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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: mining metals. Ownership re-checked 2026-09-08 — exposure claims not re-checked since fill. Company profile →
Cornish Lithium is a private UK mineral exploration and development company (founded 2016 by Jeremy Wrathall) building two lithium production routes in Cornwall: a hard-rock route at Trelavour Downs (near St Dennis), which processes lithium-mica-bearing granite using Lepidico's hydrometallurgical process to produce battery-grade lithium hydroxide, and a geothermal Direct Lithium Extraction (DLE) route at United Downs (near Redruth) and a planned commercial facility at Cross Lanes (Chacewater), which recovers lithium from naturally occurring, high-lithium geothermal brine. The company opened a low-emission demonstration plant for the hard-rock route in October 2024 and is targeting first commercial hard-rock production (10,000 tpy lithium hydroxide) from 2027, rising to a combined ~25,000 tpy lithium-carbonate equivalent across both routes by 2030 — enough, on the company's own estimate, to supply roughly a quarter of projected UK industrial lithium demand. It is backed by the UK National Wealth Fund (formerly UK Infrastructure Bank), The Energy & Minerals Group and TechMet, plus UK government Automotive Transformation Fund support.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Cornish Lithium produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Lithium (upstream producer, not a downstream buyer). Cornish Lithium's entire business is extracting and refining lithium chemicals (hydroxide via hard rock; carbonate via geothermal DLE) — it sits at the top of the battery supply chain rather than being exposed to lithium as an input.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
BR · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 19 Jun 2026, 108d pending
First federal statutory framework for critical and strategic minerals; establishes CMCE oversight committee, R$2B Mineral Activity Guarantee Fund (0. 2% gross revenue levy on critical-mineral companies), mandatory 0. 3% gross revenue R&D investment, 20% tax credits for domestic mineral transformation projects; limits raw-mineral exports where domestic processing capacity exists; covers niobium explicitly (CBMM/CMOC supply ~85% of global niobium — Brazil is a structural chokepoint); Chamber passed 343-97 on 7 May 2026, Senate review pending
source ↗Lithium (upstream producer, not a downstream buyer). Cornish Lithium's entire business is extracting and refining lithium chemicals (hydroxide via hard rock; carbonate via geothermal DLE) — it sits at the top of the battery supply chain rather than being exposed to lithium as an input.
This changes the form of what Brazil exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Brazil-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Brazil processing partner, not a supplier switch.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CD · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
source ↗Lithium (upstream producer, not a downstream buyer). Cornish Lithium's entire business is extracting and refining lithium chemicals (hydroxide via hard rock; carbonate via geothermal DLE) — it sits at the top of the battery supply chain rather than being exposed to lithium as an input.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
CN · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 28 Jun 2026, 99d pending
Chinese battery-materials major Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt (603799. SH) signed a BINDING Scheme Implementation Deed (7 May 2026) to acquire 100% of Atlantic Lithium Ltd (AIM/ASX: ALL) for ~US$210M all-cash (US$0. 25486/share; 26. 6% premium), gaining control of the Ewoyaa lithium project — Ghana's first parliament-ratified lithium mine (Central Region, 15-yr lease ratified Mar 2026). The Atlantic Lithium board unanimously recommends; largest holder Assore (~26. 4%) supports; deed has no financing/DD conditions. This is a Chinese-SOE-adjacent capture of a West-African hard-rock lithium chokepoint that had been positioned as a NON-China / Western-aligned supply source (Atlantic Lithium previously had US DFC / Piedmont offtake-JV ties), so the transaction re-prices Ewoyaa from a diversification asset into Chinese-controlled lithium supply — directly relevant to the cn-outbound-mining-fdi exposure series and to Ghana's local-ownership/beneficiation policy.
source ↗Lithium (upstream producer, not a downstream buyer). Cornish Lithium's entire business is extracting and refining lithium chemicals (hydroxide via hard rock; carbonate via geothermal DLE) — it sits at the top of the battery supply chain rather than being exposed to lithium as an input.
This governs deal-making — stakes, acquisitions, joint ventures — not the flow of material. Your purchasing is untouched; it matters to you only if you plan an investment or partnership inside its scope. No supplier alternatives apply.
