2 critical materials scored · binding chokepoint: Tungsten (🇨🇳 CN 90% of refining) · 18 restrictive government measures on record
Subject
medartis · 🇨🇭 CH
Sector
medical-devices
Materials scored
2
As of
2026-08-06
Risk Office verdict
Critical · 85/100Company supply-risk index
The binding exposure is Tungsten — 🇨🇳 CN controls 90% of global refining. On this company's production footprint that scores 88/100 (adversarial chokepoint; global 76). The register holds 18 restrictive government measures touching this company's materials — each traced to its primary source below.
Peer rank · TungstenMedartis AG is the 33rd-most-exposed of the 451 named companies we track on 🇨🇳 CN's Tungsten chokepoint; the most-exposed is Elbit Systems (88/100). Ranked on the same footprint-adjusted buyer score as above — a relative read of an existing metric, not a new one.
Competitor cohort · medical devices
Medartis AG ranks 6th of 49 verified medical devices companies, tied with 2 others at 85.
88🇯🇵 Shimadzu CorporationTungsten
87🇩🇪 Karl Storz SE & Co. KGTungsten
86🇩🇪 Ottobock SE & Co. KGaADysprosium
85🇮🇹 Esaote S.p.A.Dysprosium
85🇸🇮 Fotona d.d.Tungsten
85🇨🇭 Medartis AGTungsten
84🇫🇷 GuerbetNeodymium
84🇺🇸 Hologic, Inc.Tungsten
83🇩🇪 Drägerwerk AG & Co. KGaADysprosium
82🇺🇸 ResMed Inc.Tungsten
81🇫🇷 Amplitude Surgical SATungsten
81🇩🇪 B. Braun Melsungen AGTungsten
81🇺🇸 Baxter International Inc.Tungsten
81🇦🇺 Cochlear LimitedNeodymium
81🇺🇸 DexCom, Inc.Tungsten
Same sector_primary, ranked on the company supply-risk index. Restricted to hand-verified dossiers — 1 further medical devices company is tracked but auto-onboarded, and excluded here because their exposure list is a sector template rather than company research. A peer scoring lower is the useful read: it usually means a different production geography or a qualified second source.
Company supply-risk index 85/100 — the binding chokepoint dominates, with a modest add for exposure breadth across 2 scored materials. Buyer-relative (first-order): weighted by where the company produces (CH 70% · US 15% · FR 10% · BR 5%, estimated split — no cited source states these exact shares), applied across all materials — it does not yet trace each input to its specific sourcing step.
Medartis AG
What they do
Medartis AG (operating subsidiary of Medartis Holding AG, SIX: MED) is a Basel-based medical device company focused exclusively on osteosynthesis — surgical fixation of bone fractures and deformities. Their product portfolio covers titanium plates, screws, nails, and instruments for upper and lower extremity trauma, foot-and-ankle surgery (via US subsidiary Nextremity), and craniomaxillofacial (CMF) surgery. All standard implants are CNC-machined from titanium rod stock or billet at the Basel plant; their 2025 acquisition of Belgium-based CADskills added titanium additive manufacturing (3D printing) capability for patient-specific implants. Medartis reported CHF ~320 M in FY2025 sales, with 15.7% organic growth driven by extremity and international expansion.
Critical-material exposure
Vanadium(corrects a prior "niobium" claim, 2026-09-13) — Re-verification found no
source supporting niobium-bearing Ti-6Al-7Nb alloy at Medartis or its CADskills subsidiary. Medartis's own MRI-compatibility documentation names cp-Ti/Ti6Al4V for its implants, and CADskills' published material spec for its additively-manufactured implants is Titanium Grade 23 ELI — both are the standard 6% Al / 4% vanadium alloy, not the niobium-bearing variant. The niobium and tantalum entries previously listed here are dropped as unsupported; vanadium is the alloying element actually documented. No company-specific vanadium sourcing disclosure was found — this is an industry-standard inference from the alloy composition, not a company-issued materials statement.
Tungsten — CNC machining of titanium alloys at production scale requires tungsten-carbide
cutting tools exclusively (no economically viable substitute for titanium turning/milling at this tolerance). Medartis's Basel plant processes several thousand implants daily; tool consumption makes tungsten a recurring upstream dependency. ~85% of refined tungsten is produced in China (USGS 2024).
