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One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
If South Africa mining (54% of global) halts: 4 substitutes cover 100% of non-ZA capacity · fastest ramp 0-6mo (RU) · highest policy-risk: RU (score 0, 0 filings) · 1 of these (RU) sit under comprehensive Western sanctions and aren't a real option for a Western buyer regardless of the risk score.
Stage: Platinum-group-metals mining (combined Pt + Pd) · Year: 2025 · Source: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (Feb 2026 release; 2025 data).
Post-removal HHI = 4,762 (high). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m platinum-palladium filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Russia ~44% of palladium specifically; South Africa ~71% of platinum specifically. PGM autocatalyst demand ties this directly to ICE-vehicle policy. Most stable supply structure in the register — ZA+RU duopoly unchanged from 2014. Chokepoint = Pretoria + Moscow, not Beijing: scored under the all-chokepoints rule (2026-07-13).