NG · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 14 Jun 2026, 113d pending
Prohibits raw mineral exports unless 30% value-addition achieved domestically; affects Chinese mining companies (dominant in Nigerian critical minerals sector), Western offtake agreements, and all foreign-invested mining JVs; builds on existing eMC+ digital cadastre and mandatory value-addition plans introduced Nov 2024; could force processing-plant investment or suspension of raw mineral shipments from Africa's most populous economy; RMRDC = Raw Materials Research and Development Council (the sponsoring agency)
source ↗Lithium (upstream producer, not a downstream buyer). Cornish Lithium's entire business is extracting and refining lithium chemicals (hydroxide via hard rock; carbonate via geothermal DLE) — it sits at the top of the battery supply chain rather than being exposed to lithium as an input.
This changes the form of what Nigeria exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your Nigeria-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a Nigeria processing partner, not a supplier switch.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
GH · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · touches lithium · flagged 17 Jun 2026, 110d pending
Cabinet-cleared bill to replace the 2006 Minerals and Mining Act, Act 703: raises mining royalties from current 3–5% range to 9–12% (price-linked sliding scale), introduces a new medium-scale mining licence category bridging artisanal and large-scale operations, mandates district-level community and traditional-authority consultation before applications reach national regulators, scraps unlimited concession renewals (currently indefinitely renewable), and strengthens Ghanaian ownership provisions; National Mining Policy approved by Cabinet simultaneously; affects Newmont (Ahafo/Akyem), AngloGold Ashanti, Kinross (Chirano), Gold Fields (Tarkwa, post-Damang reversion), and Atlantic Lithium (Ewoyaa lithium project); royalty more than doubles at current gold prices — material cost increase for large-scale operators
source ↗Lithium (upstream producer, not a downstream buyer). Cornish Lithium's entire business is extracting and refining lithium chemicals (hydroxide via hard rock; carbonate via geothermal DLE) — it sits at the top of the battery supply chain rather than being exposed to lithium as an input.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
lithium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
On 28-Nov-2025 European Metals Holdings announced the Czech government approved a grant of up to EUR 360M under the Ministry of Industry and Trade's "Strategic Investments for a Climate-Neutral Econo…
In March 2026 the outgoing Boric administration reportedly fast-tracked and submitted to the Contraloría General de la República (Chile's comptroller) a batch of ~5 further Contratos Especiales de Op…
Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member State…
Minister of Mines, Petroleum and Energy Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly formally launched the revision of Côte d'Ivoire's 2014 Mining Code on 13 June 2026, standing up an expert team drawn from his minis…
Draft law amending Morocco's 2015 Mining Code (led by the Ministry of Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, Minister Leila Benali), with public consultations reported open since ~Feb 2025.
Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising…
New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12.
10% free-carried state equity in ALL new mining and energy projects (no-cost government stake via Epangelo Mining); consultations on 51% Namibian ownership in new mining ventures; maximum royalty rat…
RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence…
Tanzania's Ministry of Minerals (Minister Anthony Mavunde) has FINALISED a Critical and Strategic Minerals Strategy that takes legal effect only once the Government formally approves and gazettes the…
Binding plurilateral trade agreement among like-minded partners (US, EU, Japan and FORGE coalition members) establishing coordinated trade measures for critical mineral supply chains — including bord…
Second wave of CRMA Art.
On 10 July 2026 the African Development Bank Group, with the African Union Commission, the AfCFTA Secretariat and UNECA, convened African ministers of mining/energy/industry in Abidjan for the "Minis…
On 11 May 2026 Huayou Cobalt announced an all-cash agreement to acquire ASX/AIM-listed Atlantic Lithium for USD 210m, taking control of the Ewoyaa project (~1.
On 11 Feb 2025 the Attorney General of Canada filed a Notice of Application (Federal Court file T-472-25) seeking a court order under ICA s.
Ministry of Mines issued operational guidelines for the Mining Sector Reforms component under Scheme for Special Assistance to States for Capital Investment (SASCI) FY2026-27, with total ₹5,000 crore…
2 of 35 filed an explicit in-force stage; the rest (flagged below) default from an absent stage: field, not a filed assertion. Each links to the register entry with its primary source.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 1 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in ev batteries, permanent magnets, ev motors, wind turbines, defence… — read via the graph's critical minerals node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of lithium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the lithium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.