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What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: metals refining. Company profile →
Hernic Ferrochrome, based at Brits in South Africa's North West Province, is a chrome-ore miner and ferrochrome producer: two underground mines, four ore beneficiation plants, four closed submerged-arc furnaces, pelletising and sintering plants and two ferrochrome recovery plants, exporting mainly to Asia and Europe. Formerly a Mitsubishi Corporation subsidiary, it entered voluntary business rescue in September 2017; under the adopted plan the business was sold as a going concern to Samancor Chrome (process ran to June 2021). The assets are now operated within Samancor Chrome, hence `parent_slug`.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
No production footprint is recorded in its dossier yet — its HQ country is 🇿🇦 South Africa, a registration fact, not a production or sales claim. We say so rather than guess.
Of everything in its products, we track the critical inputs — the materials whose supply is concentrated in few countries, policy-exposed, or hard to substitute — because those are the ones a single measure can move. Each carries its role in the product, quoted from the dossier's own exposure note.
Chromium — producer, bulk product. Chrome ore is mined and smelted into ferrochrome, whose main end use is stainless steel. South Africa hosts the large majority of the world's chrome-ore reserves and output, and ferrochrome smelting is electricity-intensive, so Eskom supply and South African export policy on chrome ore bear directly on this asset.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
Scope. The non-critical remainder of the bill of materials — structural steel, polymers, glass and the like — is not tracked here because it is not supply-constrained: this section covers the constrained inputs, which is where policy risk concentrates, not a full bill of materials.
The top 5 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
ZA · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
If enacted, chrome ore export tax and/or quota would disrupt South Africa's ~2. 4 Mt/yr chrome ore export stream (≈45% of global seaborne supply); beneficiation licensing conditions attached to mineral rights allocations would require FTSE/JSE-listed chrome miners (Samancor/Merafe, Assore, Glencore) to build local ferrochrome and stainless-steel capacity before new rights are allocated; PGMs and other minerals may follow chrome as the test-case model, expanding scope to the full South African mining portfolio
source ↗Chromium — producer, bulk product. Chrome ore is mined and smelted into ferrochrome, whose main end use is stainless steel. South Africa hosts the large majority of the world's chrome-ore reserves and output, and ferrochrome smelting is electricity-intensive, so Eskom supply and South African export policy on chrome ore bear directly on this asset.
This changes the form of what South Africa exports, not whether you can buy: raw/unprocessed exports are restricted while domestically processed material stays available — that is the measure's own mechanism. Your South Africa-origin raw feed becomes processed-only; the route is a value-added purchase or a South Africa processing partner, not a supplier switch.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
KZ · stage passed-vote → high likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Senate-approved package of amendments to Kazakhstan's Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use (No. 125-VI ZRK): (1) raises the mandatory local (domestic) content share in works and services from 50% to 70% during exploration and extraction of solid minerals INCLUDING URANIUM — a material new in-country-value obligation on the world's #1 uranium producer (Kazatomprom) and its JV partners (Cameco, Orano, CGN/CNNC, Uranium One); (2) digitises geological data and expands electronic auctions for granting subsoil-use rights; (3) grants strategic investors implementing large industrial/innovation projects (>14. 5M MCI) a priority right to explore and extract solid minerals. Re-prices the cost base and access regime for Kazakh uranium, copper, chromium and the country's emerging rare-earth deposits.
source ↗Chromium — producer, bulk product. Chrome ore is mined and smelted into ferrochrome, whose main end use is stainless steel. South Africa hosts the large majority of the world's chrome-ore reserves and output, and ferrochrome smelting is electricity-intensive, so Eskom supply and South African export policy on chrome ore bear directly on this asset.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
JP · stage awaiting-signature → high likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 29 Jun 2026, 100d pending
Japan's METI + MOF made an affirmative PRELIMINARY determination in an anti-dumping investigation (initiated 22 Jul 2025 on an application from Nippon Steel, Nippon Yakin Kogyo, NAS Stainless Steel Strip and Nippon Kinzoku) into nickel-added cold-rolled stainless steel coil, sheet and strip originating in the People's Republic of China and the separate customs territory of Taiwan (Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu); Trade Minister Ryosei Akazawa indicated provisional duties of ~45% on Chinese product and ~21% on Taiwanese product, expected to take effect as soon as July 2026. On 19 Jun 2026 METI/MOF EXTENDED the investigation period by four months to 21 Nov 2026 (final determination pending). IPTM relevance: (1) a RARE Japan-issuer trade remedy — JP has ZERO trade-remedy actions on the register and seldom uses AD, so a Japanese AD wall is a notable issuer + instrument-bloc gap; (2) China/Taiwan-target on nickel-added stainless steel, a nickel+chromium chokepoint-adjacent material; re-prices a China/TW->Japan stainless flow into a major downstream manufacturing base; (3) parallels the active 2025-26 Asian steel-AD wave the register is now capturing (Thailand DFT aluminium-extrusions, Indonesia KADI HRC, Malaysia MITI galvanised steel).
