Loading…
Loading…
What they make, where they produce, the materials that matter — then what is coming, what it would do to the business, and the moves available. Sector: semiconductor. Ownership re-checked 2026-10-06 — exposure claims not re-checked since fill. Company profile →
Kalray SA (Euronext: ALKAL.PA) is a French fabless semiconductor company and CEA spin-out (founded 2008) that designs MPPA (Massively Parallel Processor Array) processors for data-center storage acceleration, networking security, autonomous vehicles, and aeronautics. Its current commercial product is the Coolidge / Coolidge2 DPU (Data Processing Unit), taped out on TSMC 16nm FinFET, sold as the K200 PCIe acceleration card and TC4 quad-chip board.
Kalray has no wafer fabrication of its own — all manufacturing is outsourced to TSMC and downstream OSAT/ODM partners.
Verbatim from the dossier's “What they do” section — sources on the company profile.
This is where Kalray SA produces — approximate output shares from its dossier — not where it sells. Sales geography is not yet in our corpus for any company, so we cannot compute exposure to measures that bite on where products ship: an extraterritorial re-export rule follows the shipment and its material content, not the factory. Where such a measure touches its materials, the policy sections below flag it — but its sales-side incidence is not computable yet, and we say so rather than substitute the production map for it.
No tracked material exposures in the corpus yet — an empty list here means missing coverage, not a materials-free product.
The dossier also records the materials it investigated and rejected — the list above is narrowed deliberately, not cherry-picked. Its own words:
The top 4 are ranked mechanically — what the instrument does (its transmission class: an export ban is not a reporting duty), × how close to law (stage-derived likelihood band, never a probability) × how much of your tracked bill of materials it touches. Each unfolds as a chain: trigger → what it hits → the response the instrument actually calls for. A measure touching a material you produce can be an opportunity, not a threat.
US · stage passed-committee → elevated likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductor) · flagged 24 Jun 2026, 105d pending
Requires US allies — primarily the Netherlands (ASML) and Japan (Tokyo Electron, Shin-Etsu) — to align their national export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with US BIS restrictions targeting China; strips DoC discretionary licensing authority for chipmaking tools; DUV immersion lithography machines (ASML TWINSCAN NXT series) would face mandatory licensing denial for China-bound sales/servicing; includes anti-circumvention provisions to block third-country re-export through Malaysia, Singapore, or UAE; if enacted, would overturn the bilateral US-Netherlands arrangement on DUV servicing and pressure Japan to expand its April 2023 / January 2024 semiconductor-equipment controls beyond current scope; diplomatic friction: NL Trade Minister Sjoerdsma was in Washington the same week opposing this bill while simultaneously signing Pax Silica
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductor) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
No named material → no substitution bench to map; the measure text above is the read.
TW · stage in-consultation → moderate likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductor) · flagged 20 Jun 2026, 109d pending
Taiwan ITA (International Trade Administration, MOEA) launched a 60-day public consultation on planned revisions to the SHTC (Sensitive High-Tech Commodity) controlled-goods export list to add AI chips and advanced semiconductor categories specifically targeting exports to China; if enacted, would extend Taiwan's existing sub-14nm chip / advanced packaging export controls (SHTC list 2025-11-18) to include AI-application chips sold for China use — the measure is designed to align Taiwan's export controls with US BIS advanced-chip restrictions and close the gap on AI server / Nvidia chip diversion from Taiwan to China; Bloomberg June 9, 2026 cites Taiwan authorities "considering much stricter export controls on AI chip sales to China to further align with US measures"; ITA confirmed a 60-day review period for planned revisions; if enacted, would add legal tools to address diversion of AI servers and Nvidia chips through Taiwan to China; affects global AI hardware supply chains and Taiwan-domiciled chip distributors, system integrators, and ODM/OEM assemblers
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductor) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
No named material → no substitution bench to map; the measure text above is the read.
