3 critical materials scored · binding chokepoint: Rhodium-iridium (🇿🇦 ZA 83% of mining) · 17 restrictive government measures on record
Subject
chimet · 🇮🇹 IT
Sector
metals-refining
Materials scored
3
As of
2026-06-03
Ownership re-checked · exposure claims not re-checked since fill
A verification pass re-checked this dossier's ownership/corporate-structure fields against their cited sources. It did not re-read the material_exposures claim the score, band and stress figures below are built on — treat those as not yet independently re-checked.
Risk Office verdict
Elevated · 66/100Exposure claims not re-checked since fillCompany supply-risk index · consumer-side read
Role check · this company is a producer, not a buyer
Chimet S.p.A. produces 3 of the 3 scored materials above (Rhodium-iridium, Platinum-palladium, Silver). For those, a supply restriction by the controlling country is a tailwind, not a headwind — the exposure is to disruption of a market this company supplies, not to a chokepoint it depends on. Every scored material here sits on its output side, so the Elevated · 66/100 band should be read as chokepoint salience, not as buyer vulnerability, and the Art. 24 input-side duties below are qualified accordingly.
Role from an explicit dossier role: tag or the producer-sector classifier behind the /minerals alternatives bench (one classifier on disk, generated 2026-10-07) — the same source the company page uses. A material the classifier has no entry for defaults to a buyer dependency, which can understate a producer's output side. Descriptive classification only: it enters no score.
The binding exposure is Rhodium-iridium — 🇿🇦 ZA controls 83% of global mining. On this company's production footprint that scores 71/100 (neutral exposure; global 71). The register holds 17 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · Rhodium-iridiumChimet S.p.A. is the 30th-most-exposed of the 64 named companies we track on 🇿🇦 ZA's Rhodium-iridium chokepoint; the most-exposed is Isuzu Motors Limited (71/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Competitor cohort · metals refining
Chimet S.p.A. ranks 42nd of 98 verified metals refining companies, tied with 6 others at 66.
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 39 further metals refining companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 66/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 3 scored materials. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (IT 100%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Chimet S.p.A.
What they do
Chimet S.p.A. ("Chimica Metallurgica Toscana," founded 1974; plants at Badia al Pino and Viciomaggio near Arezzo, Italy) recovers and refines precious metals from industrial waste and scrap: electronic waste, photographic, galvanic, pharmaceutical and petrochemical residues, goldsmith scrap, and spent industrial/automotive catalytic converters. Alongside recovery/refining it also manufactures fresh PGM catalysts and precious-metal powders/ screen-printable pastes, and runs a precious-metals trading desk. It has been on the LBMA's Good Delivery list for gold since 1996 — an independent third-party mark of institutional-grade refining quality — and was named by a 2022 Mongabay/Euronews investigation as a source (via intermediary banks) of gold supplied to Apple, Microsoft, Amazon and Alphabet, alongside allegations (which Chimet denies) that some of that gold traced to illegal Amazon mining.
Critical-material exposure
Silver — named alongside gold as a core metal Chimet recovers/refines
from scrap and industrial residues (chimet.com's own recovery-and-refining division page, re-confirmed textually 2026-09-08). Silver is a scored chokepoint material (concentrated mine supply, mostly a byproduct of base-metal mining); Chimet sits at the refining/recycling stage rather than the mining stage.
platinum and palladium among the metals it recovers, principally from spent industrial and automotive catalytic converters, and it also manufactures fresh PGM catalysts; palladium (not platinum) is also named on the recovery-and-refining division sub-page — corrected 2026-09-08, the division sub-page alone does not textually name platinum. Platinum/ palladium mine supply is one of the most geographically concentrated chokepoints scored in this register (South Africa for platinum; South Africa plus Russia for palladium) — Chimet's exposure runs through catalyst-scrap feedstock availability rather than export policy on refined metal.
Rhodium-iridium — rhodium and iridium (plus ruthenium, which has no
dedicated scored slug and is folded into this line for coverage purposes) are named on the chimet.com homepage; rhodium (not iridium or ruthenium) is also named on the recovery-and-refining division sub-page — corrected 2026-09-08, same textual-confirmation issue as platinum above. Rhodium supply is even more concentrated than platinum/palladium — overwhelmingly a South African byproduct output — making it one of the tightest chokepoints in the scored set.