You = buyer-relative score (this company's disclosed footprint vs. the controller). Global = buyer-agnostic supply risk. Substitute = ease of swapping the material out (none = locked in). Input share = the material's disclosed magnitude in the company's input basket (HIGH/MED/LOW only where a public filing quantifies it; — = unrated). Descriptive effect-size, never scored.
Art. 5 = does the global top single-country share breach the EU's own CRMA Art. 5 diversification ceiling (no more than 65% of a strategic raw material from a single third country)? A conservative global-production PROXY for the EU-import denominator — descriptive only, sits beside the score, never merged into it (— = non-strategic material). Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 Art. 5 ↗
Supply-risk factor analysis
Per-material factor scoring on a 1–5 likelihood×impact scale, mapped to the Art. 24(2)(b) risk-factor framework. The headline score above is a portfolio RAG; this matrix is the assessment — it is where two companies with the same binding chokepoint diverge.
1 = very low … 5 = very high — a standard supply-risk likelihood×impact scale (the form a competent authority expects for the Art. 24(2)(b) factor analysis, not a CRMA-numbered scale). Public-source factors are pre-filled from the engine's primary sources (USGS concentration, IPTM government actions, EU import data); the three rightmost factor categories need company / Tier-1 supplier data and are flagged as input under Art. 24(3). Hover any cell for its evidence.
Material factors (scored 4–5) — evidence
Tungsten
4Geopolitical: 16 restrictive actions, peak severity 5, 10 in last 24mo, less 2 liberalising actions
4Concentration: refining HHI 8126 (extreme); top CN 90%
5Price / market: price up, as of 2026-09-01
Vanadium
4Geopolitical: 3 restrictive actions, peak severity 4, 3 in last 24mo
4Concentration: refining HHI 6497 (extreme); top CN 79%
5Price / market: price up, as of 2026-08-21
4Substitutability: Graedel et al. 2013 PNAS Fig. 5: 63/100 (long-horizon, all major uses). Prior analyst short-run rating 0.60: niobium substitutes in some HSLA steel; VRFB has no substitute
Named refiners in the supply base
For the conflict-minerals metals among this company's exposures, the named chokepoint refiners that US-listed manufacturers disclose dependence on in their SEC Form SD / Conflict Minerals Reports. This is the peer-disclosed supply base for the material — drawn from 29 US filers' reports — not necessarily this company's own sourcing (which requires its Tier-1 supplier data under Art. 24(3)). It names the specific facilities behind the concentration number.
The named refinersShowHide
Tungsten
China = 54% of filer-disclosed refiner mentions · 291 named refiners
Two independent lenses: USGS official puts China at 90% of global refining output (by tonnage); US filers' own disclosures independently name China for 54% of their refiners (by facility count). Different metrics — both rank China first.
Source: US SEC Form SD / Conflict Minerals Report exhibits (EDGAR full-text search), aggregated from RMI smelter tables. “US filers naming it” = distinct US-listed companies whose most-recent CMR names that refiner — disclosure-derived presence, not verified throughput. Link opens the SEC exhibit.
Change log
last 30 days
Every new filing and every amendment (rate change, scope change, repeal) touching this company's materials in the window above. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date.
No filings or amendments in this window — the register has been quiet on this company's materials.
The laws that threaten it
Restrictive government measures on this company's materials, newest first — each links to its primary government source.
2023-12-14· export-control· severity 3· copper, nickel, aluminium, lead
+ 3 more in the register.
Art. 24(2)(c) · vulnerability to disruption
Stress test — two plausible scenarios
The Art. 24(2)(c) vulnerability assessment, made explicit. For each leading exposure we model the move in this company's buyer-relative score under two distinct supply-disruption scenarios — the production footprint held fixed, only one lever moved at a time so each delta isolates one shock:
Both stress-test scenariosShowHide
Policy shock — the controlling country escalates to a full export-licensing / ban regime.
Concentration shock — the supply structure collapses to a single source (second-source loss / full monopoly).
Type
Scenario
Today
Stressed
Δ
Policy
Tungsten — 🇨🇳 CN escalates tungsten controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime
88
91
+3
Concentration
Tungsten — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for tungsten — the second source is lost (full 90%+ monopoly)
88
92
+4
Policy
Vanadium — 🇨🇳 CN escalates vanadium controls to a full export-licensing / ban regime
74
84
+10
Concentration
Vanadium — 🇨🇳 CN becomes the single source for vanadium — the second source is lost (full 79%+ monopoly)
74
88
+14
A zero delta means that lever is already modelled at maximum on that material — today's score already prices it in. This is why the two scenarios are shown together: where a material's policy lever is already maxed (zero policy delta), the concentration shock still carries a real delta, and vice-versa. Each stressed score isolates its one lever; all other factors are held at current values.
