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Exchange-visible warehouse stock only — a floor on world inventory, never a total. State reserves, producer and consumer inventories, and all off-exchange holdings are disclosed by nobody. USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (data release).
Volume data pending.
The chokepoint sits downstream: 28% mining share (AU) concentrates to 61% at refining, with China's share rising from 20% to 61%. CRMA Art.5 production proxy: 🇨🇳 CN at 61% vs the 65% ceiling.
Aluminium is the second-largest non-ferrous metal market by volume after iron ore (~70 Mt primary 2024 vs ~22 Mt copper) and the largest single…
Import-dependency chokepoints: 🇺🇸 US 85%, 🇯🇵 JP 100%, 🇰🇷 KR 100%.
Aluminium is the most universal industrial-input critical mineral in the register — every German auto + machinery + aerospace + electrical-cable + packaging +…
Per-country net position. Emerald = supply > consumption (net exporter); red = consumption > supply (net importer). 11 countries appear on only one side of the two source tables and are left grey — a missing row means not itemised, which is not the same as zero, so no gap is computed for them.
China is counted in this figure. Its annual declaration is UN Comtrade with China as reporter (primary, and the basis of the percentage above, which uses an annual denominator). The monthly bilateral series is a third-party republisher of GACC, not primary — top-partner agreement against China’s own declaration is 24/33 on imports and 15/33 on exports. UN Comtrade’s own China monthly series (not the republisher above) has been frozen at period 202412 since its release; a watcher flags the day it moves.
Customs cannot isolate this material. Its HS codes (260600, 281820, 760110, 760120) are shared with aluminium, so every flow figure here covers both materials together. No customs source anywhere splits them.
Denominator: UN Comtrade annual 2024, imports from World, 52 reporters (Taiwan absent from UN data entirely). Read the percentage above as “the importers on this panel are on file”, never as “we see the trade” — Taiwan is absent from UN data entirely, so it is never in this denominator and the true gap is larger than shown.
How much of China’s exports we see monthly: ≈73% of China’s non-EU exports — importer declarations from JP, IN, MY, US, ID, MX in the monthly feed (202608), annualised against BACI 2024. EU destinations (AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR) are seen separately through Eurostat Comext in EUR and are kept out of this ratio rather than converted. Not in our reporter set: Russia (43% of China's 2024 exports), Taiwan (2% of China's 2024 exports), Vietnam (1% of China's 2024 exports), Argentina (1% of China's 2024 exports), Nigeria (1% of China's 2024 exports), United Arab Emirates (1% of China's 2024 exports) — national customs portals, not Chinese hosts; each is a route that can be wired.
Source: CEPII BACI HS22 2024 (reconciled from UN Comtrade annual; CIF/FOB harmonised). Annual and one to two years behind — structure, not a current figure; never summed with the monthly rows above. Includes Taiwan (BACI 490), which no monthly artifact here carries.
Largest single dependence: Norway supplies 18% of EU imports, of which €287.3m lands in Netherlands.
Source: Eurostat Comext monthly bulk, CN8 × partner × declarant (10 CN8 codes: 26060000, 28182000, 281820XX, 76011010, 76011090, 760110XX …). Values in EUR, declarant-side — a different basis from the USD/HS6 figures elsewhere on this page. Not summable with them.
Reserves cover ~66 years of current mine output. Reserves 2025 ÷ mine production 2025, both USGS. A reserve is what is economic to extract at today’s price and technology, so this is a stress indicator, not a countdown to exhaustion.
Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (public domain). Production and reserves are world shares of the USGS-published world total. Stocks, price and net import reliance are United States salient series — never world figures. Reserves are a single-year snapshot; USGS does not restate history, so a reserves trend needs each year’s file archived separately.
Economy at stake: a cut-off by BR would take $6M off US GDP (USGS puts that scenario at 4% probability; weighted, $0M). Alumina, USGS Open-File Report 2025-1047 input-output model over 402 US industries, 2023 dollars. US economy only and a model estimate, not an observation. Source.
$11.2bn of output at risk worldwide, 2.42× the $4.6bn first-round loss. US $1.5bn, EU $1.5bn. Other suppliers: AU $32.2bn · GN $29.5bn · CA $19.1bn.
| Where it bites hardest | At risk | of its output | Named here |
|---|---|---|---|
| IS · Chemicals | $40M | 21.25% | none in our corpus yet |
| IS · Rubber & plastics | $13M | 15.14% | none in our corpus yet |
| IS · Agriculture | $31M | 5.87% | none in our corpus yet |
| NO · Chemicals | $278M | 3.42% | none in our corpus yet |
| NO · Rubber & plastics | $64M | 3.41% | none in our corpus yet |
| IS · Glass, ceramics, cement | $10M | 3.26% | none in our corpus yet |
| IS · Non-ferrous metals | $72M | 2.55% | none in our corpus yet |
| IE · Non-ferrous metals | $17M | 2.23% | none in our corpus yet |
Output at risk if BR’s $4.6bn of exports stop, propagated through every country and industry: OECD ICIO 2025 edition (released Aug 2025, revised Jan 2026), 2022 structure, BACI 2024 flows, supply-side (Ghosh) input-output model. No substitution and no inventories, so this is an upper-bound exposure, not a forecast loss; USGS’s price-based estimate above answers a different question. Amplification by year: 2016 2.43× · 2017 2.41× · 2018 2.42× · 2019 2.37× · 2020 2.37× · 2021 2.4× · 2022 2.42×. Named companies: dossiers headquartered there, in a matching sector, already exposed to this material.
Source: China Data Portal (chinadata.live), an independent third-party republisher of GACC customs data — not primary GACC, methodology not disclosed by the operator. Cross-validated once against our own BACI 2024 extraction; treat as directionally reliable, not audited. Never summed with the flows or totals below.
| Direction | GACC commodity line | Quantity YTD | Value YTD |
|---|---|---|---|
| Import | Aluminium ores and concentrates bauxite basis | 155.25 Mt | $9.96bn |
National totals — there is no partner dimension in these tables. This is what China imported or exported in total on each line, never to or from whom, so these figures cannot be combined with the bilateral flows above.