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One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If China refining (78% of global) halts: 4 substitutes cover 100% of non-CN capacity · fastest ramp 6-12mo (FI) · highest policy-risk: BE (score 0, 0 filings).
Stage: Refining (refined cobalt metal + chemicals) · Year: 2025 · Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (Feb 2026 release; 2025 data).
Post-removal HHI = 2,700 (high). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m cobalt filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
DRC / Chinese-capital interlock: ~74% of mine output (USGS MCS 2026) exits to Chinese refineries. Refining HHI > mining HHI — the binding chokepoint is downstream. **2025 policy escalation:** In February 2025, DRC temporarily banned all cobalt exports to address market oversupply and depressed prices (LME cobalt had fallen from $24/lb 2022 → $12/lb 2024). In October 2025, the temporary ban was replaced with explicit export quotas: **18,125 t of contained cobalt for the remainder of 2025; 96,600 t/yr cap for 2026 and 2027, inclusive of 9,600 t/yr earmarked for national strategic reserves**. The 96,600 t/yr cap is materially below 2024-2025 DRC mine output (226,000-230,000 t), meaning the quota is binding — Western buyers face a structurally tighter market 2026-2027, with Indonesia (44,000 t/yr Morowali HPAL ramp) as the only material non-DRC swing supplier. The DRC quota is the largest single-policy-event cobalt supply constraint since the 2008-2009 financial-crisis demand collapse. In 2025 the US published a National Defense Stockpile solicitation to procure 7,480 t cobalt over 5 years; the solicitation was cancelled before year-end. Indonesia mine output share rose 0.10 → 0.14 as Morowali HPAL projects (Huayou + Brunp + Tsingshan / GEM) continued ramping; cobalt is sulphate-route HPAL by-product of Indonesian Ni-laterite processing, so the structural shift moves cobalt feedstock further inside the Chinese battery-cathode value chain.