Sequel Watchlist — the next policy events and their pre-mapped alternatives

Forward application of the validated transmission-map template (2024-12-03-cn-ge-ga-sb-ban-market-transmission.md, user-endorsed 2026-07-05). Logic: each China restriction made the next rung's winners predictable — the Ga/Ge/Sb ban (Dec-2024) telegraphed tungsten (Feb-2025), and Almonty did +130% for anyone holding the watchlist. This document pre-builds that watchlist for the materials China dominates but has NOT yet restricted, plus the pending EASING event. Research, not investment advice. Tickers from analyst knowledge — each requires the audit_listing verification gate before any surface use. Register/dossier coverage status noted per name (most alternatives are NOT yet in our 753-dossier universe — onboarding queue updated 2026-07-05).

0. THE LEAD ITEM IS AN EASING — US-China rare-earth deal (in our upcoming queue, stage: awaiting-signature, likelihood: HIGH)

The single most likely near-term catalyst in the register is the Trump-Xi REE framework (June 2026, "deal done subject to final approval") suspending/easing the Apr-2025 REE licensing for US-bound shipments. Our directional study's suspension bucket flipped sign 2/2 (Nov-2025 suspensions: producer−consumer spread −3.0% and −7.3%) — scarcity-premium names FALL on easing.

• Exposed on signing (scarcity premium unwinds): MP Materials (MP),

Lynas (LYC.AX), Ucore (UCU.V), Aclara (ARA.TO), Energy Fuels (UUUU), Neo Performance (NEO.TO), Arafura (ARU.AX), Australian Strategic Materials (ASM.AX). The purer the ex-China REE story, the harder the de-rate.

• Complication that could BLUNT it: China entity-listed MP specifically on

2026-06-22 (filed action) — Beijing's hostility to the flagship US alternative persists inside the détente; MP may trade on its DoD price-floor deal more than on Chinese flows. Watch whether the final text carves MP out.

• Relieved side: magnet-consuming OEMs (autos, drones, defense primes) —

but per Ch.4, consumer relief rarely moves P&L-immaterial inputs; the tradable leg is the SHORT side of the pure-plays.

• Trigger to watch (promote-when in upcoming.md): MOFCOM announcement

suspending the Apr-2025 licensing regime, or a signed bilateral text on whitehouse.gov/Xinhua.

• Symmetry: if the deal COLLAPSES, the same list is the long side — this

event is a two-way switch with a defined trigger, the cleanest setup in the register.

1. Magnesium — China ~85-90% of primary production. The most asymmetric un-restricted material.

Not yet on any MOFCOM control list; a US-targeted restriction would replay antimony (a small market where the marginal ex-China producer re-prices 3-5x).

• Alternatives: Latrobe Magnesium (LMG.AX, micro-cap, Australian

ferronickel-slag Mg project); US Magnesium LLC (Utah — PRIVATE, Renco Group; no listed expression — the Spruce Pine pattern again); ICL Group (ICL — Dead Sea Mg, but diluted inside a fertilizer major, pure-play LOW); RUA/Golden Triangle developers (pre-listing).

• Domicile trap: Western alloy processors dependent on Chinese primary Mg

feed (Luxfer LXFR — has dossier — is a Mg products maker whose input cost explodes; sign ambiguous: pricing power vs margin squeeze).

• Read: thinnest alternatives bench of any candidate — the trade may be

spot-price expressions and the SEQUEL (whoever announces a Western Mg restart gets the Perpetua treatment).

2. Fluorspar → fluorochemicals → semiconductor etch gases — China ~60% fluorspar, higher downstream.

The semiconductor angle (NF3/WF6/electronic specialty gases, LiPF6 electrolyte) makes this the highest-escalation-value un-played card: it hits fabs directly, matching China's tit-for-tat pattern against US chip controls.

• Alternatives: Orbia (ORBIA.MX — Koura fluor unit, world #1 fluorspar

miner ex-China, pure-play MEDIUM inside a conglomerate); SK Specialty (unlisted sub of SK Inc 034730.KS) / Kanto Denka (4047.T) / Resonac (4004.T) for electronic gases; Ares Strategic Mining (US micro, pre-production).

• Domicile trap: any Western refrigerant/electrolyte maker running Chinese

AHF (anhydrous hydrofluoric acid) feed.

• Sequel logic: graphite (Oct-2023) proved MOFCOM will control a bulk

industrial mineral when the downstream (anodes) is strategic; fluorine's downstream (etch gases) is MORE strategic.

3. Titanium sponge — China ~57%, aerospace-grade concentrated in Japan/Kazakhstan.

• Alternatives: IperionX (IPX — US-listed pure-play Ti metal recycler/

producer, the UAMY-profile candidate: small, US, DoD-adjacent); Osaka Titanium (5726.T) and Toho Titanium (5727.T) — the two Japanese aerospace-sponge duopolists, direct beneficiaries of any CN (or RU) supply event; Kenmare (KMR.L) / Iluka (ILU.AX) / Tronox (TROX) upstream feedstock.