Gold is Chimet's most prominent recovery output and the basis of its LBMA
Good Delivery accreditation, but is not a scored critical mineral in this register (investment/monetary metal rather than an industrial supply-chain input) — noted here for completeness, not carried into material_exposures.
Dropped from the sector-derived defaults: nickel, tin, antimony (no
source names these as a Chimet recovery output). Copper appeared only in one third-party corporate-registry aggregator listing that could not be corroborated against chimet.com's own metals list, so it is excluded rather than force-fit.
Chimet is a refiner/recycler, not a downstream manufacturing consumer — its
exposure is to feedstock (e-waste, industrial residues, spent catalytic converters) availability, which tracks the same mine-supply concentration risk (South Africa, Russia) that determines how much recyclable material reaches the market, rather than to export restrictions on refined product it buys.
Sources
Chimet — About Us (company history, positioning; re-checked 2026-09-08, textually confirms Badia al Pino/Viciomaggio, Arezzo, and no plants outside Italy)
Chimet — Home (mission text names all seven recovered metals: gold, silver, platinum, palladium, ruthenium, iridium, rhodium — checked 2026-09-08)
Chimet — Recovery and Refining division (re-checked 2026-09-08: textually names gold, silver, palladium, rhodium and PGM catalysts; does NOT name platinum, iridium or ruthenium — those are sourced to the homepage above)
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Supply-risk factor analysis
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Material factors (scored 4–5) — evidence
Rhodium-iridium
4Geopolitical: 10 restrictive actions, peak severity 5, 6 in last 24mo, less 1 liberalising action
4Concentration: mining HHI 6980 (extreme); top ZA 83%
5Substitutability: Graedel et al. 2013 PNAS Fig. 5: Rh 96, Ir 69 /100; the harder element sets the pair. Rhodium has no adequate substitute in three-way autocatalysts
4Import reliance: Eurostat Comext 2025: 63% extra-EU imports, top partner ZA 56% (partner HHI 3914)
Platinum-palladium
4Geopolitical: 12 restrictive actions, peak severity 5, 8 in last 24mo, less 1 liberalising action
5Price / market: price up, as of 2026-10-07
4Substitutability: Graedel et al. 2013 PNAS Fig. 5: Pt 66, Pd 39 /100; the harder element sets the pair
Silver
5Price / market: price up, as of 2026-10-07
Change log
last 30 days
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
No filings or amendments in this window — the register has been quiet on this company's materials.
The laws that threaten it
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Both stress-test scenariosShowHide
Policy shock — the controlling country escalates to a full export-licensing / ban regime.
Concentration shock — the supply structure collapses to a single source (second-source loss / full monopoly).
Type
Scenario
Today
Stressed
Δ
Policy
Rhodium-iridium — 🇿🇦 ZA escalates rhodium-iridium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime
71
77
+6
Concentration
Rhodium-iridium — 🇿🇦 ZA becomes the single source for rhodium-iridium — the second source is lost (full 83%+ monopoly)
71
82
+11
Policy
Platinum-palladium — 🇿🇦 ZA escalates platinum-palladium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime
62
67
+5
Concentration
Platinum-palladium — 🇿🇦 ZA becomes the single source for platinum-palladium — the second source is lost (full 54%+ monopoly)
62
83
+21
Policy
Silver — 🇲🇽 MX escalates silver controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime
43
52
+9
Concentration
Silver — 🇲🇽 MX becomes the single source for silver — the second source is lost (full 24%+ monopoly)
43
73
+30
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
Art. 24(4) · mitigation trigger
Significant-vulnerability conclusion
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold on the input side — every scored material here is one Chimet S.p.A. produces, and Art. 24 addresses the use of a strategic raw material as an input. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the public-source evidence; the mitigations below are precautionary.
