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1 critical material scored · binding chokepoint: Antimony (🇨🇳 CN 78% of refining) · 9 restrictive government measures on record
The binding exposure is Antimony — 🇨🇳 CN controls 78% of global refining. On this company's production footprint that scores 68/100 (adversarial chokepoint; global 60). The register holds 9 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · Antimony DuPont de Nemours, Inc. is the 63rd-most-exposed of the 112 named companies we track on 🇨🇳 CN's Antimony chokepoint; the most-exposed is Northrop Grumman Corporation (73/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
DuPont de Nemours, Inc. ranks 35th of 99 verified chemicals companies, tied with 2 others at 68.
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 13 further chemicals companies are tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 68/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 1 scored material. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (US 50% · KR 12% · CN 10% · JP 8% · LU 5% · CA 4% · DE 4% · TW 4% · MX 3%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
DuPont (NYSE: DD) is a US specialty materials company whose portfolio — after the November 2025 spin-off of its electronics unit as Qnity (NYSE: Q) — centres on two segments: Healthcare & Water Technologies (FilmTec™ reverse-osmosis and ultrafiltration membranes, ion-exchange water treatment systems, Tyvek™ protective and medical packaging, medical device filtration) and Diversified Industrials (Kalrez™ perfluoroelastomer seals, Vespel™ polyimide precision parts, engineering polymer compounds, aerospace and safety materials). The semiconductor materials business (CMP slurries, photoresists, interconnect solutions) that previously drove a large share of revenue is now Qnity and is no longer part of DD's supply chain.
into Diversified Industrials engineering-polymer applications, lists antimony trioxide / sodium antimonate as a flame-retardant-synergist additive (≥1 %) per its safety data sheet. China's 2025 antimony mine output was ~40,000 t of an estimated 110,000 t global total — about 36 % of world supply (USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025), down from the ~70–80 % China held a decade earlier. A supply disruption or Chinese export restriction on antimony — as has occurred with gallium and germanium — would raise input costs for this product line.
Exposure profile note: Post-Qnity DuPont has a deliberately narrow critical-mineral footprint compared to chemicals peers. Its primary inputs are fluoropolymer feedstocks (fluorspar/HF chain, not on the EU CRM scored list) and petrochemical intermediates. No scored material other than antimony is a primary bill-of-materials input for the remaining segments. The generic sector list (phosphate, potash, nickel, cobalt, manganese, lithium, silicon, vanadium) was removed — these are not material inputs for water treatment membranes, medical packaging, or high-performance polymer parts.
Ranked by buyer-relative risk, highest first.
| Material | Controlled by | You | Global | Band | Art. 5 | Input share | Substitute | Laws | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antimony | 🇨🇳 CN 78% refining | 68 | 60 | Elevated | — | Low | limited | 9 | ▲ rising |
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
| Material | Geopolitical | Concentration | Price / market | Substitutability | Import reliance | Logistics · ESG · Supplier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Antimony | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | company input |
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
No filings or amendments in this window — the register has been quiet on this company's materials.
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
| Type | Scenario | Today | Stressed | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Policy | Antimony — 🇨🇳 CN escalates antimony controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime | 68 | 75 | +7 |
| Concentration | Antimony — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for antimony — the second source is lost (full 78%+ monopoly) | 68 | 83 | +15 |
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the public-source evidence; the mitigations below are precautionary.
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the materials this company buys. The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
The mitigating efforts Art. 24(4) names — diversifying the supply chain and substituting the material — plus the standard levers against a concentrated, policy-exposed input. Prioritise around the binding input chokepoint (Antimony).
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
| CRMA provision | Obligation | Where addressed |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 24(1) | Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology). | Scope & applicability |
| Art. 24(2)(a) | Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled. | Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis |
| Art. 24(2)(b) | Analyse the factors that might affect supply. | Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it |
| Art. 24(2)(c) | Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions. | Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion |
| Art. 24(3) | Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources. | This report's basis — see Methodology & sources |
| Art. 24(4) | Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting. | Significant-vulnerability conclusion + Priority mitigations |
| Art. 24(5)–(6) | Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board. | This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable |
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
| Threshold test | This assessment |
|---|---|
| Average employees (last FY) > 500 | company input |
| Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M | company input |
| Uses a strategic raw material as an input | Yes — 1 scored SRM on the input side (binding: Antimony) |
| Manufactures a listed strategic technology | chemicals (confirm against Annex) |
| Formally identified by a Member State authority | company input |
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-06-29; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
MACROLENS · CICONIALABS · GEOPOLITICAL SUPPLY-RISK REPORT (EU CRMA ART. 20–25) · report generated 2026-10-07
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.