered alongside the tungsten rather than sourced separately.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
cobalt — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches tungsten · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Tungsten — *bulk input and principal output*. Recovered from spent cemented-carbide scrap and refined into sodium tungstate, calcium tungstate, APT, tungsten oxide and tungsten powder.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
tungsten — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches tungstencobalt · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗Tungsten — *bulk input and principal output*. Recovered from spent cemented-carbide scrap and refined into sodium tungstate, calcium tungstate, APT, tungsten oxide and tungsten powder.
Cobalt — *bulk input and co-product*. Cobalt is the binder phase in tungsten-carbide hard metal, so it arrives in the same scrap stream and is recovered alongside the tungsten rather than sourced separately.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
Minister of Finance, acting under s.
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0.
Revises 30 CFR Part 580 to streamline 10 provisions governing prospecting, leasing, and operations for hard minerals (manganese nodules, cobalt-rich crusts, seafloor massive sulfides) on the US Outer…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Madagascar's Council of Ministers approved resumption of mining-permit issuance on ~28-29 Jan 2026, ending a moratorium in place since 2010 (imposed during a political transition amid mining-title sp…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligat…
If adopted, creates a unified mining regulatory framework across Cameroon, CAR, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad — harmonising licensing regimes, fiscal terms, transparency oblig…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
All DRC mining operators (Glencore, CMOC, Ivanhoe Mines, Eurasian Resources Group, and 50+ others) must transfer 5% of share capital to Congolese employees by July 31, 2026 or face permit suspension;…
Saudi sovereign mining vehicle Manara Minerals (PIF + Ma'aden JV) is in advanced negotiations to acquire a 15-20% equity stake (deal value ~USD 1.
Full replacement of the Mining Act 1992 with sweeping new statute: state acquires up to 30% equity in any new mining project (Kumul Minerals free-carry); special mining leases (SML) issued for initia…
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
2 of 38 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China MOFCOM Announcement No. 1 [2026] — country-specific dual-use export controls on Japan claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 2 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its sector (metals recycling) has no downstream edges in our supply-chain adjacency graph — no downstream signal in the register.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of tungsten. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the tungsten chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of cobalt. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the cobalt chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.