Reported separately (not an Art. 24(4) trigger): Rhodium-iridium clears the same numeric bar but is a material Chimet S.p.A. produces. That is an output-market concentration — relevant to revenue and to counterparties who buy from this company — not an input dependency the company must mitigate under Art. 24(4).
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the 0 materials this company buys (the 3 it produces are excluded from the test and listed above). The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Proposed — not yet law
Upcoming regulatory threats
Proposed, announced or draft regulation that is not yet in force but would touch this company's at-risk materials if it passes. Forward-looking early-warning — the likelihood shown is an honest band derived from the legislative stage, not a forecast or a fabricated probability. Kept separate from the enacted register above: nothing here is law yet.
The upcoming threatsShowHide
🇪🇺 EU CRMA Strategic Projects — Second Designation Round
in-consultation→moderate likelihood·flagged 114d ago · not yet law·matches Platinum-palladium
If passed — Second wave of CRMA Art. 14 strategic projects (drawn from 160+ applications: 95 EU-domestic + 66 third-country including 40 from strategic-partnership countries) gains fast-track permitting (27-month EU cap, 15-month Member State cap), EIB/EBRD financing-hub priority, and off-taker certainty; 75 battery-value-chain projects + 21 REE-for-permanent-magnets in pool; widens the EU's 2030 extraction/processing benchmarks pipeline beyond the first 60 projects
Caveat — Second call for applications closed January 15, 2026 (September 2025 launch). Commission stated ~4-month assessment period → designation expected May–June 2026. As of 2026-06-15, no Commission press release or OJ publication confirmed. EUR-Lex CELEX 32026D0923 verified via web search to be an unrelated EU animal-disease implementing decision. Moved from filing. md 2026-06-15. Distinct from: 2025-03-25-eu-crma-strategic-projects-first-designation (60 projects, first round) and 2024-05-23-eu-crma-entry-into-force (base regulation). Severity 3 expected (same as first-round designation).
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (moderate likelihood)
Platinum-palladium🇿🇦 today 62→67+5
🇵🇪 Peru Ley General de Minería Amendment — Mining Concession Regime Reform
passed-committee→elevated likelihood·flagged 115d ago · not yet law·matches Silver
If passed — Reduces maximum idle-concession period from 30 to 15 years (initial production deadline unchanged at 10 yr; penalty extension cut from 20 yr to just 5 yr); eliminates irrevocable legal status of mining concessions for first time in Peruvian law history, making concessions revocable by administrative authority; introduces higher annual fees and stronger production/investment requirements; threatens legal certainty for Peru's undeveloped copper and silver project pipeline — Peru = #2 copper, #4 silver, #1 lead, #2 zinc globally
Caveat — Approved by Energy and Mining Commission March 17, 2026 by 11 votes to 1 with 3 abstentions — driven by left-aligned Juntos por el Perú (JPP) and Podemos Peru majority. Bill also introduces "comuneros como accionistas" (community shareholders) in mining concessions — first legislative insertion of indigenous community equity rights. MINEM, SNMPE, ComexPerú, and Ingemmet publicly opposed; MINEM warns reform would incentivise illegal mining expansion. Full plenary debate pending as of June 2026. Distinct from all filed PE actions (all executive/regulatory decrees — no prior legislative amendment to Ley General de Minería in register). Also distinct from filed PE actions on REINFO extension (2025-12-26), illegal-mining criminalization (2026-01-20), and Tía María revocation (2026-03-19).
announced→low likelihood·flagged 113d ago · not yet law·matches Silver
If passed — The Energy and Mineral Resources Ministry (ESDM) and Ministry of Finance announced May 11, 2026 that the implementation of higher tiered royalty rates under Government Regulation (PP) 19/2025 — covering copper, tin, nickel, gold, and silver — is postponed indefinitely pending development of a "mutually beneficial formulation"; the already-filed PP 19/2025 (2025-04-11) established a tiered royalty regime that would have raised effective royalty burdens for large-volume miners; the postponement relieves immediate cost pressure on Freeport McMoRan (copper/gold — Grasberg), Vale Indonesia (nickel), PT Timah (tin), and other major operators; the delay also signals continued investor-consultation sensitivity in Indonesian mining fiscal policy following industry pushback
Caveat — This is an amendment-trigger candidate: the formal revision to PP 19/2025 does not yet exist; only a minister's public announcement through the state news agency. Not yet a Government Regulation. Severity of the underlying PP 19/2025 was 3; this postponement reduces near-term supply-chain fiscal pressure on Indonesian nickel/copper miners but signals policy instability. Public hearing held May 8, 2026 with no final decisions (Mysteel, May 12, 2026). Distinct from all 25 filed Indonesia actions. Filed upcoming 2026-06-16.