Art. 24(4) · mitigation trigger
Significant-vulnerability conclusion
No material crosses the significant-vulnerability threshold. The Art. 24(4) mitigation duty is not triggered on the public-source evidence; the mitigations below are precautionary.
Stated threshold (so the conclusion is reproducible and auditable): buyer-relative band ≥ High AND substitutability hard/none AND ≥ 1 in-force restrictive measure on the material, assessed over the materials this company buys. The CRMA does not fix a numeric definition of “significant”; the company may adopt a stricter or looser threshold and should record it here.
Proposed — not yet law
Upcoming regulatory threats
Proposed, announced or draft regulation that is not yet in force but would touch this company's at-risk materials if it passes. Forward-looking early-warning — the likelihood shown is an honest band derived from the legislative stage, not a forecast or a fabricated probability. Kept separate from the enacted register above: nothing here is law yet.
The upcoming threatsShowHide
🇨🇩 DRC Strategic Mineral Reclassification Decree — 6 new minerals (lithium, tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REEs) elevated to strategic tier, royalty 3.5%→10%
passed-vote→high likelihood·flagged 114d ago · not yet law·matches Tungsten
If passed — Royalty near-triples on Manono lithium project (Zijin Mining/La Cominière, DRC's first industrial lithium mine commissioning June 2026) and all DRC tantalum, niobium, tungsten, uranium, REE operators; reprices extraction economics across the entire DRC critical-mineral portfolio
Caveat — Council of Ministers adoption confirmed late May 2026 (Bloomberg May 31 2026: "Congo Triples Royalty Rate on Lithium With New Strategic Minerals Decree"; Zoom Eco June 1: "6 nouveaux minerais rejoignent la liste des substances stratégiques"; Jeune Afrique confirmed). Modifies décret n°18/042 of 24 November 2018. DRC gov websites unreachable as of 2026-06-14: mines. gouv. cd times out, gouvernement. cd times out, jocc. cd ENOTFOUND, primature. gouv. cd only shows 2020 content — formal text not yet accessible online. Moved from filing. md 2026-06-14. Secondary: https://africa. com/drc-moves-to-tax-lithium-as-a-strategic-mineral/
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (high likelihood)
Tungsten🇨🇳 today 88→91+3
🇺🇬 Uganda Mining and Minerals (Amendment) Bill 2026
in-consultation→moderate likelihood·flagged 115d ago · not yet law·matches Tungsten
If passed — Mandates 15% free-carried interest for Uganda National Mining Company (UNMC) in all new mining licences; introduces mandatory mineral buying centres; tightens local-content and value-addition obligations — changes joint-venture economics for all new Ugandan mining operations, raising effective cost-of-entry for foreign miners
Caveat — Amends the already-filed Uganda Mining and Minerals Act 2022 (UG action 1); expected to be enacted before end of 2025/26 parliamentary session per legal commentary; Bank of Uganda gold purchase programme and new mineral buying centres already being piloted — regulatory infrastructure being built ahead of formal enactment. Distinct from filed Uganda Gold Export Regulations 2024 (SI No. 30 of 2024).
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (moderate likelihood)
Tungsten🇨🇳 today 88→91+3
🇪🇺 EU CRMA Art. 22 Commission Implementing Decision — Strategic Raw Material Stock Benchmarks
awaiting-signature→high likelihood·flagged 113d ago · not yet law·matches Tungsten
If passed — Establishes the first legally binding "safe level" benchmark for EU strategic stocks of each of the 17 strategic raw materials listed in the CRMA Annex I; benchmarks used as reference by Member States, financial institutions, and industrial consumers to assess strategic supply risk; mandated every 2 years, so this is the first edition setting the baseline; informs CRMA Art. 23 monitoring obligations and is the evidential basis for Art. 24 corporate-reporting thresholds
Caveat — The May 24, 2026 deadline set by Parliament and Council in Reg. (EU) 2024/1252 has now passed. No OJ publication confirmed as of June 15, 2026 — Commission may have adopted quietly or is overdue. This is the first CRMA Art. 22 benchmark cycle and is legally distinct from: (1) the CRMA base regulation (filed 2024-05-23); (2) the Strategic Projects first designation (filed 2025-03-25); (3) the RESourceEU Amendment — CRMA revision (filed 2026-03-04). If confirmed adopted, severity=2 (establishes the measurement baseline for EU strategic material supply risk assessment and directly feeds corporate Art. 24 reporting obligations). Distinct from all filed EU-CRMA actions. Not in filing. md or upcoming. md.