• Trigger: defense-aviation escalation; China added Ti alloys to dual-use

catalogues progressively through 2025.

4. Manganese (EMM / battery-grade sulphate) — China ~95% of refined EMM.

Follows the graphite playbook exactly (bulk mineral, battery downstream).

• Alternatives: Euro Manganese (EMN.TO — Czech Chvaletice tailings

recycler, the only EU HPEMM project); Element 25 (E25.AX — WA mine + planned US sulphate plant w/ GM+Stellantis agreements); Firebird Metals (FRB.AX, micro).

• Note: ore is NOT the chokepoint (South32/Eramet mine plenty ex-China);

the restriction would be on refined/battery-grade — read the announcement's HS codes before trading the miners.

5. Vanadium — China ~65-70% (with Russia adjacent).

• Alternatives: Largo (LGO — Brazil, one of two primary producers ex-China);

Australian Vanadium (AVL.AX); Bushveld (BMN.L — DISTRESSED, capital-structure risk swamps the policy signal; exclude).

• Trigger: grid-storage (VRFB) industrial policy or steel-alloy dual-use

listing.

6. Silicon metal / polysilicon — China dominant across the chain.

• Alternatives: Ferroglobe (GSM — HAS dossier; the largest Western silicon

metal producer, US/EU/ES assets — the most liquid name on this whole list); Wacker Chemie (WCH.DE — Western polysilicon anchor).

• Cautionary tale: REC Silicon's Moses Lake restart already FAILED on

qualification issues (2025) — Western-restart execution risk is real; the Perpetua exit-signature (raise into the pop) applies doubly here.

• Trade-remedy trap (2026-09-13): GSM is also the sole listed beneficiary

of the recurring Ferroglobe/Mississippi Silicon AD/CVD petition cycle (Kazakhstan/Bosnia/Iceland 2020; Angola/Laos/Australia/Norway/Thailand 2025-26) — do NOT read an affirmative AD/CVD determination against those minor origins as a buy signal for GSM. Two cycles, five origins, rates 21-240%, and none produced a durable re-rating because China (the actual price-setter, explicitly out of scope in every filing) is untouched. Full channel walk + new Ch.-4 "dominant-supplier-exclusion" gate in 2026-04-16-us-silicon-metal-ad-cvd-enforcement-arc-ferroglobe-market-transmission.md. The pending Australia/Norway AD order (final LTFV 2026-06-30, order not yet issued) is a skip-on-the-news case, not a buy trigger.

7. Lithium chemicals refining (carbonate + hydroxide) — China ~65% (mining itself is diffuse: Australia 32%, China 21%, Chile 19%).

Added 2026-07-29 (R67 correction) — the mining-vs-refining split matters here more than anywhere else on this list: Australia leads MINING (spodumene) but China dominates the CHEMICALS-REFINING step that actually makes battery-grade product, which is why resource-CAPTURE deals (a Chinese refiner buying upstream mine equity, e.g. Huayou/Atlantic Lithium/Ewoyaa) are the live catalyst class here, not export-control announcements — the exact gap R67 flagged in the event-briefs auto-feed rule.

• Alternatives: Albemarle (ALB — the most liquid Western-integrated name,

mine-to-chemicals); Rock Tech Lithium (RCK.V — Guben, Germany refinery project, the clearest EU-refining-capacity play); Zinnwald Lithium (ZNWD.L — Germany); Sibanye-Stillwater's Keliber project (SSW.JO — Finland); Savannah Resources (SAV.L — Barroso, Portugal, the EU's domestic hard-rock hope); Energy Transition Minerals (ETM.AX — Kvanefjeld, Greenland, carries REE optionality too).

• Trigger: any cn-outbound-mining-fdi action targeting a lithium asset

(the Huayou deal is the live example, stage: awaiting-signature in ops/queue/upcoming.md), OR a China refining-capacity/export-licensing move on carbonate/hydroxide specifically (not spodumene ore).

• Note: unlike the graphite/manganese playbook, the mine is NOT

ex-China-safe by default — Zimbabwe's lithium mines (~10% of world supply) are ~95% Chinese-controlled per our own production data, so "Australia mines it" does not automatically mean "the West controls it."

Standing screen (how wakes should maintain this)

1. When a new CN export-control action files, pull this doc's section for that material within 48h and produce the full transmission case study (template: Ge/Ga/Sb doc) with day-1 tape. 2. When upcoming.md flips a stage band on the REE deal (§0), that IS the trigger — both directions pre-defined above. 3. Onboarding queue (updated 2026-07-05) now carries the missing alternatives: iperionx, latrobe-magnesium, euro-manganese, element-25, largo-resources, osaka-titanium, toho-titanium, orbia, mp-materials, lynas — dossiers + listing verification via the normal fill gates. 4. Coverage honesty: 17 of the 20 names checked had NO dossier on 2026-07-05. The register knows the policies; the company layer must catch up to the alternatives bench — that is now the highest-value fill direction (consistent with the 2026-07-04 upstream-producers-in-scope directive).