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One screen answering: “if the dominant supplier halts, who can fill the gap, how fast, at what regulatory risk?” Replaces manual cross-referencing of the production table with the IPTM register.
Only China produces terbium at the refining stage in our dataset — no substitute capacity to rank.
Stage: Heavy-RE separation (Tb oxide/metal) — near-total China monopoly · Year: 2025 · Source: Heavy-RE split modelled from USGS MCS 2026 rare-earths aggregate + IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 / EU JRC (Dy/Tb: ion-adsorption-clay feedstock in southern China + Myanmar; ~100% Chinese separation).
Post-removal HHI = 10,000 (extreme). Lead-time is a heuristic from share-of-stage (≥10% → 0-6mo brownfield · ≥2% → 6-12mo ramp · >0 → 12-24mo new line · 0 + supplier-directory present → 24-36mo greenfield). Policy-risk = Σ over last-24m terbium filings issued by that country (severity × polarity-sign × 5y-linear recency). This measures a country's own export-restriction behaviour only — it is a separate axis from Western sanctions exposure (flagged below in red where it applies). A country with zero restrictive filings can still be sanctioned by the US/EU/UK and therefore not a real sourcing option.
Terbium is a HEAVY rare earth with a supply structure essentially identical to dysprosium: ion-adsorption-clay feedstock concentrated in southern China + Myanmar, and ~100% Chinese separation (separation HHI ~9,800, extreme). It is even scarcer and costlier than Dy. China named terbium explicitly alongside dysprosium in its April 2025 export-licensing controls, putting all NdFeB magnets containing Tb under non-automatic licensing. Used, like Dy, for high-temperature demagnetisation resistance in magnets; being engineered out of recent turbine/EV platforms, with residual exposure in the installed fleet + service/spares. Mining + separation shares are a modelled estimate (USGS reports rare earths only in aggregate); see HEAVY_RE_ESTIMATE source note.