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (high likelihood)
Tungsten🇨🇳 today 88→91+3
🇲🇳 Mongolia Minerals Law Comprehensive Amendment 2026 — ~40% of 2006 law revised; exploration-licence term cut, statutory critical-minerals definition, downstream-beneficiation licensing
draft-published→moderate likelihood·flagged 101d ago · not yet law·matches Tungsten
If passed — Mongolia's cabinet approved and submitted to the State Great Khural a draft amending ~40% of the 2006 Minerals Law: (i) cuts the maximum exploration-licence duration from 12 to 6 years while raising holding fees (to curb speculative licence-trading/flipping); (ii) introduces a STATUTORY definition of "critical minerals" (aligned to Mongolia's 11-mineral list: molybdenum, manganese, nickel, copper, fluorspar, graphite, REEs, cobalt, lithium, PGMs, tungsten) and a SEPARATE licensing regime for downstream beneficiation plants; (iii) mandates mine-closure plans + financial bonding once a mine reaches 75% of its life; aims to accelerate licence issuance and expand the resource base. Mongolia is a structural China/Russia-flanked chokepoint pursuing Western REE/copper partnerships (US FORGE, JP, KR), so a domestic critical-minerals statutory regime + downstream-processing licensing reprices the entry terms for any foreign developer of Mongolian copper/REE/fluorspar (Oyu Tolgoi-adjacent, Erdenes critical-minerals SOE pipeline).
Caveat — As of 2026-06-27 the bill is cabinet-approved and submitted to Parliament — NOT yet passed, hence axis-2/upcoming. Likelihood moderate: ruling-party majority favours passage but Mongolian minerals-law amendments are politically contested and frequently amended in committee. Distinct from filed 2024-04-19-mongolia-sovereign-wealth-fund-law (SWF + 34% strategic-deposit state-stake amendments), filed 2025-01-15-mongolia-critical-minerals-support-law (the separate critical-minerals PROJECT-support draft law), and filed 2025-09-05-mongolia-mpe-royalty-calculation-shift (royalty base shift to the Mining Product Exchange). Severity 3 expected if enacted.
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (moderate likelihood)
Tungsten🇨🇳 today 88→91+3
🇪🇺 EU European Critical Raw Materials (CRM) Centre — establishing instrument
consultation-closed (pre-proposal; CFE + OPC both closed 2026-07-29)→elevated likelihood·flagged 68d ago · not yet law·matches Tungsten
If passed — RESourceEU (COM(2025) 945, 3 Dec 2025) commits the Commission to establish a **European Critical Raw Materials Centre** in early 2026 with four functions: (a) generate **systemic market intelligence on CRM value chains**; (b) steer and de-risk finance into strategic projects with public and private partners; (c) support **strategic stockpiling**; and (d) run **joint purchasing** by pooling company orders and matchmaking demand with supply (a "raw materials platform" pooling orders and creating joint stocks, with an EU-coordinated stockpiling pilot to become operational in the following year). A **call for evidence + public consultation opened 19 May 2026**, and the Commission announced a **legislative proposal for Q2 2026**. Supply-relief on the material axis (EU-side aggregation, stockpiles and de-risking finance directly loosen chokepoint exposure for EU industrial buyers), but it also creates a new EU purchasing/allocation gatekeeper whose membership and priority rules will be contested. If it carries reporting or data-submission duties on participating companies, it becomes a second corporate-facing CRM information obligation alongside CRMA Art. 24.
