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Base rate computed from analyst-asserted responds_to: edges in the reverse direction (target-country → issuer-country) for prior issuer-actions on the same target. Modal type + lag percentiles only — not a model output. Treat as a historical anchor for sizing counter-response scenarios, not a forecast in itself.
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorises the USTR to impose tariffs on countries determined to engage in unfair trade practices. The 2018-2019 China tariff regime ($550B in covered imports across "Lists 1-4A") underwent statutory four- year review in 2022-2024; this announcement is the substantive output of that review.
Layered tariff actions:
1. EVs (HTS 8703.80.00): 25% → 100%, effective 27 Sep 2024 2. Lithium-ion EV batteries: 7.5% → 25%, effective 27 Sep 2024 3. Lithium-ion non-EV battery cells: 7.5% → 25%, effective 1 Jan 2026 4. Battery parts (cathode active material, electrolyte salts, separators): 7.5% → 25%, effective 27 Sep 2024 5. Natural graphite + permanent magnets: 0% → 25%, effective 1 Jan 2026 6. Semiconductors (HTS 8541, 8542): 25% → 50%, effective 1 Jan 2025; certain wafer items effective 2026 7. Solar cells (whether or not in modules): 25% → 50%, effective 27 Sep 2024 8. Steel + aluminum products (selected HS codes): 0-7.5% → 25%, effective 27 Sep 2024 9. Ship-to-shore cranes: 0% → 25%, effective 27 Sep 2024 10. Selected PPE / syringes / face masks: 0-7.5% → 50% (PPE), 25% → 50% (syringes), effective 27 Sep 2024 - 1 Jan 2026
The 100% EV tariff was the headline; in practice, no Chinese BEV manufacturer was selling in the US at material volume (BYD has no US distribution; Polestar is partly Chinese- manufactured). The actual binding constraint is on the battery + critical-mineral inputs that underlie domestic and ally-built EVs.
on Chinese battery cells, anode-grade graphite, and PV cells flow through to US EV / energy-storage / utility-solar economics, partially offset by IRA §30D + §45X credits but net negative for end-user prices in 2025-26.
+ production credits for domestic manufacturing = classic industrial-policy sandwich. Combined with FEOC carve-outs in IRA §30D, the effective cost of relying on Chinese-controlled supply for US-deployed clean-energy assets is ~30-50% higher than nominal sticker price.
zero direct trade impact (no meaningful Chinese BEV exports to US); (b) the Trump April-2025 reciprocal regime (filed: 2025-04-02-us-trump-reciprocal-tariff-regime) layered on top, making the §301 hikes increment-on-increment rather than the binding marginal action.
Arizona, SK On Tennessee, Samsung SDI Indiana) gained marginal protection on US-deployed product but face graphite-input cost pressure pending non-Chinese supply.
graphite tariffs help domestic anode pilot projects (Novonix, Syrah, Westwater) but raise short-term costs for cell makers.
small in dollar terms ($18B affected initially per USTR estimate) but the precedent matters for the post-2024 trajectory.
docs/minerals/materials/lithium.md, docs/minerals/materials/graphite.md, docs/minerals/materials/neodymium.md carry the relevant supply-chain context.
the bilateral framework deals being negotiated under EO 14257 may absorb or replace these tariffs. Filed as a pre-Trump baseline.
exclusions for items where domestic / non-China supply is unavailable. Track exclusion grant rates as a leading indicator of supply-chain-substitution feasibility.