source ↗Chromium — producer, bulk product. Chrome ore is mined and smelted into ferrochrome, whose main end use is stainless steel. South Africa hosts the large majority of the world's chrome-ore reserves and output, and ferrochrome smelting is electricity-intensive, so Eskom supply and South African export policy on chrome ore bear directly on this asset.
A duty raises the cost of the origins the measure names into Japan's market — a cost line on affected flows, not lost availability. Origins outside the measure's named targets are the route around it; the text above names the targets where its source does.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
ZW · stage announced → low likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 4 Oct 2026, 3d pending
VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit — future licensees must demonstrate capacity to identify, separate and process the full mineral suite present, or be barred from operating. Framed as beneficiation policy, layered on Zimbabwe's Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed). Raises the entry bar specifically for Great Dyke chrome/PGM claims, which are frequently single-mineral operations — a licensing-stage chokepoint action, distinct instrument type from the export-ban actions already in the register.
source ↗Chromium — producer, bulk product. Chrome ore is mined and smelted into ferrochrome, whose main end use is stainless steel. South Africa hosts the large majority of the world's chrome-ore reserves and output, and ferrochrome smelting is electricity-intensive, so Eskom supply and South African export policy on chrome ore bear directly on this asset.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Zimbabwe stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Zimbabwe processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
ZW · stage announced → low likelihood · touches chromium · flagged 4 Oct 2026, 3d pending
Zimbabwean officials have signalled intent ("raw chrome exports obsolete") to expand the 25-Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed) to cover chrome CONCENTRATE specifically — concentrate was exempt under the original order, which targeted raw ore only. This is the same ore/concentrate carve-out pattern that made Zimbabwe's 2022 SI 213 lithium ban a non-event (everyone exported the exempt concentrate instead). If the concentrate carve-out is closed, it would hit Zimbabwe's ~$1. 5-2bn/yr chrome sector feeding South African and Chinese ferrochrome smelters. No SI number, no date, no gazette found.
source ↗Chromium — producer, bulk product. Chrome ore is mined and smelted into ferrochrome, whose main end use is stainless steel. South Africa hosts the large majority of the world's chrome-ore reserves and output, and ferrochrome smelting is electricity-intensive, so Eskom supply and South African export policy on chrome ore bear directly on this asset.
The prohibition covers the raw/unprocessed form; material processed in Zimbabwe stays exportable under the order's own exemption — so a Zimbabwe processing route remains open alongside the alternatives below.
chromium — you sit on the supply side: a measure tightening others' supply pushes buyers toward you, so your move is positioning, not substitution (chokepoint page).
None of these filed an explicit stage — in-force status defaults from an absent stage: field (flagged below), not a claim any filer made. Each still links to the register entry with its primary source; verify stage before treating as a confirmed baseline.
For a material it buys, a restriction tightens supply and raises input cost — a headwind. For the 1 it produces, the same restriction supports pricing — a tailwind. Scores are footprint-adjusted and buyer-relative (0–100, higher = more exposed).
Its customers sit in critical minerals — read via the graph's critical minerals processing node, the nearest equivalent of its sector. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
Every tracked material is on the supply side — the strategy here is positioning, not substitution.
This company sits on the supply side of chromium. Restrictions by 🇨🇳 CN push buyers toward ex-CN producers — the strategy is to be visible where those buyers look: the chromium chokepoint page and the watchlist.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.