Loading…
Loading…
One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If China refining (85% of global) halts: 3 substitutes cover 100% of non-CN capacity · fastest ramp 6-12mo (MY) · highest policy-risk: MY (score 0, 0 filings).
Stage: Separation + magnet manufacturing · Year: 2024 · Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025 (Jan 2026 release; 2024 data).
Post-removal HHI = 4,556 (high). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m neodymium filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Magnet-grade NdFeB processing is China-dominant. China escalated its rare-earth export-licensing regime through 2025: April 2025 added controls on Sm/Gd/Tb/Dy/Lu/Sc/Y; October 2025 expanded to Eu/Ho/Er/Tm/Yb; November 2025 China suspended the October tranche for one year while the April controls remained in force (general licenses issued to selected exporters). Mining diversification has run faster (85%→69%) than refining diversification (92%→85%) over 2014-2025.