Loading…
Loading…
USGS publishes no stock statistic for antimony in the current dataset. No exchange warrant register. US National Defense Stockpile holdings are reported by DLA Strategic Materials, whose site 403s this host, so no free machine-readable figure is available.
Antimony — businessanalytiq.com monthly provider index, a labelled proxy (not an exchange settlement). Each point is a month this platform actually recorded a reading; a gap in the line is a gap in what was fetched, never interpolated.
Free Western-CIF customs benchmark
EU import values are CIF by statistical definition, so the customs unit value (value ÷ quantity) is an official, transaction-derived Western landed price — Adamas “stream 3”, the one paid price-reporting agencies sell, here from free Eurostat records. Basket unit values (grades/subcodes mixed under one HS heading), not single-grade spot assessments.
Latest €16.59/kg (2026-07, official CIF · 16-month series)
Sb₂O₃ landed from China — the flame-retardant form German plastics/compound makers consume — as an official customs CIF €/kg. Basket unit value across antimony-oxide grades, not a single spot assessment; Sb₂O₃ is ~83% antimony by weight, so it prices below antimony metal. High, steady import volumes make this the most reliable antimony leg.
Latest €35.16/kg (2026-06, official CIF · 6-month series)
Unwrought antimony metal landed from China as an official customs CIF €/kg. Volatile month-to-month — thin, lumpy lots plus grade mix, and the post-ban spot swings (China cut antimony to the US in Dec 2024) show through. Basket unit value, not a single-grade spot; read alongside the steadier oxide leg.
Source: Eurostat COMEXT DS-045409 (EU trade by CN8, free public API), refreshed 2026-09-17. ~6–10 week publication lag; latest month often provisional; months under a 5 t volume floor are dropped rather than shown as fake prices. Descriptive customs values — never merged into any exposure score.
Annual market size ~~$4-6bn.
The chokepoint sits downstream: 36% mining share (CN) concentrates to 78% at refining, with China's share rising from 36% to 78%. Refining is a single point of failure: 🇨🇳 CN controls 78%.
The canonical "weaponised critical mineral" of the 2024 trade war: China MOFCOM Announcement 46 (December 3, 2024) imposed an outright export ban on antimony…
Import-dependency chokepoints: 🇺🇸 US 100%, 🇪🇺 EU 100%, 🇯🇵 JP 100%, 🇰🇷 KR 100%, 🇮🇳 IN 95%.
Flame-retardant synergism is the central demand fact: Sb₂O₃ amplifies brominated/chlorinated flame retardants 2-3× via the gas-phase HBr/HCl radical-scavenging mechanism.
Per-country net position. Emerald = supply > consumption (net exporter); red = consumption > supply (net importer). 10 countries appear on only one side of the two source tables and are left grey — a missing row means not itemised, which is not the same as zero, so no gap is computed for them.
China is counted in this figure. Its annual declaration is UN Comtrade with China as reporter (primary, and the basis of the percentage above, which uses an annual denominator). The monthly bilateral series is a third-party republisher of GACC, not primary — top-partner agreement against China’s own declaration is 24/33 on imports and 15/33 on exports. UN Comtrade’s own China monthly series (not the republisher above) has been frozen at period 202412 since its release; a watcher flags the day it moves.
Customs cannot isolate this material. Its HS codes (261710, 282580, 811010) are shared with bismuth, so every flow figure here covers both materials together. No customs source anywhere splits them.
Denominator: UN Comtrade annual 2024, imports from World, 52 reporters (Taiwan absent from UN data entirely). Read the percentage above as “the importers on this panel are on file”, never as “we see the trade” — Taiwan is absent from UN data entirely, so it is never in this denominator and the true gap is larger than shown.
How much of China’s exports we see monthly: ≈31% of China’s non-EU exports — importer declarations from KR, IT, TH, MX, IN, BR in the monthly feed (202608), annualised against BACI 2024. EU destinations (BE, DE, IT) are seen separately through Eurostat Comext in EUR and are kept out of this ratio rather than converted. Not in our reporter set: Taiwan (7% of China's 2024 exports), Russia (3% of China's 2024 exports), Vietnam (2% of China's 2024 exports), Pakistan (2% of China's 2024 exports), Hong Kong (1% of China's 2024 exports), Philippines (0% of China's 2024 exports) — national customs portals, not Chinese hosts; each is a route that can be wired.
Source: CEPII BACI HS22 2024 (reconciled from UN Comtrade annual; CIF/FOB harmonised). Annual and one to two years behind — structure, not a current figure; never summed with the monthly rows above. Includes Taiwan (BACI 490), which no monthly artifact here carries.
Largest single dependence: TJ supplies 33% of EU imports, of which €9.4m lands in France.
Source: Eurostat Comext monthly bulk, CN8 × partner × declarant (6 CN8 codes: 26171000, 261710XX, 28258000, 282580XX, 81101000, 811010XX). Values in EUR, declarant-side — a different basis from the USD/HS6 figures elsewhere on this page. Not summable with them.
