Loading…
Loading…
What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: semiconductors. Company profile →
AXT Inc. (NASDAQ: AXTI) is a US-headquartered manufacturer of compound semiconductor substrates — the wafer-form crystalline materials on which semiconductor devices are grown. It is one of the world's largest independent suppliers of: - GaAs (gallium arsenide) substrates — for RF power amplifiers in smartphones (5G front-end modules), defence phased-array radar, and solar concentrators - InP (indium phosphide) substrates — for high-speed optical transceivers (data-centre 400G/800G coherent optics), lidar, and compound-semi power devices - Ge (germanium) substrates — for space solar cells (triple-junction III-V cells for satellites and space probes), terrestrial CPV cells, and infrared optics Primary manufacturing is at Beijing Tongmei Xtal Technology Co.
Ltd (北京通美晶体技术有限公司), a majority-owned subsidiary in Beijing, with additional substrate finishing at Dingxing, Hebei. US operations in Fremont, CA handle executive functions, R&D, and some finishing. FY2024 revenue was approximately $95M.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where AXT Inc. produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
In its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
EU · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches galliumindiumgermanium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 112d pending
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
source ↗gallium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
indium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
germanium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
This is a reporting / disclosure obligation — it does not prohibit importing from anywhere, so there is no supplier to switch and we list none. What you must do is what the measure's own text above describes: map the supply chain it covers, run the audit, and file. Its text states no filing deadline — we don't invent one.
Mapping your supply chain is exactly the work this obligation requires — your MacroLens exposure report is that map's starting point.
Further materials are covered in section 6 below.
EU · stage consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29) → elevated likelihood · touches galliumgermanium · flagged 30 Jul 2026, 67d pending
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
source ↗gallium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
germanium is in its verified exposure list, but the dossier carries no product-level note for it yet — we make no product claim until it does.
This is support, not a threat — it funds, fast-tracks or relaxes rather than restricts. If you have operations, projects or purchases inside its scope, check your eligibility against the measure's own text above.
gallium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
germanium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
US · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductors) · flagged 24 Jun 2026, 103d pending
Requires US allies — primarily the Netherlands (ASML) and Japan (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu) — to align their national export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with US BIS restrictions targeting China; strips DoC discretionary licensing authority for chipmaking tools; DUV immersion lithography machines (ASML TWINSCAN NXT series) would face mandatory licensing denial for China-bound sales/servicing; includes anti-circumvention provisions to block third-country re-export through Malaysia, Singapore, or UAE; if enacted, would overturn the bilateral US-Netherlands arrangement on DUV servicing and pressure Japan to expand its April 2023 / January 2024 semiconductor-equipment controls beyond current scope; diplomatic friction: NL Trade Minister Sjoerdsma was in Washington the same week opposing this bill while simultaneously signing Pax Silica
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductors) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
No named material → no substitution bench to map; the measure text above is the read.
TW · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductors) · flagged 20 Jun 2026, 107d pending
Taiwan ITA (International Trade Administration, MOEA) launched a 60-day public consultation on planned revisions to the SHTC (Sensitive High-Tech Commodity) controlled-goods export list to add AI chips and advanced semiconductor categories specifically targeting exports to China; if enacted, would extend Taiwan's existing sub-14nm chip / advanced packaging export controls (SHTC list 2025-11-18) to include AI-application chips sold for China use — the measure is designed to align Taiwan's export controls with US BIS advanced-chip restrictions and close the gap on AI server / Nvidia chip diversion from Taiwan to China; Bloomberg June 9, 2026 cites Taiwan authorities "considering much stricter export controls on AI chip sales to China to further align with US measures"; ITA confirmed a 60-day review period for planned revisions; if enacted, would add legal tools to address diversion of AI servers and Nvidia chips through Taiwan to China; affects global AI hardware supply chains and Taiwan-domiciled chip distributors, system integrators, and ODM/OEM assemblers
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductors) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
No named material → no substitution bench to map; the measure text above is the read.
CN · stage announced → low likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductors) · flagged 4 Jul 2026, 93d pending
Reuters (exclusive, multiple sources) reported 31 Dec 2025 that Chinese authorities have been requiring domestic chipmakers to source at least 50% of equipment spend from Chinese toolmakers when applying for approval to build or expand fab capacity — enforced administratively (approval rejected if the threshold isn't met) rather than via any published law or ministry order; strictest on mature-node lines, with temporary carve-outs for advanced-node lithography where local tools don't yet exist; officials reportedly want the floor higher over time, with a stated long-run goal of 100% domestic tooling. Directly squeezes foreign equipment suppliers (Lam Research, Applied Materials, Tokyo Electron, ASML) out of incremental Chinese fab capacity and is already lifting order books at domestic tool makers Naura Technology and AMEC (Naura H1 2025 revenue +30% YoY to RMB16bn; AMEC +44% YoY to RMB5bn). GTA logged this as a state act (state-act/95890) but provides no primary source; no MIIT/NDRC/MOFCOM document, gazette notice, or on-the-record government confirmation has surfaced in any outlet reviewed.
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductors) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
If enacted, first Taiwan restriction covering all Chinese customers (not just blacklisted entities); would require Taiwanese OEMs (Foxconn, Pegatron, ASUS, Quanta, Wiwynn), server makers, and compone…
None of these filed an explicit stage — in-force status defaults from an absent stage: field (flagged below), not a claim any filer made. Each still links to the register entry with its primary source; verify stage before treating as a confirmed baseline.
⚠ Extraterritorial measure — switching supplier origin may not exit its scope.
China State Council enacts unified Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items claims reach over foreign-made goods (“extraterritorial”) — the rule follows the material, not the seller, so an alternative outside the issuer can still be captured if its products contain or are made with in-scope inputs. Verify each alternative's feedstock origin before treating it as an exit.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 3 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ai compute, consumer goods, electronics, automotive, defence…. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of gallium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the gallium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of indium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the indium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
This company sits on the supply side of germanium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the germanium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.