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (low likelihood)
Silver🇲🇽 today 43→52+9
🇧🇴 Bolivia nueva Ley de Minería — comprehensive replacement of the 2014 Ley 535 de Minería y Metalurgia
draft-published→moderate likelihood·flagged 112d ago · not yet law·matches Silver
If passed — New general mining law (distinct from PL-157 lithium/evaporites bill already in index): 20-year tax stability regime for mining projects; eliminates the 12. 5% impuesto adicional IUE-RM on extraordinary commodity-price gains; retains 25% company profits tax (IUE) and 5% royalty; streamlines licensing from current 9–15 years to international norms; enables association contracts between private companies and cooperatives; coordinated with a forthcoming general investment law incorporating fiscal and non-fiscal incentives; framed around reversing 15+ years of investment drought; backing from World Bank; bill to be presented to Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional after Mining Summit (May 18–20, 2026); target: executive submission late July 2026
Caveat — Distinct from 2026-02-01-bolivia-pl-157-recursos-evaporiticos (lithium-only evaporitícos bill; this is the general mining law replacing Ley 535 for ALL mineral sectors) and 2025-12-17-bolivia-ds-5503-economic-emergency (fuel subsidies/fiscal package). Bolivia = world's 7th-largest tin producer and holds the world's largest known lithium resources; the Paz government reform is the most significant pro-investment mining signal since the 2014 Ley 535. Likelihood moderate — new government with World Bank backing but legislative timeline uncertain; Bolivia protests history (2026 protests wiki) creates social-risk overlay. Filed upcoming 2026-06-17.
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (moderate likelihood)
Silver🇲🇽 today 43→52+9
🇿🇼 Zimbabwe — ban on new mining licences for single-mineral ("isolated") operations; VP Chiwenga, Zimbabwe-China Business Forum
announced→low likelihood·flagged 3d ago · not yet law·matches Platinum-palladium
If passed — VP Constantino Chiwenga announced at the Zimbabwe-China Business Forum (Hangzhou) that Zimbabwe will no longer issue new mining licences for operations that extract only one mineral from a deposit — future licensees must demonstrate capacity to identify, separate and process the full mineral suite present, or be barred from operating. Framed as beneficiation policy, layered on Zimbabwe's Feb-2026 raw-mineral/lithium-concentrate export ban (filed). Raises the entry bar specifically for Great Dyke chrome/PGM claims, which are frequently single-mineral operations — a licensing-stage chokepoint action, distinct instrument type from the export-ban actions already in the register.
Caveat — Likelihood kept LOW per the discovery brief's calibration caution (a forum announcement with no SI number is exactly the channel that has previously stalled — e. g. the chrome-concentrate extension signalled since Feb-2026, entry below, remains unenacted 8 months on). Dedup: checked "chiwenga", "single mineral", "single-mineral", "zimbabwe chrome licence" across filing. md, upcoming. md, and action-index — zero hits; distinct from filed Zimbabwe lithium/chrome export-ban actions (different instrument: licensing bar on NEW operations, not export control on existing ones).
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (low likelihood)
Platinum-palladium🇿🇦 today 62→67+5
Likelihood band is derived deterministically from the legislative stage (announced → low; draft-published / in-consultation → moderate; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote / awaiting-signature → high) — a reproducible, source-traceable proxy, not a probability estimate. Where shown, the modelled impact-if-passed re-uses the same buyer-relative stress engine as the enacted scenarios above: it holds this company's production footprint fixed and escalates the proposed measure to a full export-licensing / control regime — the conservative upper bound for a measure that may pass only as a partial cap. The delta is the move from today's score to that stressed score; companies with no modelled production footprint show no delta.