Caveat — europa. eu/info/law/better-regulation/brpapi/groupInitiatives/14832) serves the registry entry directly. Verified: initiative **id 14832**, ref **Ares(2025)6918424**, planning ref **PLAN/2025/1815**, lead **DG GROW**, **isMajor: true**, foreseen act **PROP_REG**; the Commission's own dossier summary names the four pillars as **joint purchasing, stockpiling, investments, and raw materials intelligence**. (1) The **19 May 2026 launch IS confirmed** — both consultation publications carry publishedDate 2026/05/19; the call for evidence (CFE_IMPACT_ASSESS, titled "Legislative proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the EU Critical Raw Materials Centre") and the open public consultation (OPC_LAUNCHED) each ran a 10-week window that **CLOSED 2026-07-29 23:59:59**, drawing **138** and **72** submissions respectively. (2) The **Q2-2026 slip is confirmed, not a fetch artefact** — the PROP_REG publication still carries plannedPeriod "Q-2026-2" (2026-04-01 → 2026-06-30) with initiativeStatus **UPCOMING**, and a EUR-Lex check on 2026-07-31 finds no COM(2026) text establishing the Centre: ~31 days overdue by the Commission's own planning record, neither folded into another instrument nor silently adopted. **Legal form now known: a Regulation of the EP and Council** → full ordinary legislative procedure after the proposal lands, so an operational Centre is a 2027+ event. Cheapest future check: re-poll the same API endpoint and watch for the PROP_REG publication flipping to published. Distinct from filed 2025-12-03-eu-resourceeu-action-plan-com-2025-945 (the umbrella action plan announcing the intent — this item tracks the specific instrument establishing the Centre), from the CRMA base regulation (filed 2024-05-23), from the CRMA Art. 22 strategic-stock benchmarks item (line 103 above — that is a benchmark-setting implementing measure, this is an institution-creating instrument), and from the permanent-magnet scrap export restriction (line 141 above). ALSO a competitive-positioning item, not only a register item: a publicly-funded EU body with a statutory CRM market-intelligence remit is the most credible free substitute for our minerals intelligence layer — see the 2026-07-30 entry in docs/strategy/mandate_triggers_watch. md ("Demand-narrative signals").
If passed & escalated to a full control regime — modelled impact (elevated likelihood)
Tungsten🇨🇳 today 88→91+3
Likelihood band is derived deterministically from the legislative stage (announced → low; draft-published / in-consultation → moderate; passed-committee → elevated; passed-vote / awaiting-signature → high) — a reproducible, source-traceable proxy, not a probability estimate. Where shown, the modelled impact-if-passed re-uses the same buyer-relative stress engine as the enacted scenarios above: it holds this company's production footprint fixed and escalates the proposed measure to a full export-licensing / control regime — the conservative upper bound for a measure that may pass only as a partial cap. The delta is the move from today's score to that stressed score; companies with no modelled production footprint show no delta.
What to watch next
Forward-looking read on the binding chokepoint, from the recent trajectory of policy on these materials. Directional, not a forecast.
The watch listShowHide
Tungsten is the line to war-game: 🇨🇳 CN already controls 90% of refining, and the policy lever is active. A single new licensing or export-control action on this material moves the binding score materially.
Vanadium carries 3 restrictive measures on record (🇨🇳 CN 79% of refining) — a secondary escalation candidate.
Art. 24(4) · diversification & substitution
Priority mitigations
The mitigating efforts Art. 24(4) names — diversifying the supply chain and substituting the material — plus the standard levers against a concentrated, policy-exposed input. Prioritise around the binding input chokepoint (Tungsten).
The mitigation optionsShowHide
Map your real exposure to Tungsten. Trace it from the component back to the smelter/refiner and country of origin — most buyers discover the dependence is one tier deeper than their direct supplier.
Qualify a non-CN source. Identify and validate at least one supplier outside CN for the binding input before it is needed, even at a cost premium — optionality is the hedge.
Lead-time to re-source is ~9 months (6-12mo). The largest tracked non-CN producer of Tungsten is 🇦🇹 AT (~4% of refining); scaling it into a replacement is roughly a 6-12mo ramp. A share-of-stage substitution heuristic derived from current production share, not a firm supplier quote.
Design for substitution where feasible. Tungsten has at least partial substitutes; specify them into next-generation products to cut the dependence structurally.
Hold strategic inventory / contract forward. For materials with no substitute and active export controls, a buffer stock or long-dated offtake converts a shock into a managed cost.
Run a live policy tripwire. Monitor MOFCOM, EU CRMA and the exporting jurisdictions for new measures on your materials, with a pre-agreed escalation if a licensing regime tightens — this register is that monitor.
Annex A · regulatory basis
CRMA Art. 24 compliance crosswalk
Under the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (Reg. (EU) 2024/1252), a Member State identifies the large companies (Art. 2(29): >500 employees and >€150M net worldwide turnover) using strategic raw materials to manufacture a listed strategic technology (batteries, renewables, hydrogen, traction motors, heat pumps, aircraft, data-storage equipment, robotics, drones, satellites, advanced chips). Those companies must, at least every three years and to the extent the information is available to them (Art. 24(2)), assess their strategic-raw-material supply chain. Where suppliers do not provide the data on request, the assessment may rely on the Commission's monitoring dashboard (Art. 20(4)) or other publicly available information (Art. 24(3)) — which is the evidence base this report assembles. Board reporting (Art. 24(5)) is voluntary unless the Member State mandates it (Art. 24(6)).