Reserves cover at least ~22 years of current mine output — the resource itself is the constraint, not only who controls it. Reserves 2025 ÷ mine production 2025, both USGS. A reserve is what is economic to extract at today’s price and technology, so this is a stress indicator, not a countdown to exhaustion. USGS publishes this world total as a lower bound, so the figure is a floor.
Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (public domain). Production and reserves are world shares of the USGS-published world total. Stocks, price and net import reliance are United States salient series — never world figures. Reserves are a single-year snapshot; USGS does not restate history, so a reserves trend needs each year’s file archived separately.
Economy at stake: a cut-off by CN would take $129M off US GDP (USGS puts that scenario at 100% probability; weighted, $131M). Antimony, USGS Open-File Report 2025-1047 input-output model over 402 US industries, 2023 dollars. US economy only and a model estimate, not an observation. Source.
| Stage | Companies | Most exposed |
|---|---|---|
| Mining, refining, trading | 31 | Vital Pure Metal Solutions GmbH, Treibacher Industrie AG, Korea Zinc Co., Ltd. |
| Functional goods (magnets, chemicals, cells, components) | 27 | Brolis Semiconductors, IQE plc, Colorobbia España, S.A. |
| Industries that depend on them | 52 | Northrop Grumman Corporation, Photonis Technologies SAS, 4iG Nyrt. |
Counted from our company dossiers and recomputed on every load. Stage is inferred from each company’s role and sector, and this counts companies, not output.
$1.4bn of output at risk worldwide, 2.48× the $558M first-round loss. US $297M, EU $142M. Other suppliers: TH $793M · TJ $762M.
| Where it bites hardest | At risk | of its output | Named here |
|---|---|---|---|
| TW · Chemicals | $30M | 0.04% | none in our corpus yet |
| JP · Non-ferrous metals | $17M | 0.02% | DOWA Holdings Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Materials Corporation |
| IN · Rubber & plastics | $13M | 0.02% | none in our corpus yet |
| IN · Chemicals | $26M | 0.01% | none in our corpus yet |
| KR · Chemicals | $27M | 0.01% | none in our corpus yet |
| JP · Chemicals | $17M | 0.01% | Mitsubishi Gas Chemical Company, Inc. (Mitsubishi-lineage, independently listed — battery electrolyte solvents, specialty chemicals), AGC Inc. (formerly Asahi Glass Co. — Mitsubishi keiretsu lineage; semiconductor/display glass, fluorochemicals) |
| US · Rubber & plastics | $25M | 0.01% | none in our corpus yet |
| IN · Textiles & apparel | $17M | 0.01% | none in our corpus yet |
Output at risk if CN’s $558M of exports stop, propagated through every country and industry: OECD ICIO 2025 edition (released Aug 2025, revised Jan 2026), 2022 structure, BACI 2024 flows, supply-side (Ghosh) input-output model. No substitution and no inventories, so this is an upper-bound exposure, not a forecast loss; USGS’s price-based estimate above answers a different question. Amplification by year: 2016 2.48× · 2017 2.48× · 2018 2.49× · 2019 2.48× · 2020 2.45× · 2021 2.51× · 2022 2.48×. Named companies: dossiers headquartered there, in a matching sector, already exposed to this material.
Eurostat Comext imports (tonnes) and EU27 industrial production, 12 months before the disruption against the months since, refreshed monthly. Descriptive, not causal: prices, seasons and other shocks move the same series, and only a control supplier the cause does not touch isolates it.
PRODCOM records no EU27 production of antimony on any ore, refined or metal code. Absence here can also mean the figure is withheld: a single-producer code is routinely suppressed for confidentiality, so this is “not disclosed as produced”, not proof that nothing is made.
Source: Eurostat PRODCOM DS-059358, sold production by member state, EUR. Production, not trade — a different basis from the import figures above and never summed with them. Producers exclude states that only trade the code, and exclude non-EU27 reporters (PRODCOM also carries Iceland, Norway and candidate countries).
Source: China Data Portal (chinadata.live), an independent third-party republisher of GACC customs data — not primary GACC, methodology not disclosed by the operator. Cross-validated once against our own BACI 2024 extraction; treat as directionally reliable, not audited. Never summed with the flows or totals below.
Policy pressure on Antimony (ingot) is accelerating — 9 restrictive actions on record, peak severity 4, 4 in the last 12 months (vs 3 the year before). Most-active issuer: 🇨🇳 CN (6).
Signals are read directly from the policy register's recorded cadence, pending effective dates, and responds_to cycles for Antimony (ingot). They describe the trajectory already on the record — not a forecast.
Tickers and corporate names parsed from the company_refs field of every action whose target_materials includes antimony — the specific operators a policymaker identified by name. Click a company to see the filings.
Worked causal-chain narratives whose recorded actions overlap this material's policy register — the evidence behind the exposure thesis.