CN · stage announced → low likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductor) · flagged 4 Jul 2026, 95d pending
Reuters (exclusive, multiple sources) reported 31 Dec 2025 that Chinese authorities have been requiring domestic chipmakers to source at least 50% of equipment spend from Chinese toolmakers when applying for approval to build or expand fab capacity — enforced administratively (approval rejected if the threshold isn't met) rather than via any published law or ministry order; strictest on mature-node lines, with temporary carve-outs for advanced-node lithography where local tools don't yet exist; officials reportedly want the floor higher over time, with a stated long-run goal of 100% domestic tooling. Directly squeezes foreign equipment suppliers (Lam Research, Applied Materials, Tokyo Electron, ASML) out of incremental Chinese fab capacity and is already lifting order books at domestic tool makers Naura Technology and AMEC (Naura H1 2025 revenue +30% YoY to RMB16bn; AMEC +44% YoY to RMB5bn). GTA logged this as a state act (state-act/95890) but provides no primary source; no MIIT/NDRC/MOFCOM document, gazette notice, or on-the-record government confirmation has surfaced in any outlet reviewed.
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductor) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
The filed text doesn't state this instrument's mechanism clearly enough to classify, so we don't guess a response — the measure text above is the read.
TW · stage announced → low likelihood · matches its sector (semiconductor) · flagged 15 Jun 2026, 114d pending
If enacted, first Taiwan restriction covering all Chinese customers (not just blacklisted entities); would require Taiwanese OEMs (Foxconn, Pegatron, ASUS, Quanta, Wiwynn), server makers, and component suppliers to seek export licences before any AI hardware shipment to China — affects ~$15-20bn/yr of Taiwan-to-China AI server/component flows; raises costs for Taiwanese firms with significant China revenue
source ↗Matched at sector level (semiconductor) — none of this company's tracked materials is named. Read the measure to judge product-line impact.
No named material → no substitution bench to map; the measure text above is the read.
No tracked materials to check the register against.
No scored material exposures yet — upstream impact cannot be assessed until the dossier carries a material list.
Its customers sit in semiconductors. A measure supporting those sectors supports demand for this company's products; one restricting them puts that demand at risk. The sign shown is the mechanical read — click through to judge whether a measure protects or constrains the customer.
No tracked materials, so no substitution or benefit routes to map yet.
lib/policy-transmission.ts): an export prohibition in the measure's name/text → supply restriction; a raw/unprocessed-export limit or local-processing mandate → beneficiation (form change, not unavailability); reporting/disclosure/due-diligence language → compliance obligation; tariff/trade-remedy language → import cost; subsidy/fast-track/relaxation language → support; investment-screening/M&A language → investment control. When the text carries no signal we fall back to the action-type default and label the chip inferred; when neither exists the card says so and derives no response — we never assert a class the evidence doesn't support.lib/iptm-material-country-production.ts; mining stage preferred, refining as fallback — the stage and source year are in each figure's hover text). Ex-issuer supply removes the ISSUING country and renormalises the remaining listed shares (so they sum to 100% of what's left) — alternatives to the country making the rule, never a default ex-China list. Where the issuer holds no measurable share, the card says so plainly instead of implying supply loss.lib/alternative-viability.ts): each named alternative carries a deployment status — operating / ramping / restarting / development / unknown — derived from word-boundary signal phrases in its own dossier (“operating since 1896”, “restarting the … mine”, “FID taken”), and the verbatim matched phrase is shown as the basis so the claim is auditable; a dossier with no signal stays unknown, never guessed. Any evidenced production date is quoted verbatim (“first production targeted H2 2029” → “no tonnes before 2029”) — we never synthesize one. A measure whose own text claims extraterritorial / re-export / de-minimis / foreign-direct-product / percentage-of-value scope triggers the origin-switching warning above the list: such a rule follows the material, not the seller, so a foreign-made alternative can still be captured. Same-issuer register actions targeting an alternative's country and material mark it may be captured, with the entries linked. “Capacity partly committed” lines quote the dossier verbatim — we hold no structured free-capacity numbers and never imply a utilisation figure.How MacroLens tracks this for you. The policy register files new measures daily and this page recomputes from it — the same chokepoints are monitored live on the watchlist and in the full register.