The full crosswalkShowHide
CRMA provision
Obligation
Where addressed
Art. 24(1)
Member State identifies the company as in-scope (uses an SRM to make a listed strategic technology).
Scope & applicability
Art. 24(2)(a)
Map where the strategic raw materials are extracted, processed and recycled.
Exposure register + Supply-risk factor analysis
Art. 24(2)(b)
Analyse the factors that might affect supply.
Supply-risk factor analysis (factor matrix) + The laws that threaten it
Art. 24(2)(c)
Assess vulnerabilities to supply disruptions.
Stress test + significant-vulnerability conclusion
Art. 24(3)
Where supplier data is unavailable, rely on Commission (Art. 20(4)) / public sources.
This report's basis — see Methodology & sources
Art. 24(4)
Where significant vulnerabilities are found, assess diversifying or substituting.
Report results, sources, significant risks and mitigations to the board.
This document — board-ready, PDF-exportable
This report pre-fills the Art. 24(3) public-source half of the assessment. The company-specific inputs — employee/turnover thresholds, bill-of-materials volumes, the tiered supplier map, and formal board adoption — remain the company's to complete; they are flagged as “company input” where they appear.
Why this dependence is structural, not transitional. The EU's own external auditor — the European Court of Auditors, Special Report “Critical raw materials for the energy transition — Not a rock-solid policy” (Feb 2026) — judges the bloc's 2030 extraction, processing and recycling targets to be out of reach (recycling runs 1–5% for 7 of 26 materials, and diversification shows no measurable effect). A separate industry-analyst assessment (Adamas Intelligence & Tradium, EU CRMA report, Apr 2024 — an interested-party commercial view, not an independent verdict) reaches a compatible conclusion that the 2030 rare-earth targets will be missed without an expedited push. The chokepoint this report maps is therefore a durable constraint the Act has not yet closed, not a gap that resolves on its own.
Annex B · Art. 24(1) · Art. 2(29)
Scope & applicability
Article 24 applies only when both size thresholds are met and a Member State has identified the company as making a listed strategic technology with strategic raw materials.
Scope detailsShowHide
Threshold test
This assessment
Average employees (last FY) > 500
company input
Net worldwide turnover (last FY) > €150M
company input
Uses a strategic raw material as an input
Yes — 2 scored SRMs on the input side (binding: Tungsten)
Manufactures a listed strategic technology
medical-devices (confirm against Annex)
Formally identified by a Member State authority
company input
Evidence & sources
Production-concentration figures: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 + the production dataset behind each material page. Policy measures trace to the primary government sources below.
Each material's global supply-risk index blends five weighted factors: concentration of refining/processing (35%), active trade-control & policy pressure (25%), import reliance (15%), substitutability (15%), and price stress (10%). The buyer-relative score then scales the relational factors (concentration / policy / import) by this company's production-footprint alignment against each material's controlling country — bloc-neutral factors (substitutability, price) are left intact.
Caveats. The footprint is the company's assembly / manufacturing geography applied uniformly across all materials — a first-order proxy, not per-material input tracing. Scores are an analytical judgement on public data with a transparent weighting, not a market forecast or investment advice. Production shares reflect 2024-2025 figures and the policy position as of 2026-08-06; the register is continuously maintained and should be re-pulled against each new policy action.
Tip: the change log above defaults to the last 30 days. Append ?since=YYYY-MM-DD to this URL for a custom start date (e.g. ?since=2026-04-01).
Refresh SLA
New government measures — polled hourly; a filed action can appear on this report within the hour it's picked up.
Dossier verification (this company's exposure list, sourced against its own disclosures) — the auto-onboarded backlog drains on a 30-minute cycle; a specific company's upgrade timing depends on queue position, not a fixed date.
Live-quoted materials (currently: neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, indium, tellurium — see the price row on each material's page) — refreshed daily.
Other material prices — hand-maintained; flagged STALE on the minerals index past 45 days without a fresh source, rather than left silently out of date.
This is a description of the actual automated pipeline (verifiable against this repo's own cron schedule), not a contractual commitment.