What to watch next
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
The watch listShowHide
Rhodium-iridium is the line to war-game: 🇿🇦 ZA already controls 83% of mining, and the policy lever is active. A single new licensing or export-control action on this material moves the binding score materially.
Platinum-palladium carries 12 restrictive measures on record (🇿🇦 ZA 54% of mining) — a secondary escalation candidate.
Silver carries 5 restrictive measures on record (🇲🇽 MX 24% of mining) — a secondary escalation candidate.
Art. 24(4) · diversification & substitution
Priority mitigations
Every scored material here is one Chimet S.p.A. produces, so the Art. 24(4) buyer levers — qualify an alternative supplier, re-source, substitute the input — do not apply to this company. The output-side items below are what a concentrated producer's risk office actually acts on. We render them rather than a generic diversification list because a prescription addressed to the wrong side of the market is worse than none.
The mitigation optionsShowHide
Track demand-side substitution against your own book. The buyer levers listed for consumers of Rhodium-iridium, Platinum-palladium, Silver — qualifying alternative suppliers, designing the material out — are the demand risk to Chimet S.p.A.'s revenue. The substitutability factors on each material above are the same numbers read from the other side.
Watch the controlling jurisdiction's measures as price/volume events, not supply risk. A restriction by ZA / MX on a material Chimet S.p.A. produces tightens the market it sells into. The register below is the same monitor; only the sign of the read changes.
Concentration of the output market cuts both ways. The materials above are concentrated by construction — that is the pricing power, and it is also the counterparty and offtake concentration a board should see stated next to it.
Run a live policy tripwire. Monitor MOFCOM, EU CRMA and the exporting jurisdictions for new measures on your materials, with a pre-agreed escalation if a licensing regime tightens — this register is that monitor.
Annex A · regulatory basis
CRMA Art. 24 compliance crosswalk
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
The full crosswalkShowHide
CRMA provision
Obligation
Where addressed
Art. 24(1)
Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology).
Scope & applicability
Art. 24(2)(a)
Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled.
Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis
Art. 24(2)(b)
Analyse the factors that might affect supply.
Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it
Art. 24(2)(c)
Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions.
Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion
Art. 24(3)
Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources.
This report's basis — see Methodology & sources
Art. 24(4)
Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting.
Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board.
This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Why this dependence is structural, not transitional. The EU's own external auditor — the European Court of Auditors, Special Report “Critical raw materials for the energy transition — Not a rock-solid policy” (Feb 2026) — judges the bloc's 2030 extraction, processing and recycling targets to be out of reach (recycling runs 1–5% for 7 of 26 materials, and diversification shows no measurable effect). A separate industry-analyst assessment (Adamas Intelligence & Tradium, EU CRMA report, Apr 2024 — an interested-party commercial view, not an independent verdict) reaches a compatible conclusion that the 2030 rare-earth targets will be missed without an expedited push. The chokepoint this report maps is therefore a durable constraint the Act has not yet closed, not a gap that resolves on its own.
Annex B · Art. 24(1) · Art. 2(29)
Scope & applicability
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
Scope detailsShowHide
Threshold test
This assessment
Average employees (last FY) > 500
company input
Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M
company input
Uses a strategic raw material as an input
company input — all 3 scored SRMs here are ones this company produces, not buys; input use is not evidenced by this assessment
Manufactures a listed strategic technology
metals-refining (confirm against Annex)
Formally identified by a Member State authority
company input
Evidence & sources
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-06-03; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
Refresh SLA
New government measures — polled hourly; a filed action can appear on this report within the hour it's picked up.
Dossier verification (this company's exposure list, sourced against its own disclosures) — the auto-onboarded backlog drains on a 30-minute cycle; a specific company's upgrade timing depends on queue position, not a fixed date.
Live-quoted materials (currently: neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, indium, tellurium — see the price row on each material's page) — refreshed daily.
Other material prices — hand-maintained; flagged STALE on the minerals index past 45 days without a fresh source, rather than left silently out of date.
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.